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Research suggests that unintentional recognition of distracting non-target stimuli can 
bias goal-related, intentional recognition judgements to target stimuli encountered in 
the same environment. Spontaneous recognition (SR) effect can be defined as the 
unintentional recognition of stimuli and is measured by the effect of familiarity to 
distractors on a recognition task. This thesis investigated how previously seen or not-
seen distractors affect recognition of targets when working memory (WM) resources 
are manipulated by a secondary WM load task (chapter 2), using both behavioural 
and ERP measures (Chapter 3). The findings suggest that when working memory 
resources are low, SR is then easier to observe. Additionally, neural and memory 
processes are dissociable for unintentional and intentional recognition and retrieval 
monitoring is found to be enhanced when the new targets were paired with old 
distractors. Furthermore, the findings on the early ERPs may suggest that the 
proactive control might be activated. Finally, a set of experiments revealed that, SR 
effect may not be related to conscious awareness since having a low or high 
confidence did not modulate the SR effect indicating a lack of conscious awareness 
of the SR effect (Chapter 4). Together these findings may help to understand the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1. Main concepts 
1.1. Overview 
The experiments presented in this thesis explored how unintentional recognition of 
the distractors affect intentional recognition memory which can be termed as the 
µspontaneous recognition effect¶6SHFifically, I looked at the behavioural effects and 
neural correlates of spontaneous recognition. To do so I used the memory Stroop 
paradigm and manipulated a number of cognitive constructs such as working 
memory and emotion and investigated the role of subjective confidence judgements. 
 In this Chapter, I will start by giving an overview on intentional and 
unintentional memory, reviewing theories of recognition memory and the theoretical 
background as well as studies on working memory. I will discuss the several 
interpretations of recognition memory. Following this, I will present an overview of 
studies of SR effect. Second part of the chapter is concerned with familiarising the 
reader with the tasks and methodology used in this thesis which included, reviewing 
colour-word Stroop task and its mechanisms, introducing the memory Stroop task 
which will be used to investigate SR effect and explaining the rationale of using n-
back task as a WM manipulation. Additionally, this chapter reviews the recognition 
confidence measurements before introducing the experiments in this thesis. 
1.2. Intentional and Unintentional Memory 
5HVHDUFKRQWKHIXQFWLRQRIPHPRU\UHFRJQLVHV³LQWHQWLRQDO´DQG³XQLQWHQWLRQDO´
memory as its two main constituents (Berntsen, 1996; Mace, 2008; Mandler, 2008; 
Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watkins, 2013). Intentional memory is activated when 
individuals engage in deliberate effort to recall an event (e.g. previous experiences). 
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This aspect of memory has been widely investigated in both theoretical and 
experimental studies, owing to an ease of testing its functions methodologically. 
Intentional memories are relatively easy to work on because the concept of it allows 
researchers to question memories directly and/or to measure it using a variety of 
paradigms.  
On the other hand, unintentional memory is considered automatic and usually 
occurs with lack of intent which is considered to be the new interest in cognitive 
neuroscience (Hall et al., 2014). As such, the difference between intentional and 
unintentional memory is clear, insofar as intentional memories require intention and 
effort towards recall whereas unintentional memories are stimulus-driven (Anderson, 
Jacoby, Thomas, & Balota, 2011).  
Preliminary research on the workings of intentional memory date back to the 
1970s whilst unintentional memory remained unspecified until the late 1990s. One 
of the first studies on unintentional memories was conducted by Berntsen in 1996. 
The researcher described unintentional autobiographic memories as memories of 
past events that occur spontaneously without any attempts for intentional retrieval 
(Berntsen, 1996).  In turn, she suggested, that our daily lives are governed by equal 
amounts of unintentional and intentional memories, despite their underlying 
functional differences (Berntsen, 1996). However, Rasmussen, Ramsgaard and 
Berntsen (2015) asked participants to record their intentional and unintentional 
memories with a mechanical counter and found a three-to-one frequency 
correspondence in unintentional memories, as compared to intentional ones. 
Additionally, a study using retrospective methods to measure the occurrence of 
unintentional memories indicated the latter were more frequent in healthy individuals 
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(Brewin, 1996). These studies suggest that past experiences which come to mind 
unintentionally are more frequent and common than originally suggested.  
Despite increased research into unintentional memories, findings on their content 
and underlying processing mechanisms relative to intentional memories, remain 
unclear. For instance, Mace (2008) distinguishes between three types of 
unintentional memories, namely: ones that occur during cognitive processing, ones 
that occur during autobiographical recall and ones that are associated with specific 
psychological disorders. Elsewhere, Mandler (2008) argues that there are three major 
variants of unintentional memories. Firstly, brief unintentional (semantic) memories 
which are brief unintentional memories that occur spontaneously even with a lack of 
overt cues and that are generally the by-product of relatively automatic activities. 
Secondly for unintentional autobiographical memories, which occur without any 
intention to recall, and are connected to past life events. The third and last variant of 
unintentional memory is relevant to dreams (Mandler, 2008). Unintentional 
autobiographical memories are surprising in that they occur without any prior 
intention to recall and their occurrence is usually unexpected. Semantic memories, 
on the other hand, occur when an individual is engaged in an automatic activity or 
when attention is divided with another unrelated task.  
1.3.Recognition Memory 
Recognition memory is a particular aspect of intentional memory, which has been of 
great importance to cognitive research. Recognition memory can be defined as the 
ability to recognize and consciously remember previously encountered information 
(Mandler, 1980). There is a vigorous discussion amongst several prominent 
researchers whether recognition memory consists of one or two processes. 
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Accordingly, theoretical perspectives taken by those researchers can be presented in 
two different main classes; that is, single or dual process models. The following 
section focuses and summarizes these two models of recognition memory. 
1.3.1. Models of recognition memory 
Several distinct recognition memory models have been proposed. The models can be 
categorised as single process models and dual-process models of recognition 
memory. The distinction between the two models was made according to the 
emphasis made on the underlying processes (e.g. memory strength, familiarity and 
recollection) forming recognition memory. Those models classify memory signals as 
a discrete process (Batchelder & Riefer, 1990; Klauer & Kellen, 2010), a continuous 
representation (Wixted, 2007), or a mixture of both (e.g.Yonelinas, 1997). In this 
section models of recognition memory will be explained in detail and discussed. 
1.3.1.1. Single Process Models of Recognition Memory 
Single process models support the idea that recognition decisions are grounded on 
the strength of a memory signal relative to a decision criterion set by the individual. 
In this thesis, three dominant single process models of recognition memory have 
been reviewed; namely the signal detection theory, matching models and threshold 
models. 
1.3.1.1.1. Signal detection theory 
The typical interpretation of signal detection theory involves two Gaussian 
distributions, one for target items and one for lure items. A decision criterion lays 
between these two distributions; any test item that generates a memory signal that 
H[FHHGVWKLVFULWHULRQLVODEHOOHGDVµROG¶DQGDQ\PHPRU\VLJQDOWKDWIDLOVWRH[FHHG
the FULWHULRQLVODEHOOHGDVµQHZ¶This model assumes a continuous memory process 
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(familiarity). The recognition judgment is based on the comparison of a memory to a 
criterion. Thus, the average familiarity of a target is greater than the average 
familiarity of a lure since targets were studied in the specified context.  
1.3.1.1.2. Global matching models 
The Search model assumes that items are stored separately, each item retrieved and 
compared against the test item; if there is a match the response would be yes and 
otherwise, no. However, making a serial search would prolong reaction time for each 
GHFLVLRQHVSHFLDOO\IRU¶QR¶UHVSRQVHV$OWHUQDWLYHO\ the direct access model 
proposes that such serial search is used in recall, but for recognition a direct access to 
the relevant node can be granted when the memory is cued by the test word. 
+RZHYHUWKLVPRGHOGRHVQ¶WSUHGLFWWKDWWKHUHFRJQLWLRQFDQEHDIIHFWHGE\RWKHU
(non-target or distractor) items. Matching models (e.g.Flexser & Tulving, 1978) 
focus on the serial or parallel match of the probe item with the memory item, and 
each decision is made according to the strength of the match. Alternatively, global 
matching models combine all the strength of the matches and generate a composite 
value which then contributes to the decision. 
1.3.1.1.3. Threshold models 
In contrast to signal detection models which assumes a continuum of memory 
strength, high threshold models define discrete memory states. The high threshold 
model assumes that there is only one memory state; it is either a recognition, or 
otherwise a non-recognition. The model puts emphasis on guess responses on the 
recognition judgement process. The model assumes that an old item will be 
recognised if it exceeds the memory threshold or on the basis of a guess. If an old 
item exceeds the memory threshold, it will be correctly identified as old, if it fails it 
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may be identified as old or new depending upon the response bias from non-
recognition.  
The 2-threshold model assumes that old items which exceed the old 
recognition threshold will always be identified as old and new items which exceed 
the new item threshold will always be identified as new and uncertain items will be 
judged on the basis of a guess. The model asserts that occurrence of false alarms are 
dependent on new item, a new item will be incorrectly accepted as old if it is not 
recollected as new. Therefore, the 2-threshold model includes one more parameter 
than the high threshold model and differentiates the processes behind the occurrence 
of hits and false alarms by using two memory thresholds for old and new items. 
Interestingly, if the probability of an old/new item will exceed the old/new 
recognition threshold is assumed equal, which suggests that the hit rate is composed 
of a proportion of true recognitions as well as the correct guesses from the uncertain 
state. Conversely, occurrence of false alarms is only dependent on the uncertainty, 
the false alarm rate is basically the probability of saying "old/yes" when uncertain. 
Therefore, recognition bias is highly dependent on the false alarms. 
To sum up, threshold models contribute to the theory by including parameters of 
guess and uncertainty in recognition, discrimination and response bias measurements 
and threshold of old and/or new items. 
1.3.1.2. Dual process models of recognition memory 
Research on recognition memory has triggered much contemplation due to its 
capacity to not rely on merely a single process. Although assuming recognition 
memory is based on a single process is more parsimonious, behavioural, 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies support the thesis that recognition 
memory consists of two different processes; familiarity and recollection (often 
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referred to as "knowing" and "remembering"). Recognition expresses itself as the 
vivid memory of having experienced the same information before (recollection) but 
can also be linked to the recognition of a feeling of having previously encountered 
the stimulus in question (familiarity) (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Mandler, 
1980, 2008; Yonelinas, 2002). Encountering a stimulus in our daily life, may feel 
familiar (familiarity) but may not necessarily lead to the recollection of previous 
experiences relative to that stimulus. The dual-process signal detection model 
(DPSD;Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1997) is a hybrid approach that combines a 
continuous familiarity process and threshold component (recollection). Despite the 
ample research on familiarity and recollection processes, a variety of models exist in 
the literature. Although, they have similar assumptions, such models also offer some 
different views about the way familiarity and recollection work. In this thesis six 
influential dual process models of recognition memory have been reviewed, namely 
the high threshold/ signal detection model, Mandler model, Jacoby model, Tulving 
model, Atkinson model, and continuous dual process model. 
1.3.1.2.1. High threshold/ signal detection model (HTSD; Yonelinas) model 
Yonelinas and colleagues have proposed that two processes (recollection and 
familiarity) can be differentiated by type of information that they provide 
(quantitative or qualitative) and how those processes influence recognition 
confidence. According to this model, recollection is a threshold process where an 
information should be retrieved; in contrast, familiarity is a signal-detection process 
in which information has been accepted as having been studied. For instance, 
recollection requires one to remember detailed episodic information; if one recollects 
DSHUVRQ¶VIDFHVKHZLOODOVRUHPHPEHUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKDWIDFHVXFKDVWKH 
SHUVRQ¶V name or occupation. Whereas in familiarity, remembered information 
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would be less specific; feeling familiarity to a face requires recognizing a number of 
pieces of information related to that face, lacking the episodic information. In some 
situations, people can retrieve different aspects of information such as its temporal or 
spatial context or associations between different components which are necessary for 
recollection. However, for some situations people may fail to retrieve qualitative 
information. When this happens, people are expected to show a tendency to rely on 
their familiarity assessments. This model proposes both processes are involved in the 
decision-making process. 
1.3.1.2.2. Mandler model 
According to this model familiarity and recollection supports different processes; 
familiarity supports both recognition and implicit tasks whereas recollection supports 
recognition and recall. Mandler (1980) argues that familiarity and recollection works 
in parallel but familiarity is faster than recollection. 
1.3.1.2.3. Jacoby model 
Jacoby and his colleagues suggested that recognition memory judgements may rely 
on processing fluency (familiarity) or retrieval of an item that has been studied 
earlier (recollection) and the distinction between the two processes lies in the idea 
that recollection is a controlled process whereas familiarity is an automatic one 
(Jacoby, et al., 1993). The two processes are assumed to be independent but to 
operate in parallel. 
1.3.1.2.4. Atkinson model 
Atkinson and Juola (1973) aimed to reconcile single and dual process theories and 
SURSRVHGDµWZR-FULWHULRQPRGHO¶ZKLFKHPSKDVL]HVWZRGLIIHUHQWFULWHULRQVKLJK
and low. Familiarity signals are formed when the memory signal falls above a high 
(old) or below a low criterion (new) value. If the familiarity process falls between 
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high and low criteria, then a search process is initiated. Successful search leads to 
slower recollection-based decision. Similar to dual-process theory, familiarity and 
recollection are defined as two processes, however, recollection works as a back-up 
process activated when familiarity fails to provide an answer. Assessment of studied 
and non-studied items are based on the activations of the lexical nodes. In a 
recognition test those nodes are activated and studied items are naturally more active 
compared to non-studied items. Therefore, evaluation of activation of the lexical 
nodes is the first step of the recognition, if the activation is ambiguous a search is 
initiated for further evaluation. This model assumes that familiarity is a fast and 
perceptual process whereas recollection is a slower semantic based process. 
1.3.1.2.5. Tulving model 
Tulving and colleagues argued that there are several functionally distinct memory 
systems including episodic memory which reflects remember (recollection) 
responses and semantic memory which includes conscious experience of knowing 
(having familiarity without remembering). 
Tulving (1985) defines three main memory systems which were accompanied with 
three different consciousness levels; episodic, semantic and procedural memory 
reflects autonoetic, noetic and anoetic consciousness levels, respectively. He argues 
that it is possible that a person cannot remember an event but he/she may know 
something about it. Thus, any kind of retrieved information from episodic or 
semantic memory may be one of remembering (autonoetic awareness) or knowing 
(noetic awareness), or a combination of both. As a result, he argues that one cannot 
remember without awareness. 
It is important to note that in earlier versions, remember and know responses are 
considered to be related to recollection and familiarity (Gardiner & Java, 1993). 
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However recently it has been suggested that recollection and familiarity are 
independent processes but recognition responses can be made from a combination of 
both (Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, 1997; Yonelinas, 1994). Contrarily, remember 
and know responses are mutually exclusive, because know responses can only be 
made in the absence of remember response.  
1.3.1.2.6. Continuous Dual-Process Model 
The common assumption of single process models posits that remember judgements 
reflect strong memories whereas know judgements reflect weak memories. To 
challenge, a new model has been formed: continuous dual process model (Ingram, 
Mickes, & Wixted, 2012). Researchers argued that the assumption of single process 
models is generally true. However low confidence-remember judgments are 
associated with lower old/new accuracy, but higher source accuracy, than high 
confidence- know judgments.  
1.3.2. Overview of models 
In previous section, three single process models and five dual process models have 
been reviewed and summarised. In this section those will be compared briefly. 
The most obvious difference between two models is that single process models argue 
that recognition mainly relies on one familiarity process whereas dual process 
models assumes there are two separate processes underlying recognition; 
recollection and familiarity. 
Comparison of single process models reveal several important distinction 
between models.  First, the underlying process has been accepted to be familiarity or 
memory strength in signal detection models and recognition (or non-recognition) in 
global match models, whereas guessing as well as familiarity have been emphasised 
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in high threshold models. Second, global matching theories stress the match between 
test item and memory representation. However, according to signal detection model 
recognition is a continuous process.  
Most dual-process theories agreed on the assumption that familiarity is a 
continuous and recollection is a dichotomous process (Atkinson & Juola, 1973; 
Jacoby, 1991; Mandler, 1980). $FFRUGLQJWR$WNLQVRQ¶VPRGHO(Atkinson & Juola, 
1973) familiarity is completed prior to the start of the recollection process whilst the 
models of Mandler, Tulving and Yonelinas assume the two processes to initiate 
simultaneously (Mandler, 1980; Tulving, 1985; Yonelinas, 1994). The latter models 
also suggest that during the retrieval of information familiarity and recollection work 
independently. Finally, some researchers suggest that recollection reflects conceptual 
processes whereas familiarity reflects perceptual processes (Atkinson & Juola, 1973; 
Mandler, 1980). 
Yonelinas (2002) in his influential review paper pointed out some important 
agreements among the dual process models (a) familiarity is faster than recollection 
(b) both processes work independently at retrieval (c) familiarity is a continuous 
index of memory strength and recollection forms with a retrieval of a specific 
information (d) recollection reflects conceptual and familiarity reflects perceptual 
processes (e) recollection reflects controlled and familiarity reflects automatic 
processes (f) familiarity decreases more rapidly than recollection. 
Although there are different models trying to explain the differences between 
recollection and familiarity, they are considered dissociable processes. Some 
researchers are investigating different forms of familiarity (Anderson, et al., 2011; 
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Jacoby, et al., 1993; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993) . In the next section we will 
concentrate on SR effect.  
1.4. Spontaneous Recognition Effect 
The spontaneous recognition effect is an aspect of recognition memory that can be 
regarded as a part of unintentional memories. Occurrence of the SR effect stems 
IURPXQLQWHQWLRQDOSURFHVVLQJRIGLVWUDFWRUVDQGLQYROYHV³WDNLQJRYHU´DWWHQWLRQ
unintentionally during intentional target recognition (Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993).  
Most interference tasks, such as the Stroop and Flanker tasks, focus on the 
competition between automatic and conscious processes. Manipulations of 
intentional processing of information in interference tasks allows automatic 
processes to remain undisturbed (Jacoby, 1991). In order to differentiate and 
estimate the separate contributions of intentional and unintentional recognition 
Jacoby (1991) developed the process dissociation procedure. He also suggested that 
attention demanding tasks are required in order to rule out the intentional processing 
put in place in order to ignore irrelevant information. (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 
1989) conducted a study on the false fame effect to investigate the effects of dividing 
attention on familiarity compared to conscious recollection. In the study phase of the 
task, participants read a list of names. Then, in the test phase they decided whether a 
name was famous or not. Participants were informed that all of the names they had 
read in the first list in the study phase were non-famous, so if they remember a name 
from the first list they should be able to know that it was non-famous. In the divided 
attention condition, participants listened to a continuous string of numbers and 
searched for three odd numbered digits during test phase. They hypothesized that 
when attention was divided, participants should be unable to consciously recollect a 
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name that they have read before, and any remaining effect could be attributed to its 
familiarity. They found that the probability of identifying a name as famous is high 
when the non-famous name was new (non-famous names that are not in the list) vs. 
non-famous name was old (non-famous names those are in the list) in full attention 
condition, whereas it was lower when the non-famous name was new vs. non-famous 
name was old in divided attention condition. This suggests that dividing attention 
disrupted the conscious recollection of old non-famous names as studied before and 
WKHIDPLOLDULW\FUHDWHGD³IDOVH´IDPH 
 Ste-Marie and Jacoby (1993) suggested that the SR effect could be measured 
via the indirect influence of distracting stimuli on recognition judgements of target 
stimuli and suggested that dividing attention in a task would decrease correct 
responses arising from recollection and increase errors arising from unintentional 
automatic responses. They investigated SR with a Flanker task paradigm which was 
used to examine the influence of presenting a flanking letter on the time required to 
judge whether a test letter was a member of a memory set. The centre target word 
was surrounded by one distractor word above and below the target. Recognition 
responses were made to the target words whilst ignoring the distractors. The 
experiment included full and divided attention conditions (Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 
1993). They provided participants with a Flanker task which was coupled with a 
listening task, aiming to divide their attention. They found that in the divided 
attention condition participants made more false alarms than in the full attention 
condition. In turn, they demonstrated that they were faster RT levels in the congruent 
trials, as compared to the incongruent trials in the divided attention condition. They 
also showed that repeating the words during study and changing the modality of the 
words from study to test reduced the effects from distractors. Accordingly, it is 
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suggested that familiarity did not produce flanker effects under full attention. As 
such, the researchers argued that in the divided attention condition participants were 
not able to make accurate recognition judgements and instead relied more on 
familiarity judgements because they are less able to make conscious recollection of 
previously encountered information. Two accounts were suggested for why this 
distractor effect is larger under divided attention conditions. First, the selective 
attention account suggests attention is spread more widely under divided attention 
conditions and thus flankers are processed to a greater extent than under full 
attention. Second, that divided attention reduces the ability to use intentional 
recollection and allows the more automatic familiarity processes to dominate 
recognition memory decisions. 
Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2011) suggested that investigating SR effect 
could be achieved by comparing the influence of old distractors to new distractors on 
behavioural performance (accuracy and/or reaction time measurements) of 
recognition judgements for the target stimuli without directly questioning 
SDUWLFLSDQWVDERXWWKHGLVWUDFWRUV,QH[SHULPHQWROGHUDGXOWV¶recognition 
judgements (hits and false alarms) to word targets were affected by the type of 
picture distractor (old or new). This SR effect was not shown for younger adults or 
when pictures were targets. They reasoned that older adults were more likely to 
process the distractors given their general deprivation of attentional resources. Also, 
words are less likely to affect performance on picture judgements as pictures are 
thought to be more salient (possibly due to their relatively larger size compared to 
words). 
 Anderson et al. (2011) compared SR effect for older and younger adults on 
divided and full attention conditions. They used a listening task which required 
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participants to listen to a sequence of numbers in order to divide their attention and 
respond to a 3-digit odd number that appeared on screen while they were doing a 
memory Stroop task comprised of old/new targets and old/new distractors. They 
found that both older and younger adults showed the SR effect in the divided 
attention condition. They also showed an increase in the false alarms produced by 
new targets and increase in hits to old targets. Jacoby and other researchers have 
shown that younger adults can perform similarly to older adults by providing 
younger adults with an attentional load (e.g. see Balota, Burgess, Cortese, & Adams, 
2002; Castel & Craik, 2003; Jacoby, 1999)  
 Anderson et al. (2011) provided evidence of how unintentional distractor 
recognition affects intentional target recognition in behavioural level. They argued 
that the SR effect stems from familiarity responses to distractors. However, it was 
vital to provide the evidence that participants actually show familiarity to distractors 
which Anderson et al. (2011) failed to demonstrate. To address this issue, 
Bergström, Williams, Bhula and Sharma (2016) investigated how unintentional 
recognition of distractors affected the recognition of target stimuli and whether these 
processes could be dissociable neurally. They designed two experiments where in 
experiment 1 they used words as targets and pictures as distractors and vice versa in 
H[SHULPHQW%HKDYLRXUDOO\WKH\UHSOLFDWHG$QGHUVRQHWDO¶VILQGLQJV,Q
experiment 1 they found that new distractors decreased the likelihood of recognising 
old targets as old compared to old distractors, and they found a trend of new 
distractors facilitated correct rejections of new targets compared to old distractors. 
However, for experiment 2 where pictures were targets and words were distractors, 
they failed to find a distractor effect. They compared two experiments and found that 
distractor effect was significantly different from each other. More importantly, their 
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EEG results demonstrated the difference between distractor types arises from 
different recognition mechanisms. Indeed, both old target words and old distractor 
pictures elicited significantly more positive FN400 amplitudes (which indicates 
familiarity processes) than new target words and new distractor pictures, whereas a 
typical increased parietal positivity (which indicates recollection processes) for old 
compared with new items was only found for word targets. Therefore, they provided 
important information about the neural processes underlying SR effect. First, they 
demonstrated that both distractors and targets trigger familiarity related ERPs 
(FN400), whereas, ERPs indicating recollection are specific to targets. Secondly, this 
study showed that despite the fact that participants were instructed to ignore 
distractor items, they unintentionally processed them due to familiarity processes. To 
sum, their research had several contributions in understanding the processes 
underlying the SR effect. Behaviourally, they demonstrated that previously seen and 
non-seen distractors affected the recognition of targets, and that participants made 
more hits and correct rejections when targets and distractors were congruent 
compared to when they were incongruent. In addition, they established the difference 
in the neural processing of targets and distractors. Their results showed that 
recollection related parietal old-new effect was present only for targets whereas 
familiarity related FN400 was present for both old targets and old distractors. 
Overall, studies investigating SR with different paradigms showed that when 
attention is divided, SR is more likely to occur. These findings imply attention has 
an important influence on SR: attention is needed to avoid spontaneous recognition. 
Previous studies usually required participants to hold numbers in mind during a 
recognition task in order to ensure divided attention. The use of a secondary task 
suggests that working memory might potentially play an important role in tasks that 
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demonstrate SR effect. The working memory will be explained and its possible 
influence on SR effect will be discussed in the next section. 
1.5. Working Memory (WM) 
Fundamentally, working memory is a system that allows us to hold, maintain and 
PDQLSXODWHLQIRUPDWLRQ7KHPDLQUROHRI:0LVWRUHGXFHLQGLYLGXDOV¶UHOLDQFHRQ
automatic responses and allow for alternative responses to be represented in mind 
(Goldenberg, 2001). Therefore, WM has a crucial role in carrying out cognitive 
processes such as attention, concentration and inhibition whilst it also contributes in 
changing some automatic responses, understanding language, setting goals, 
planning, problem solving and decision-making processes (Solso, MacLin, & 
MacLin, 2004). Most of our physical, psychological and social daily activities are 
dependent on the performance of WM.  
Different models have been proposed in order to explain and increase our 
understanding about this memory type. In this section, two influential models are 
exSODLQHGLQGHWDLO%DGGHOH\¶VPXOWLFRPSRQHQWPRGHORIZRUNLQJPHPRU\DQG
&RZDQ¶VHPEHGGHGSURFHVVPRGHORIZRUNLQJPHPRU\ 
1.5.1. Multicomponent Model of Working Memory 
Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed a working memory (WM) model that pioneered 
in offering a multi-component approach to the WM as compared to the idea of a 
unitary store. This model was very successful in giving a composite framework to 
study cognition. In constructing the WM model, Baddeley originally assumed that 
the central executive is modality-free, acting as a link between modality dependent 
slave subsystems (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). In turn, he proposed three main parts 
associated with it called, central executive, phonological loop and visuo-spatial 
27 
 
sketchpad. However, the researchers later reformulated their model by adding an 
episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000).  Figure 1.1 shows the schematic representation of 
their final WM model. 
 
Figure 1. 1. Revised model of working memory reprinted from (Baddeley, 2000). 
Phonological Loop 
Baddeley (1986) suggested that most tasks involving speech coding in reasoning and 
comprehension, necessitated phonological coding. Accordingly, he offered the 
articulatory loop model, wherein he defined phonological coding as speech-based, 
articulatory coding as speech production and acoustic coding as speech perception 
(Baddeley, 1986). Phonological loop is one of the slave systems of the central 
executive, which includes a temporary phonological store. It can hold information 
with the help of articulatory rehearsal which repeats the information in order to 
protect it from decay through time. The phonological loop is considered to be 
evolved for speech perception and production (Baddeley, 2000). The phonological 
loop comprises two main components: phonological store (holds speech-based 
information) and articulatory control (process of inner speech with sub-vocal 
rehearsal). 
Visuo-spatial sketch pad (VSSP) 
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When one tries to recall a picture or scene or imagine a new route the cognitive 
processes that are utilised to perform these actions rely on the visuospatial 
sketchpad. This component is responsible for storing visually presented information 
such as drawings or remembering motor movements. The visuospatial sketchpad 
contains two structures that create visual imagery: the visual cache and the inner 
scribe (Logie, 1995, 2003). The visual cache is capable of storing visual information 
temporarily that comes from perceptual information (Smyth & Pendleton, 1989). 
Also, it contains shape, colour and spatial information. Whereas, the inner scribe is 
capable of refreshing stored information and storing kinaesthetic information, the 
inner scribe manipulates the information kept in the visual cache. Also, it has been 
showed that the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop are independent 
systems (Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley, 2002)  
Central executive 
The central executive (CE) is the most diligent and important part of the WM model, 
as it coordinates the activities of the visuospatial sketchpad, phonological loop and 
episodic buffer. In addition, the CE also links gathered information to the long-term 
memory via the episodic buffer. Although the CE is not a memory store, it functions 
as a control system which directs and guides attention and combines, manipulates, 
and updates information from the sub-systems to maximise the outcome (Baddeley 
& Logie, 1999). 
The transaction between the two different modalities coming from the 
visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop requires the participation of a 
control system. This communication between two sub-systems is made possible by 




The episodic buffer (EB) has a limited storage capacity and is responsible for 
binding information that comes from different dimensions and as such creates 
integrated episodes (Baddeley, 2000). An integrative buffer was proposed to connect 
the information between the visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop into a 
coherent sequence. EB is fed by perception and WM subsystems and links the 
information to the central executive. Holding the information temporarily in a multi-
dimensional manner allows the EB to combine and bind the information so as to 
create chunks of episodes that are essential for consciousness.  
1.5.2. Embedded Process Model of Working Memory 
The Embedded Process Model emphasises the role of attention in WM (Cowan, 
1999). According to Cowan (1999), three memory components are (a) activation, (b) 




where attention should be directed.  
Moreover, Cowan (1999) distinguished between the activated part of LTM and the 
focus of attention. The focus of attention is assumed to have limited capacity 
whereas the activation of representations in LTM is not capacity limited. Information 
can be processed in the focus of attention without being impaired by holding other 
information in the activated LTM.  
Cowan (1999) suggested that if holding information is necessary for a mental 
task it is possible that along with the target information, irrelevant information could 
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be held in the WM. During information processing information is held in the focus 
of attention and if capacity is exceeded, extra information could be held outside of 
focus of attention. In this model, rehearsal recirculates and reactivates the 
LQIRUPDWLRQLQDQGRXWVLGHRIWKHIRFXVRIDWWHQWLRQ,Q%DGGHOH\¶VPRGHOYHUEDO
rehearsal serves to reactivate items in the phonological store. Similar functions are 
XVHGLQ&RZDQ¶VPRGHOLQWHUPVRINHHSLQJLQIRUPDWLRQLQWKHIRFXVRIDWWHQWLRQ
When information is needed, it is activated in LTM and if there is any additional 
information added in activated part in LTM, new information combinations are 
formed which then may become a part of LTM. 
1.5.3. Attention and Working Memory 
Kane and Engle (2003)  suggested that WM is the sum of short term memory (STM) 
and controlled attention. Their formula suggests that the difference between STM 
and WM is the controlled attention. Furthermore, it is supported by the research that 
shows WM tasks usually necessitate control of attention.  
Lavie and her colleagues proposed two mechanisms for selective attention to 
explain the effects of load on attention. The first mechanism is a passive, perceptual 
selection mechanism that excludes irrelevant distractors from perception in high 
perceptual load settings. The second mechanism is an active attentional control 
mechanism that rejects irrelevant distractors in low perceptual load settings (Lavie, 
1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994). This mechanism rejects distractors even if they are 
perceived and depend on higher order cognitive functioning (De Fockert, 2013). 
When the higher cognitive systems are loaded, because the capacity for controlling 
goal directed stimuli would be interrupted, the processing of distractor stimuli could 
increase. According to this theory, increased perceptual load is expected to reduce 
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distractor interference because the distractors are not perceived to interrupt the goal 
directed control. The load theory of attention predicts that early selection is expected 
for high perceptual load, whereas late selection is expected for low perceptual load. 
(Lavie & Fox, 2000) found that high perceptual load reduced distractor interference 
on reaction times of target processing which suggests that early selection effects 
distractor processing in high perceptual load conditions. 
 Lavie and De Fockert (2005) conducted a series of studies to examine the 
causal role of WM in distractor rejection during visual search. They suggested that 
irrelevant distractor rejection should depend on the availability of the WM to 
maintain goal-directed control in visual search. They hypothesized that if WM for 
the search task determines attentional capture by an irrelevant singleton, then the 
singleton interference would be greater in a dual task condition with a high WM load 
compared to single task condition with no WM load. In their first experiment they 
compared distraction (attentional capture) from an irrelevant singleton during visual 
search in single and dual task conditions. The researchers found greater errors and 
slower RTs for the dual task condition compared to the single task condition. In their 
second experiment they used the same visual search and added successor naming 
tasks with high (digits were presented randomly) and low (digits were presented in 
the same order) working memory loads. They found significantly slower RTs and 
higher error rates with high WM load than low WM load. Also, the distractor effect 
was greater in the high WM load condition as compared to the low WM load 
condition. These findings support the hypothesis that WM is involved in goal 
directed control of visual selective attention. 
Moreover, de Fockert, Rees, Frith and Lavie (2001) argued that WM is 
essential for reducing distractor effects by maintaining the direction of attention and 
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having control over relevant stimuli. They suggested that higher WM load should 
increase distractor processing. As such, they manipulated working memory load in a 
YLVXDO³VXFFHVVRU-QDPLQJ´WDVNLHDVHOHFWLYHDWWHQWLon task) which involved the 
classification of famous names as pop stars or politicians whilst ignoring the 
distractor faces present in a simultaneous WM task that required keeping 5 digits in 
mind during selective attention task. They found greater interference on RTs from 
incongruent distractors compared to neutral or congruent distractors under high (vs. 
low) working memory load. Moreover, the neuroimaging results showed that there 
was greater activity in frontal cortex which was associated with WM during 
conditions of high WM load than low WM load. In addition to this, activity in visual 
cortex related to the presence (vs. absence) of distractor faces was significantly 
greater under conditions of high compared to low WM load. These results provide 
further evidence for the load theory of selective attention (Lavie, Hirst, De Fockert, 
& Viding, 2004). 
Connectedly, Conway and Engle (1994) argued that individual differences on 
measures of "working-memory capacity" reflect the ability to use controlled 
attention to prevent environmental distractions and interference from events stored in 
LTM. A variety of studies have demonstrated that individuals who score high on 
WM tasks are better at inhibiting distractors (Conway & Engle, 1994; Engle, 
Conway, Tuholski, & Shisler, 1995). Kane and Engle (2003) showed that 
participants with low WM span made more errors towards a distracting incongruent 
word in a Stroop paradigm. This suggests that WM capacity is involved in 
controlling the distractor effects. Similarly, Conway, Cowan and Bunting (2001) 
asked participants with high and low WM capacity to perform a dichotic listening 
task in which their own name was presented in the irrelevant message. The results 
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indicated that participants with low WM capacity detected their names more than 
participants with high WM capacity. Consequently, they argued that low WM 
capacity resulted in difficulty in blocking out, or inhibiting, distracting information 
(Conway, et al., 2001). 
Lastly, the dual mechanisms of cognitive control (DMC) theory suggest that WM 
supports the task relevant information by using the ability to alter the responses to 
particular task demands instead of habitual or automatic responses. Proactive control 
is conceptualised as the maintenance of task relevant information to control and alter 
the cognitive processes such as attention, perception and preparation of responses 
whereas reactive control reflects stimulus-driven goal reactivation, especially after a 
high interference event is detected. Consequently, proactive control actively 
anticipates the conflict whereas reactive control comes in after the onset of the 
interference (Braver, 2012). Therefore, WM resources are required for proactive 
control to actively maintain goal-related representations (Burgess & Braver, 2010). 
1.6. The Spontaneous Recognition Effect and Working Memory 
The spontaneous recognition effect occurs when distractor stimuli interrupt a 
recognition judgement. To avoid the SR effect in an ongoing task it is necessary to 
ignore distracting stimuli, and goal directed control is crucial in order to resist 
distracting stimuli in target processing. Goal directed control is to focus attention on 
goal-relevant stimuli while ignoring irrelevant distractor stimuli. Working memory is 
necessary to actively maintain goal-relevant information for performing complex 
cognitive tasks (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miyake & Shah, 1999). Attention and WM 
could be considered as an important aspect of understanding the SR effect. 
34 
 
The spontaneous recognition effect is an unintentional process that appears when 
the prior presentation of stimuli affects the recognition judgements. If attention is 
sufficiently focused on a recognition task, recognition of distractor stimuli may not 
occur. Previous studies showed that SR effect occurs in a recognition test when 
attention is divided with another task (Anderson, et al., 2011; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 
1993). In addition, a recent study investigating the influence of unintentional 
recognition on intentional recognition have used a WM task to divide the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DWWHQWLRQDQGGHPRQVWUDWHGDQ65HIIHFWVXJJHVWLng a link between SR 
effect and WM (Bergström, et al., 2016).  
As predicted by the load theory of the selective attention and cognitive control 
(Lavie, et al., 2004), cognitive control is necessary to reduce the influence of the 
distractor in low perceptual load setting and is dependent on WM resources (De 
Fockert, 2013; de Fockert, et al., 2001). Thus, this account predicts that the SR effect 
is likely to be observed when the WM resources are limited. Similarly, dual 
mechanism of cognitive control theory proposes (Braver, 2012) WM is necessary to 
avoid distractor processing.  
1.7. Emotion 
1.7.1. Emotional Enhancement of Memory 
In our daily routines we experience and store emotional information intentionally 
and/or unintentionally. Making decisions and remembering information is often 
infused with emotional information. The question of how emotions affect memory 
KDVEHHQRILQWHUHVWIRUWKHODVWGHFDGHDQGLVODEHOOHGDV³(PRWLRQDO(QKDQFHPHQWRI
0HPRU\´(PRWLRQDOHQKDQFHPHQWRIPHPRU\((0FRXOGEHGHILQHGDVWKH
memory for emotional stimuli or events. Emotional stimuli are generally processed 
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more vividly, distinctly, and they are less prone to forgetting. This has been 
demonstrated using a range of stimuli, including words, sentence s and pictures (see 
Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002; Hamann, 2001, for reviews). Emotions have a 
widespread influence on memory, they may affect long term memory, working 
memory, and recognition memory. Below are summarised two models of emotional 
memory that links working memory and attention with emotional information 
processing.  
Cahill and MCGaugh (1998) modulation model of emotional memory based 
its hypotheses on the experimental evidence of psychophysiological and 
neuropsychological studies. The model focuses on the stress-hormone systems and 
the amygdaloid complex (AC) as important mechanisms of endogenous memory 
modulating/regulating system which are inactive in neutral events but active in 
emotionally arousing events (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998). The effect of emotion on 
memory, and emotional learning have been attributed to the amygdala and the 
medial temporal lobes (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; LaBar & Phelps, 1998; McGaugh, 
2000), and the contributions of ventromedial/medial prefrontal regions (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999). These areas provide a medium for the limbic 
system which is known to be involved in emotional processing and dorsolateral 
cortex which is a crucial area for working memory, decision-making, memory 
updating and goal-directed behaviour as well as suppression of irrelevant memories. 
In many situations, emotional stimuli were found to enhance or facilitate memory. A 
comprehensive investigation of the facilitation effects of emotion on memory was 
done by Hamann, Ely, Grafton and Kilts (1999). They found emotional pictures were 
better remembered than neutral pictures. They also showed that the EEM effect is 
correlated with amygdala activation during encoding. More recently, Kensinger and 
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Schacter (2006) showed that increased amygdala activity corresponded to the 
successful retrieval of negative but not of neutral stimuli. 
Alternatively, Attention Mediation Hypothesis (AMH) has been suggested as a 
complimentary framework to the modulation model of emotional memory which 
assumes that emotional memory occurs as a result of delayed consolidation 
processes. However, according to Talmi (2013) the immediate effects of emotion on 
memory is overlooked. Therefore, they proposed the AMH (Talmi & McGarry, 
2012) to emphasize the underlying cognitive processes of the construction of 
emotional memories as well as the encoding and retrieval processes. For instance, 
they showed that attention fully mediated emotional memory enhancement when 
organization and distinctiveness of stimuli were controlled (Talmi & McGarry, 
2012) 
1.7.2. Emotional Recognition Memory 
Studies have shown that one LVPRUHOLNHO\WRFDOODQLWHP³ROG´ZKHQLWLVQHJDWLYH
compared to neutral, whether the item is actually old or new. Windmann and Kutas 
(2001) UHIHUUHGWRWKLVDV³UHFRJQLWLRQELDVLQGXFHGE\QHJDWLYHHPRWLRQDOYDOHQFH´
In their study investigating recognition bias to negative words compared to neutral 
words, they found that negative old words were recognised better than neutral old 
words. 
Evidence suggests that recognition memory can be modulated by emotional 
stimuli (Tabert et al., 2001). For instance, Kensinger and Corkin (2003b) found that 
the remember responses are greater to negative compared to neutral words but know 
responses are greater to neutral than to negative words. Also, they found recollection 
was higher for negative than for neutral stimuli, and familiarity was marginally 
37 
 
higher for negative than for neutral words. They argued that the emotional 
enhancement effect is dominated by the increase in remember responses. More 
specifically, Maratos, Allan and Rugg (2000) found that hits and false alarms were 
greater for negative words compared to neutral ones. Thus, they showed that the 
discrimination of neutral words was greater and participants showed response bias 
VXFKWKDWWKH\ZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVD\³ROG´WRQHJDWLYHZRUGV,QFRQWUDVWVRPH
research has failed to show EEM on recognition memory (Taylor et al., 1998). 
Sharot, Delgado and Phelps (2004) found that 'remember' judgments were enhanced 
for emotional pictures, but there was no difference in accuracy (hit rates - false alarm 
rates) between emotional and neutral pictures.  
The EEM also depends on the valence and arousal of the emotional stimuli. 
A study designed to determine whether the memory enhancement effect is due to 
arousal or valence asked participants to encode negative (negative in valence and 
low in arousal), taboo (negative in valence and high in arousal) and neutral word 
lists. They found that recollection was greater for the taboo words compared to the 
negative words and was marginally greater for the negative than for the neutral 
words whereas, familiarity was marginally greater for the taboo words compared to 
the negative words and was significantly greater for the taboo words compared to the 
neutral words but there was no significant difference between the negative and the 
neutral words (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003b). 
To summarise, the evidence suggests that EEM for recognition memory 
affects recollection processes more than familiarity, and arousal of the stimuli is 
more important for familiarity processes. The studies described above were 
investigating the EEM effect on recognition memory when the stimuli to be 
recognised was emotional. Therefore, they were focused on the direct effects of 
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emotion. Inversely, this research was interested in the indirect effects of emotion on 
recognition memory. The influence of emotion on recognition memory was 
manipulated by using a secondary task which includes emotional stimuli, but the 
recognition task included only neutral stimuli. A working memory task was used as 
secondary task; however, the evidence also suggests emotions might modulate the 
working memory performance. 
1.7.3. Emotional Working Memory (EWM) 
The idea that cognition can directly or indirectly modulate our emotional experience 
is well established. First, the research suggested that the relationship between 
emotion and working memory is bilateral. Emotions can impair different aspects of 
working memory performance such as feature binding (Mather et al., 2006) or 
performance in operation span tasks which measures different components of WM 
(Schweizer & Dalgleish, 2016). Schweizer and Dalgleish (2016) found that 
irrelevant negative pictures impaired the performance on the operation span task. In 
contrast, loading WM may impair emotional stimuli processing. Researchers 
suggested that the negative distractors take up WM resources for attentional control, 
and away from memory storage, relative to neutral distractors, resulting in poor 
performance (Schweizer & Dalgleish, 2016). In a study investigating the role of 
working memory in decoding emotions with a dual task paradigm which contains 
WM task (2-back task comprised from letters) and facial expression recognition task, 
researchers found that working memory load impaired the performance on choosing 
the emotional label to describe a facial expression (Phillips, Channon, Tunstall, 




& Logie, 1999; Engle, et al., 1995; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) and 
it can be affected by the presence of emotional information (Vuilleumier, 2005). 
Empirical findings on working memory for emotional stimuli come from healthy 
participants yet, findings are still contradictory (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003a; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Mikels, Reuter-Lorenz, Beyer, & Fredrickson, 2008; 
Perlstein, Elbert, & Stenger, 2002). Kensinger and Corkin (2003a) found no effects 
of emotional stimuli on working memory (measured by an n-back task) accuracy and 
only marginal effects on reaction times but a large effect on delayed free recall. 
Mikels et al. (2008) found that healthy older adults showed better performance on 
positive compared to negative emotional stimuli, whereas younger controls were 
better at negative compared to positive emotional stimuli. Kopf, Dresler, Reicherts, 
Herrmann and Reif (2013) investigated emotional WM in young adults with various 
difficulty levels of an n-back task. Their behavioural results indicated that there was 
a significant difference between negative and neutral conditions in only the 2-back 
and 3-back tasks but not for the 1-back task. This finding further illustrates that 
cognitive control of emotional stimuli is achievable but as the load on WM increases, 
it becomes harder to resist the attentional bias of negative stimuli. 
 Perlstein et al. (2002) used a dual task paradigm in which participants were 
required to respond if the probe contained the same picture with a preceding one 
(WM task) and they also indicated whether the stimulus is duplicated in the probe 
(detection task). Their analysis revealed that emotion no effect on the detection task 
whereas emotion significantly affected working memory performance; the WM 
performance was better for positive compared to negative stimuli, contrary to 
previous research (Kopf, et al., 2013).  
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2. Methodological approach 
2.1.Stroop task 
The Stroop task has been developed to observe how salient task irrelevant stimuli 
can generate failure in the selective attention of the goal (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 
1935). The Colour-Word Stroop task consisted of a stimulus which is written in the 
same (congruent) or different (incongruent) name of the colour with the ink colour of 
the word is written. Typically, the task requires participants to name the stimulus 
according to its ink colour but not to the meaning of the word.  
The Stroop interference effect can be measured by the slower reaction times on 
incongruent trials (conflict) compared to control trials (e.g. string of letters). In 
addition to interference, the Stroop task can also demonstrate facilitation which is 
indexed by the difference in congruent and control trials (Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994).  
2.2. Memory Stroop task 
Results from early colour-word Stroop research have created an immense interest in 
different aspects of interference effect. Some researchers separated word and colour 
features of the stimuli and presented them one on each side of a fixation point. The 
results showed robust interference effects, suggesting that it is possible to obtain 
interference without having an integrated stimulus used in standard Stroop task. For 
example, (Hentschel, 1973) embedded a word with black-white line drawings and 
asked participants to name the pictures and found the interference of word reading 
on picture naming. Later, Rosinski, Golinkoff and Kukish (1975) demonstrated the 
same findings as Hentschel (1973), as they showed that incongruent pictures have 
very small effects on word reading. These studies suggest that picture-word and 
colour-word versions of the Stroop task seem to relate to each other.  
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At the same time, Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) developed the ³IODQNHU´WDVNLQ
which irrelevant letters or words presented simultaneously with a centrally located 
target letter or word. They showed that irrelevant flankers interfered with making the 
correct decision to the target.  
Ste-Marie and Jacoby (1993) approached Flanker task from a different 
perspective and they used the task to investigate the SR effect. In their study, the 
centre target word was surrounded by one distractor word above and below the target 
and participants were asked to give recognition responses to target words whilst 
ignoring distractors. 
Anderson et al. (2011) modified the Stroop task and devised the memory 
Stroop task to measure the SR effect. In their task participants memorised words and 
pictures, their attempt to memorisation of stimuli requires intentional effort and 
activation of episodic memory. Without any delay or distraction period participants 
were tested based on studied stimuli and non-studied (lures) stimuli. In the test 
phase, pictures and words were presented on top of each other in the centre of the 
screen. The crucial part of the test phase includes asking participants to ignore the 
picture stimuli and focus only on the word stimuli. Such an instruction enables 
pictures to be transformed into distractors and words to be transformed into targets. 
This is done to provide a basis for unintentional recognition of distractor pictures. 
Removing picture stimuli from selective attention and placing it in the centre with 
the target stimuli results in unintentional recognition of the studied (previously-seen) 
pictures. Similar to colour-word Stroop task, two conflicting tasks are activated; 
automatic and unintentional recognition of distractor stimuli and goal-related, 




Figure 1. 2. Schematic of the Memory Stroop task. In study phase participants 
memorise the stimuli then in recognition test phase, they were asked to make 
recognition decisions based on words or pictures, reprinted from (Anderson, et al., 
2011). 
There are four possible combinations used in the test phase; old target and old 
distractor, old target and new distractor, new target and old distractor, new target and 
new distractor (see Figure 1.2). The task allows one to say whether responses to the 
target (old or new targets) are affected by the type of distractor (old or new). 
2.3. N- back task 
It is important to consider how to operationally define and measure WM. 
Although there are numerous ways to operationalise WM, one of the most popular 
manipulation of WM is the n-back task especially in neuroimaging studies (Conway 
et al., 2005; Kane & Engle, 2002). N-back task was preferred to use as a 
manipulation of WM over traditional WM span tasks because the n-back task can be 
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used with different modalities (visual, auditory) and different loads (1, 2, 3, 4 and 
more backs). It is possible to use number, picture (activates visuo-spatial sketchpad 
sub-system of WM) and word (activates phonological loop sub-system of WM) 
stimuli in n-back task. Most importantly, with n-back task WM load can be 
manipulated independently from perceptual factors. This advantageous characteristic 
of the task, allows the manipulation to be controlled for perceptual changes.  
The n-back task has been widely used to measure WM and it is a versatile task 
which is practical to employ in neuroimaging studies and dual task settings. The task 
enables to manipulate WM load and its response or modality requirements easily 
relative to complex-span tasks. The load on information maintenance and 
PDQLSXODWLRQLQFUHDVHVDVWKHYDOXHRI³Q´LQFUHDVHV0DQLSXODWLRn of WM load is 
reflected in changes in accuracy and reaction time. High WM load typically results 
in lower accuracy and slower reaction time than low load conditions (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974; Kirchner, 1958; Ricker, Vergauwe, Hinrichs, Blume, & Cowan, 2015)  
N-back task was developed by Kirschner (1958) as a visuo-spatial task with four 
load factors (0-back to 3-EDFNWRPHDVXUH³YHU\VKRUW WHUP´PHPRU\UHWHQWLRQWKH
acquisition and retention of continuously and rapidly changing information. In n-
back task, participants were asked if the stimulus on the current trial is the same with 
WKHVWLPXOXV³Q´RUPRUHWULDOVEHIRUH,Q-back version, there is only one 
item needed to be maintained, in 1-back version maintenance of one item and the 
updating (replacement of one item) is required. However, additional functions are 
added as the load increases. In 2-back version maintenance of two items in 
respective order are required as well as updating which includes both shifting and 
replacement of the previous information. The logical analysis of n-back is 
represented in the Figure 1.3. Moreover, decision, selection inhibition and 
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interference resolution processes are involved in n-back task (Jonides et al., 1997; 
Kane & Engle, 2002). 
 
Figure 1. 3. The logical analysis of n-back, adapted from (Chen, Mitra, & 
Schlaghecken, 2008). 
Within this task a target is a stimulus that is the same with the stimulus 
SUHVHQWHG³Q´WULDOVEHIRUH$OORWKHUVWLPXOLDUHUHIHUUHGWRDVQRQ-targets. The ratio 
of target/non-target varies, usually ranges from a ratio of 20/80 to 50/50. 
Additionally, an n-back task consists of match and mismatch trials. A match trial is 
ZKHQDQ³Q´SUHYLRXVWULDOLVWKHVDPHZLWKWKHRQHLQWKHFXUUHQWWULDOFRQYHUVHO\D
PLVPDWFKWULDOLVZKHQDQ³Q´SUHYLRXVWULDOLVGLIIHUHQWZLWKWKHRQHLQWKHFXUUHQW
trial. Kirschner (1958) initially tested young and old participants with a visual n-back 
task and found that young and old adults did not differ in 0-back condition whereas 
old adults performed worse than young adults in one and two back tasks and only a 
few old adults got as far as to three-back condition.  
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N-back task is classified neither as a simple-span task nor a complex span task. 
However, it involves multiple processes such as encoding, shifting, maintaining, and 
updating. Especially, simultaneous execution of the storage and maintenance 
functions contributes to the categorization of the task as a WM measure. Studies 
investigated the correlation between n-back tasks (e.g. spatial and verbal), and 
complex span tasks (e.g. operation span, spatial complex span and reading span 
tasks) found non-significant and weak correlations (Campbell, Hill, & Podd, 2012; 
Kane, Conway, Miura, & Colflesh, 2007; Redick & Lindsey, 2013). In a meta-
analysis that compares n-back and other complex span tasks, Redick and Lindsey 
(2013) found that they are weakly correlated. However they also observed a 
significant heterogeneity across studies. Redick and Lindsey (2013) argued that 
complex span tasks and the n-back task should not be used interchangeably as 
measurements of WM, weak correlation between those tasks imply that they are 
possibly measuring different constructs of  WM. Several arguments have been 
suggested to explain the discrepancy between n-back task and complex span tasks 
(CST). Campbell et al., (2012) argued these tasks may assess different 
subcomponents of WM. In addition, it has been suggested that tasks rely on different 
memory constructs; n-back tasks rely on recognition memor\ZKHUHDV&67¶VUHO\RQ
recall (Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Meier, 2010). Following this argument, 
Campbell et al. (2012), argued that correct recall is needed to complete CST and 
relies on recollection whereas both recollection and familiarity are necessary to 
perform successfully in n-back task. However, this difference has not yet been 
described by current WM models. Furthermore, studies showed that n-back task 
predicts fluid intelligence and executive functions and tasks like Stroop performance, 
Wisconsin Card Sorting, and verbal fluency (Ciesielski, Lesnik, Savoy, Grant, & 
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Ahlfors, 2006; Jaeggi, et al., 2010). Additionally, it has been proposed that n-back 
task is involved in the recognition processes as well as WM related functions 
(Jaeggi, et al., 2010; Oberauer, 2005). Therefore, n-back task is an appropriate 
measurement for memory Stroop paradigm since it taps into both recollection and 
familiarity, and various WM functions. 
2.4. Event-related potentials (ERPs)  
The electrophysiological measure most commonly used in studies of memory is the 
event-related potential (ERP). An ERP waveform characterises the average time-
locked electrical activity elicited by experimental stimuli. To calculate ERP 
components, the EEG is segmented and aligned according to the onset of an 
experimental stimulus. The temporal resolution of ERPs is very high, it is measured 
in milliseconds, and therefore, they are well suited to addressing questions about the 
time course of the neural correlates of stimulus-locked cognitive processes.  
Memory retrieval studies measuring ERPs demonstrated differences in brain 
electrical activity between old (studied) and new (non-studied) stimuli. An early 
report on ERPs of recognition memory demonstrated that ERPs elicited by old items 
are more positive than new items (Warren, 1980). The evidence of having two 
memory processes, as assumed by dual process recognition models, has been 
supported by ERP studies of recognition memory (see Friedman & Johnson, 2000; 
Rugg, 1995; Rugg & Allan, 2000, for reviews). This old/new effect onsets around 
300ms and continues for a couple of more hundred milliseconds. For example, 
Curran (2004) identified three distinct ERP old/new effects (a) an FN400 that was 
maximal over anterior, superior and posterior, inferior regions between 300-500ms 
(b) a mid-frontal old/new effect between 300-500ms which only occurred for 
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pseudo-word recognition (c) P600 was maximal over posterior, superior and anterior, 
inferior regions which was larger for words than pseudo-words but did not differ 
between tasks. 
Rugg and Curran (2007) found that the ERP markers of recollection (parietal 
old/new effect) is a phasic, positive-going parietally maximal around 400-500ms 
post-stimulus onset and exhibits a left-sided maximum. Furthermore, this parietal 
old/new effect was elicited by all studied items irrespective of the task or recognition 
accuracy. In addition, an early mid-frontal effect between 300-500ms linked to 
familiarity processes whereas a later left parietal effect between 400-800ms linked to 
recollection (Curran, 2004; Rugg, 1995; Rugg & Curran, 2007). 
Although some researchers are convinced that FN400 reflects familiarity 
processes (Mecklinger, 2000; Paller, Voss, & Boehm, 2007; Rugg & Curran, 2007), 
there is also evidence that frontal N400 is actually indicates semantic priming and it 
is indistinguishable from functionally identical to centro-parietal N400 component 
(Kutas & Federmeier, 2011; Voss & Federmeier, 2011). Hence, Voss and 
Federmeier (2011) showed that semantic priming modulated the FN400, without 
having an influence on familiarity. This is also supported by findings that N400 do 
not covary with the recognition for non-semantic stimuli (De Chastelaine, Friedman, 
Cycowicz, & Horton, 2009; MacKenzie & Donaldson, 2007; Voss & Paller, 2009). 
On the other hand, recently a study conducted two experiments to differentiate 
priming from recognition which showed that primed and unprimed old words as well 
as old and new primed words were not topographically dissociable when priming 
was embedded in a recognition task, but when priming and recognition was 
separated, recognition was present at left frontal area of the scalp 6WUyĪDN
Abedzadeh, & Curran, 2016). Considered together, FN400 and N400 are distinct 
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familiarity processes which share similar neural sources. To sum, there are two 
possible sources of FN400 can be deduced: (a) familiarity-based recognition and (2) 
semantic/conceptual priming.  
Finally, late posterior negative slow wave (LPN) has been observed in a large 
number of recognition memory studies (Curran, 1999; Cycowicz, Friedman, & 
Snodgrass, 2001; Donaldson & Rugg, 1998; Dywan, Segalowitz, & Arsenault, 2002; 
Nessler, Mecklinger, & Penney, 2001) which is an ERP component that onsets 
before or at around the time the participants respond to a retrieval cue at test which is 
a bilateral posterior parietal distribution located at Pz (Johansson & Mecklinger, 
2003). In addition, LPN was linked to action monitoring triggered after a response 
conflict (Johansson & Mecklinger, 2003). Alternatively, Herron (2007) identified 
three different LPNs; two of which was stimulus-locked and third was response-
locked. A stimulus-locked early (600-1200ms) effect was found to be sensitive to 
task fluency and related to the search of episodic information, whereas a late 
stimulus-locked (1200-1900ms) component was identified for the maintenance of a 
retrieved episode. A more negative response-locked LPN (50-300ms.) was identified 
for old items compared to new items that is consistent with the action-monitoring 
account. As this thesis will explore the recognition of target and distractor items in 
general, it is also important to include LPN correlate in the investigation of SR 
effect. 
2.5. Recognition Confidence 
7KHDELOLW\WRHYDOXDWHRQH¶VRZQPHPRU\DFFXUDWHO\LVDVLPSRUWDQWDVUHmembering 
in normal cognitive functioning. Evaluations of confidence judgements are widely 
used in eyewitness research. Confidence and accuracy have important applications in 
49 
 
legal processes. In addition to face recognition and eyewitness research, 
understanding the relationship between accuracy and confidence can contribute to 
knowledge of the cognitive processes governing confidence judgements and meta-
memory.  
Two types of confidence judgements have been defined; prospective and 
retrospective. A prospective confidence rating (judgements of learning), is the 
confidence decisions made when the stimuli is studied before the recognition task 
and judgements about how well the stimulus is learnt is made. In contrast, a 
retrospective confidence rating is taken at the recognition task and is about 
confidence of the person that he/she has made the correct recognition decision. The 
research included in this thesis will only consider the retrospective confidence 
decisions of the participants as it will be used as an index of the conscious awareness 
of the unintentional recognition. 
2.5.1. Confidence judgements as an indicator of recollection and familiarity 
Confidence judgements are UHFRJQLVHGDVDPHDVXUHRIRQH¶VEHOLHIRIDFFXUDWHO\
retrieved information. Confidence judgements are considered to be a marker of 
recollection and/or familiarity. 
According to the signal detection model, the discrimination between old and 
new items arises by the selection of a response criterion. Ideally, people set a 
response criterion at the intersection of the old and new item distributions. A way of 
setting an artificial and standard response criterion for participants would be to ask 
them to evaluate their judgements on the basis of their confidence. Consequently, a 
new decision criterion would have been formed. 
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Alternatively, dual process models attempt to explain confidence of the 
UHFRJQLWLRQMXGJHPHQWVHVSHFLDOO\<RQHOLQDV¶(1994) dual process signal detection 
model placed a considerable emphasis on confidence. Recollection is related to high 
confidence judgements whereas familiarity can be associated with various levels of 
confidence responses (Yonelinas, 1994, 2001). The Dual process signal detection 
model makes a critical assumption that lower confidence responses should lead to 
increases in false alarms, but recollection should remain relatively unaffected 
(Yonelinas, 2001). This assumption provides a basis for the relationship of 
confidence and accuracy. High confidence ratings were found to be strongly 
associated with the items that are previously presented (Boduroglu, Tekcan, & 
Kapucu, 2014; Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Clark, 1997) however, the 
research also disproves the idea that highest confidence ratings produce 100% 
accuracy (Roediger & DeSoto, 2014). For example, it was found that old responses 
to words were made more with high confidence compared to low confidence 
judgements (0.73 vs 0.18) whereas new responses distributed equally for high and 
low confidence judgements (0.42 vs 0.41) (Henson, Rugg, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000). 
The research indicates that in addition to accuracy, other possible components might 
be linked to confidence levels. 
The relationship between recognition accuracy and confidence can be described 
with two main models (Busey, et al., 2000). According to single dimensional 
models, retrieval processes direct both confidence and accuracy judgements. Using 
the same resources for both judgements allows one to predict accuracy from 
confidence or vice versa. Theories of trace strength of memory postulates that 
memory strengths may vary with different levels of confidence; strong traces are 
more likely to be recalled and recognised correctly and with greater confidence. In 
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contrast, multi-dimensional model (Busey, et al., 2000) argues that memory traces 
have two dimensions, memory strength and memory certainty. They jointly affect 
confidence judgements, whereas recognition accuracy is affected by only memory 
strength. Also, confidence judgements are found to be closely linked to the strength 
of the memory representation (Stretch & Wixted, 1998). Having certainty as an 
additional dimension might make it possible to account for the lack of correlation of 
confidence and accuracy in some cases.  
2.6. Current research questions 
This chapter outlined some of the key factors that can influence SR effect, with a 
specific focus on working memory and confidence judgements. This thesis examined 
the effects of picture distractors on memory recognition judgements to words when 
the attention is divided with a working memory task (n-back) in a dual-task 
paradigm.  
The first experimental chapter describes the influence of working memory load 
and sequential dependencies on SR. To establish the role of the working memory in 
order in avoiding SR effect, an experiment was conducted with a concurrent 
secondary task which had two different WM loads (Experiment 1). There is also 
strong evidence that sequential dependencies involved in recognition memory (Düzel 
& Heinze, 2002), to understand how it was involved in this specific dual task 
settings as well as in relation to the distractor processing the data was subjected to 
further exploration (Experiment 1). Furthermore, the influence of emotions was 
investigated as their processing can alter the allocation of attentional resources which 
may influence the occurrence of SR effect (Experiment 2). 
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Subsequent to exploring the influence of working memory on SR effect, the 
remaining research questions in Chapter 3 focus on the neural correlates of SR effect 
using EEG and identify the involvement of working memory. To do so, a replication 
and an extension of (Bergström, et al., 2016) study was intended. This research was 
particularly interested in the neural dissociation of the SR effect and the modulatory 
effects of working memory.  
The final research questions in Chapter 4 focus on the impact of the confidence 
judgements on SR and investigates the neural correlates of subjective confidence 
decisions. More specifically, the main question in this chapter iV³Are people 
consciously aware of the SR effect when they make recognition decisions for the 
WDUJHWGHFLVLRQV"´ To investigate this, the experiments included a confidence scale 
to determine levels of their awareness related to SR effect. Furthermore, a neural 
investigation of this was conducted using EEG measures in this chapter.  
In summary, the current thesis will present six experiments that employ the 
memory Stroop task in conjunction with behavioural and EEG measures. The aim of 
the thesis is to provide a new and valuable insight into the influence of unintentional 
recognition on intentional recognition, as an exploration of the involvement of 
working memory and consciousness in the distractor bias. The findings from 
empirical chapters are discussed in the final chapter and suggestions for additional 




Spontaneous Recognition: Investigating the role of working memory and 
sequential dependencies 
As a requirement to fulfil the demands of the 21st century modern life, people usually 
had to joggle several tasks at the same time. Along with the goal related processes 
orchestrating everyday tasks, the ability to ignore irrelevant stimuli is very important 
to conduct those smoothly. As such, people often are surrounded by distractor 
stimuli as well as target stimuli. Therefore, the unintentional distraction biases may 
have an important influence on intentional target recognition. However, research on 
unintentional recognition has been neglected compared to decades of research on 
intentional recognition. A limited number of research has focused on the effects of 
unintentional recognition on intentional recognition (Anderson, et al., 2011; 
Bergström, et al., 2016; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993) which can also be termed the 
spontaneous recognition (SR) effect.  
SR effect was found under divided attention conditions (simultaneously 
performing a secondary listening task) in young adults (Anderson, et al., 2011; Ste-
Marie & Jacoby, 1993). These results provided support that unintentional 
recognition govern intentional recognition under divided attention conditions. Two 
different accounts have been suggested for the role of attention in distractor 
processing. The first mechanism (perceptual selection) passively excludes distractor 
stimuli whereas the second mechanism (late selection) actively rejects irrelevant 
distractors employing attentional control. According to an alternative selective 
attention account which converged the two mechanisms, perceptual selection 
mechanism rejects distractor processing in an early stage in high perceptual load 
54 
 
situations and the late selective mechanism rejects irrelevant distractors in low 
perceptual load conditions (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994).  
However, attention is not the only cognitive process that might modulate the 
processing of distractors and targets. Working memory (WM) is a system which is 
important for the maintenance and online manipulation of information and it is a 
crucial cognitive mechanism that controls attention, prevents distractor processing 
and inhibits goal-irrelevant information. According to the multi-component model of 
working memory, the central executive (CE) sub-component is mainly responsible 
from guiding the attention towards goal-related stimuli. In situations where CE is 
loaded, goal-related processing might be disrupted and result in attention being 
misguided. An alternative account of WM portrays a more complex model and 
emphasises contribution of the activated part of LTM. Accordingly, the embedded 
process of WM model suggests that focus of attention and the activated part of LTM 
forms WM, and irrelevant information can be processed in activated part of LTM 
when the focus of attention exceeded. Therefore, this model predicts that loading 
WM would allow distractor stimuli to be processed unintentionally (outside of focus 
of attention). Moving on, the central executive component of WM is responsible for 
maintaining activation of relevant information and suppressing distractors (Conway 
& Engle, 1994). Lavie et al. (2004) conducted a series of studies that highlighted the 
causal role of WM in control of interference with visual distractors. They suggested 
that loading WM in a selective attention task with a concurrent but irrelevant task 
reduces the focus of attention on the relevant stimuli with greater interference from 
distractors. 
Thus, Lavie and de Fockert (2005) demonstrated that in an attentional search 
task interference effect of distractors is greater in high WM load conditions 
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compared to low WM load conditions. Following from this intertwined connection 
between attention and working memory, it is possible to assume a greater distractor 
processing when WM is loaded. Especially, in a paradigm like memory Stroop 
where distractor processing can be observed even with the low perceptual load (one 
distractor and one target) in divided attention conditions. On the other hand, it is not 
clear whether divided attention or WM is involved in SR effect as Anderson et al. 
(2011) used a task which relies on WM functions such as maintenance and updating 
of information. Therefore, we aimed to understand the involvement of WM in the SR 
effect. 
We have only come across the use of the memory Stroop task by Anderson et 
al. (2011) and Bergström (2016). Therefore, the main aim of our study was to 
replicate these findings. We also attempted to generalise these findings by 
investigating additional manipulations. In all the reported studies we (a) only used 
words as targets and pictures as distractors. This was done to provide a stronger test 
of the unintentional nature of the distractors. As Anderson et al. (2011) used pictures 
or words as targets in different blocks as a within-subject manipulation, it could be 
argued that when distractor effects were found for word targets the results may be 
contaminated by intentional memory. That is, checking both the attended and 
ignored modalities because on some blocks pictures were the relevant target 
modality. Studying pictures and words and then only testing words as targets with 
pictures as distractors should be a stronger test of any distractor effects that are 
driven by unintentional processes. (b) We also used a different secondary task to the 
one used by Anderson et al. (2011) and Bergström et al. (2016). In particular, N-back 
task (both 1-back and 2-back) was used to tax working memory resources. The n-
back trials were alternated with the memory Stroop trials. It was predicted that the 
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distractor effect would be more likely to appear when using the 2-back task during 
the test phase as this task is more likely to divert attention away from the main 
memory Stroop task. When n-back is larger than 1, two contrasting predictions can 
be made. The higher working memory load for n-back >1 could deplete a common 
pool of attentional resources and thus allowing the distractor effect to break through. 
Alternatively, it could be assumed that when n-back>1 recollection is required to 
decide if the current stimulus matches the stimulus n trials back. If this recollection 
process competes with the main recognition task for words then this may disrupt the 
distractor effect that is thought to rely on familiarity. Additionally, n-back task 
allows the examination of whether the previous n-back decision would affect 
distractor as an additional factor (Verhaeghen & Basak, 2005). For instance, for 1-
back task, a match trial would require less WM resources than a mismatch trial as the 
mismatch trial requires not only maintaining but also updating the memory record 
(where there is a requirement to replace old representations with new ones) 
compared to match trials. Alternatively, for 2-back task, both match and mismatch 
trials would require update, maintaining and shifting (Chen, et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, it was found that continuous updating of items in WM prevents strong 
binding of those items to their contexts in WM, and hence leads to an increased 
susceptibility to proactive interference (Szmalec, Verbruggen, Vandierendonck, & 
Kemps, 2011). However, according to some researchers n-back task is considered to 
be a recognition task as well as a WM task (Jaeggi, et al., 2010). So, match trials 
would be easier compared to mismatch trials since they would initiate a possibly 
automatic familiarity response. A match trial in n-back task requires the current 
stimuli to be congruent (the same) with n-back stimuli. In contrast, a mismatch trial 
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in n-back task requires the current stimuli to be incongruent (different) with n-back 
stimuli. Therefore, this factor wilOEHFDOOHGµFRQJUXHQF\¶ in the analysis section. 
In sum, our first hypothesis was that participants would make more hits to 
old targets paired with old distractors compared to new distractors and they would 
make more correct rejections to new targets when they were paired with new 
distractors compared to old ones (SR effect). Our second hypothesis was that 
differences in accuracy defined in the first hypothesis would be higher when the 
secondary task was a 2-back task (high WM load) compared to 1-back (low WM 
load). To evaluate, we selected memory Stroop paradigm described earlier as the 
recognition task as it allows us to examine unintentional recognition indirectly. 
This chapter includes two different experiments using the same stimuli, only 
differing in the number of items encoded in the study phase. Initially, the aim was to 
investigate whether the change in the quantity of to-be encoded items would affect 
SR as well as the WM load. Accordingly, an experiment conducted with two 
episodic loads in different groups. Half of the participants encoded 12 pictures and 
12 words whereas other half encoded 6 pictures and 6 words. Later we combined all 
the data from two groups and included episodic load as a factor. In the next section, 




One hundred and two healthy young adults, undergraduate and postgraduate 
students from the department of Psycho1ogy recruited from the University of Kent.  
Participants were between 18-48 years old (77 females Mage=20.71, SD age=4.40, 21 
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males Mage=24.48, SD age=4.68). The participants were randomly assigned to the 1-
back and 2-back conditions. Four participants were eliminated due to failure in their 
performance on secondary WM task (below 50% accuracy). 
Materials 
132 words and 132 pictures were used for stimuli. Pictures were single line, 
simple drawings in black and white and they were taken from (Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980) and (Bonin, Peereman, Malardier, Méot, & Chalard, 2003) 
(http://leadserv.u-bourgogne.fr/bases/pictures/) and words were selected from 
ELEXICON project database (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/). The words selected by 
length (3-6 letters), only nouns and concrete words were used. They were presented 
in blue 60 point Arial font. Pictures and words randomly paired for the memory test 
with the restriction that the picture and word should not be semantically related.  
Procedure 
After giving information and having signed the informed consent participants 
were taken to a quieWURRPZLWKDFRPSXWHUVHWXS'HOOLFRPSXWHUZLWK´VTXDUH
screen). The experiment started with a practice with two rounds (each of which 
included interleaved 10 n-back and 10 Memory Stroop trials) which were designed 
identical to the real experiment with different stimuli and continued until participants 
reached at least 80% success. The practice phase followed by the study and test 
phases. The test phase included the Memory Stroop Task (MST) interleaved with the 
working memory task. The instructions presented were written in blue on a white 
background whereas the words were in blue and images were black on white 
background. The experiment consisted of 5 rounds for high episodic load and 10 
rounds for low episodic load condition. This was done to achieve an equal number of 
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trials for both groups. Each round included both study and test phases.  Figure 2.1 
shows the schema of the design and representative stimuli. 
 
Figure 2. 1. Illustration of the experimental procedure 
Participants were shown 12 pictures and 12 words in the high episodic load 
condition and 6 pictures and 6 words in the low episodic load condition, which were 
randomly mixed during the study and presented individually. They were asked to 
memorize the words and pictures. The inter stimulus interval (ISI) was 500ms and 
the duration of the stimulus was 2500ms. Participants were asked to switch between 
two tasks during the test phase (see Figure 1); the first task involved making a 
decision for the n-back task which comprised of numbers. The n-back task is 
generally used in the literature as a manipulation of working memory (Kirchner, 
1958). I used the n-back (1-back/2-back) task in which participants were asked if the 
number on the current trial is the same witKWKHQXPEHU³Q´RUQXPEHUVEHIRUH
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The stimuli were single digits ranging from 1 to 9 and a target was a digit that was 
the same as the digit presented 1 or 2 (1-back and 2-back, respectively) trials before. 
All other digits were referred to as non-targets. Target and non-targets were assigned 
pseudo randomly with the condition of maintaining target/non-target ratio. Each of 
the blocks contained (50%) targets and (50%) non-targets. Participants were 
LQVWUXFWHGWRSUHVVWKHµ6¶IRUVDPHRUµ/¶IRUdifferent) keys. Behavioural outputs 
were reaction times and response accuracy (hits and false alarms). The second task, 
the memory Stroop task (MST), closely followed the design used by (Anderson, et 
al., 2011) In this task, participants are required to make recognition (old/new) 
judgements on the words when displayed simultaneously with the pictures. Pictures 
and words were randomly paired and pairings were different across all participants. 
Each test block included 24 trials for the low episodic load condition and 48 trials for 
the high episodic condition with a word superimposed on a picture and presented in a 
random order. Each test block was made up of an equal number of the four 
target/distractor item types: new words and new pictures (6 trials for low, 12 trials 
for high episodic memory load), new words and old pictures (6 trials for low, 12 
trials for high episodic memory load ), old words and new pictures (6 trials for low, 
12 trials for high episodic memory load ) and old words and old pictures (6 trials for 
low, 12 trials for high episodic memory load ). Participants were instructed to ignore 
the pictures and make their recognition judgements only for the oldness of the words 
(did you see the word before in the study phase or not). Participants were instructed 
WRSUHVVWKHµ6¶EXWWRQIRUROGLIWKH\VDZWKHZRUGLQWKHVWXG\SKDVHRUµ/¶EXWWRQ
(for new) if they saw the word in the study phase.  The screen showing the test items 
was presented until the response or for a maximum of 6000ms. After 500ms ISI, a 
single digit was presented for n-back task. Participants were asked to respond as 
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accurately as possible. Stimulus presentation and response collection was conducted 
with an open source computer programme developed by Jonathan Pierce (PsychoPy 
2.0). 
Results 
The design of the statistical analysis was a 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distractor 
type: old, new) x 2 (working memory load: 1-back, 2-back) x 2 (congruity: match, 
mismatch) x 2 (episodic load: low, high) mixed factorial ANOVA with target type, 
distractor type and n-back trial was within subjects and working memory load and 
episodic load was between subjects factor.  
Analysis of N-Back task 
The n-back performance accuracy and reaction times (RTs) were compared 
with 2 (episodic load; low, high) x 2 (WM load; high vs low) x 2 (congruency; 
match, mismatch) mixed factorial ANOVA with congruency as within and WM load 
and episodic load as between subjects factors. Analysis on accuracy revealed that 
there was a significant difference between 2-back (M=0.88, SD=0.08) and 1-back 
(M=0.94, SD=0.08; F (1, 94) = 11.29, p=0.001, Șp2 = 0.11). However, there was no 
difference between high and low episodic load (F (1, 94) = 0.84, p=0.36), and no 
interaction of WM load and episodic load conditions (F (1, 94) = 0.10, p=0.76). 
Interestingly, congruency and WM load interacted (F (1, 94) = 11.14, p=0.001, Șp2 = 
0.11). Independent samples t-test separately conducted for match and mismatch 
trials. Analyses revealed that there was a significant difference between 1-back and 
2-back conditions in match (M1-back= 0.92, SD1-back = 0.09; M2-back = 0.83, SD2-back = 
0.10; t (96) = 4.58, p<0.001) but not in mismatch trials (M1-back= 0.96, SD1-back = 
0.09; M2-back = 0.93, SD2-back = 0.09; t (96) = 1.26, p=0.21).  
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Analysis on RTs revealed that there was a significant difference between 2-
back (M=1534ms, SD=58ms) and 1-back (M=864ms, SD=55ms; F (1, 94) = 70.46, 
p<0.001, Șp2 = 0.43), and between low (M=1041ms, SD=41ms) and high 
(M=1333ms, SD=61ms) episodic load (F (1, 94) = 12.76, p=0.001, Șp2 = 0.12), and 
no interaction of WM load and episodic load conditions (F (1, 94) = 2.56, p=0.11). 
Interestingly, congruency and WM load interacted (F (1, 94) = 4.15, p=0.05, Șp2 = 
0.04). Independent samples t-test separately conducted for match and mismatch 
trials. Analyses revealed that there was a significant difference between 1-back and 
2-back conditions in match (t (96) = 7.70, p<0.001) and in mismatch trials (t (96) = 
7.72, p<0.001).  
The difference between 1-back and 2-back WM load conditions on accuracy 
and RTs show that manipulations for WM load have been implemented. 
Furthermore, the results indicated that match and mismatch trials affected the n-back 
accuracy performance differentially; participants were more accurate in match trials 
compared to mismatch trials in 1-back task, but the accuracy in match and mismatch 
trials were similar for 2-back task. 
Analysis of Memory Stroop task 
  Mean scores and standard deviations of accuracy were calculated for oldness 
(new and old) of target and distractors at each WM load condition (1-back and 2- 






Table 2. 1. Mean and Standard deviation of hit and correct rejection scores for 
















Match 0.79 (0.15) 0.76 (0.18) 0.84 (0.16) 0.90 (0.17) 
Mismatch 0.75 (0.18) 0.74 (0.22) 0.88 (0.13) 0.89 (0.12) 
2-
back 
Match 0.80 (0.17) 0.67 (0.19) 0.77 (0.18) 0.87 (0.11) 
Mismatch 0.76 (0.15) 0.74 (0.20) 0.81 (0.15) 0.82 (0.16) 
Low 1-
back 
Match 0.86 (0.13) 0.84 (0.16) 0.96 (0.09) 0.96 (0.08) 
Mismatch 0.86 (0.14) 0.84 (0.18) 0.96 (0.07) 0.97 (0.11) 
2-
back 
Match 0.85 (0.19) 0.84 (0.14) 0.89 (0.15) 0.94 (0.10) 
Mismatch 0.88 (0.14) 0.83 (0.19) 0.88 (0.17) 0.92 (0.13) 
 
Analyses revealed a main effect of target (F (1,94) = 28.52, p<0.001, Șp2 
=0.23), interaction of target and distractor (F (1,94) = 21.62, p<0.001, Șp2 =0.19), 
and target, distractor, congruity interaction (F (1,94) = 3.88, p=0.05, Șp2 =0.04), all 
other main effects and interactions were non-significant (Fs<1, ps>0.09) 
As predicted, target and distractor interacted with WM load (F (1, 94) = 4.24, 
p=0.04, Șp2=0.04). To understand the three-way interaction, two separate ANOVAs 
conducted for 1-back and 2-back conditions, results revealed that, target and 
distractor interaction was non-significant in 1-back condition (F (1, 49) = 3.44, 
p=0.07, Șp2=0.07) whereas it was significant in 2-back condition (F (1, 45) = 22.03, 
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p<0.001, Șp2=0.33). Paired samples t-test revealed that participants were more 
accurate to old targets paired with old distractors (M=0.83, SD=0.15) compared to 
new distractors (M=0.77, SD=0.18; t (46) = 2.68, p=0.01), and new targets paired 
with new distractors (M=0.89, SD=0.11) compared to old distractors (M=0.84, 
SD=0.15; t (46) = 4.27, p<0.001). 
Interestingly, target, distractor, congruity and episodic load interaction (F (1, 
94) = 7.81, p=0.006, Șp2= 0.08) was significant. To investigate, 2 (target type) x 2 
(distractor type) x 2 (congruity) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
separately for high and low episodic load conditions collapsed for WM load 
conditions. Target, distractor and congruity interaction was non-significant in low 
episodic load condition (F (1, 50) = 0.43, p=0.52, Șp2= 0.008) but significant in high 
episodic load condition (F (1, 46) =8.59, p=0.005, Șp2=0.16). Further, 2 (target type) 
x 2 (distractor type) repeated measures ANOVA conducted separately on match and 
mismatch trials for only high episodic load condition. Analysis revealed a significant 
interaction of target and distractor in match trials, (F (1, 46) =23.75, p<0.001), but 
not in mismatch trials, (F (1, 46) =0.90, p=0.35). Participants were better at 
recognising old targets paired with old distractors (M=0.79, SD=0.16) compared to 
new distractors (M=0.72, SD=0.19; t (46) = 3.62. p=0.001) and new targets paired 
with new distractors (M=0.89, SD=0.15) compared to old distractors (M=0.80, 








Table 2. 2. ANOVA results for Memory Stroop recognition accuracy 
 
Source F (1,94) p Șp2 
T 28.52 <0.001** 0.23 
T * E 0.14 0.71 0.002 
T * WM 1.95 0.17 0.02 
T * E * WM 0.04 0.85 <0.001 
D 0.04 0.85 <0.001 
D * E 0.06 0.81 0.001 
D * WM 0.04 0.85 <0.001 
D * E * WM 1.20 0.28 0.01 
C <0.001 0.98 <0.001 
C * E 0.005 0.94 <0.001 
C * WM 0.03 0.85 <0.001 
C * E * WM 0.12 0.73 0.001 
T * D 21.62 <0.001** 0.19 
T * D * E 2.81 0.10 0.03 
T * D * WM 4.24 0.04* 0.04 
T * D * E * WM 0.35 0.56 0.004 
T * C  <0.001 0.98 <0.001 
T * C * E 0.93 0.34 0.01 
T * C * WM 2.98 0.09 0.03 
T * C * E * WM 0.19 0.66 0.002 
D * C 0.55 0.46 0.006 
D * C * E 0.06 .802 0.001 
D * C * WM 0.12 0.74 0.001 
D * C * E * WM 1.31 0.26 0.01 
T * D * C 3.88 0.05 0.04 
T * D * C * E 7.81 0.006* 0.08 
T * D * C * WM 0.81 0.37 0.01 
T * D * C * E * WM 1.74 0.19 0.02 
T= Target, D=Distractor, C= Congruity, WM= Working Memory Load, E= 
Episodic Load, *p<0.05, **p<0.001 
 
Discussion 
This study aimed to replicate the results from Anderson et al. (2011) using the same 
memory Stroop Task which was used to determine how the picture distractors (old or 
new) influenced recognition of old and new word targets. Our study is in line with 
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previous studies investigating the influence of old compared to new distractors on 
target recognition (Ste- Marie & Jacoby, 1993; Anderson et al., 2011; Bergström et 
al., 2016). Specifically, participants were more accurate in recognising the old 
targets paired with old distractors compared to new distractors and were better at 
correctly rejecting new targets when paired with new distractors compared to old 
distractors. 
Extending previous research, we provided evidence for involvement of WM 
on SR effect; target and distractor interaction was modulated by the WM load. 
Where the secondary task was less demanding in WM resources, participants did not 
show the SR effect even though they divided their attention for the 1-back task. On 
the contrary, more demanding high WM load task divided attention sufficiently and 
allowed unintentional recognition of distractors influence the target recognition. The 
results suggest that WM resources were required to avoid unintentional Stroop-like 
effects of distractors. Specifically, high WM-related cognitive demand reduced the 
ability of participants to reject distractors actively. 
More broadly, our results are consistent with the load theory of selective 
attention: in low perceptual load settings attentional control mechanism rejects 
distractors actively and this mechanism depends on higher cognitive processes such 
as WM (Lavie, et al., 2004). As such, in this experiment when the WM was loaded 
with 2-back task, attentional control was reduced and it was insufficient to stop the 
unintentional processing of the distractor. The 2-back task created, unlike the 1-back 
task, enough effect to divide attention and resulted in participants being less able to 
resist distractor effects and retrieve relevant information encoded in the study phase. 
This finding supports earlier studies investigating the role of WM on distractor 
effects (de Fockert, et al., 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003; Lavie, et al., 2004). 
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Contrary to the predictions, unintentional recognition of distractors 
influenced target recognition if the previous n-back trial was a match only in high 
episodic load condition. This finding is especially interesting because the influence 
of high episodic load on SR effect was revealed only in match trials. The 
combination of the high load on episodic memory and the cognitive processes 
required for match responses created a stronger SR effect similar to the effect of high 
load on WM. There is a possibility that the recognition processes underlying n-back 
task (especially in match trials) might conflicted/competed with memory Stroop task 
leading a stronger influence of unintentional distractor processing. However, an 
additional episodic load might be necessary for this competition to emerge. 
Connectedly, participants were also less accurate in 2-back compared to 1-
back task on match trials but not on mismatch trials. This suggests that possibly, 
participants found match trials harder compared to mismatch trials in 2-back task, 
leading them to be influenced by unintentional recognition of distractors. It has been 
suggested that n-back task also include recognition processes especially familiarity 
in match trials, (Jaeggi, et al., 2010; Redick & Lindsey, 2013). This suggests that 
familiarity responses may help participants in giving an accurate answer in match 
trials. However, in dual task conditions like our paradigm, a concurrent recognition 
task may have disrupted this process and conflicted with match trials more in 2-back 
than 1-back task. As a result, participants were less accurate in match trials 
compared to mismatch trials. Moreover, this effect was seen on only in high episodic 
load condition where the to-be encoded items were more than high episodic load 
condition. According to Cowan (1999), activated part of LTM is a part of WM, and 
the number of items to be recalled is related to the capacity of WM. Therefore, 
asking participants to recognize an item amongst 12 encoded items naturally harder 
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from recognizing an item amongst 6 encoded items. Alternatively, global matching 
models argue that to make a decision it is necessary to evaluate and combine the 
strength of each related item stored in memory (Clark & Gronlund, 1996; Gronlund 
& Ratcliff, 1989; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992). Therefore, this kind of 
recognition decision with more items to be matched in episodic memory might be 
more prone to errors. Furthermore, according to the search model of recognition 
memory, making a serial search prolongs the response time, as a result, more items 
would require longer search. 
Nevertheless, the results highlight the unintentional nature of the distractor 
effect as only words were used as targets throughout the study and still the picture 
distractors affected performance.  
Sequential Dependencies 
So far, the presented experiments have focused only on the evidence associated with 
current target recognition. As such, in an analysis interested in the current target 
UHFRJQLWLRQJHQHUDOO\DVVXPHVWKDWWKHWULDO³Q´LVLQGHSHQGHQWIURPSUHYLRXVWULDO³Q-
M´M!ODJ+RZHYHULWLVDOVRSRVVLEOHWRDVVXPHDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ³Q´DQG
³Q-M´WKDWUHSUHVHQWVVHTXHQWLDOGHSHQGHQFLHV Malmberg and Annis (2012) argued 
that memory researchers did not report any findings related to sequential 
dependencies, and perceived sequential dependencies as random noise. However, the 
research increasingly showing that sequential dependencies are more than a random 
noise, and it is suggested to take into account in experimental designs (Düzel & 
Heinze, 2002). A positive correlation between current trial (n) and previous trial (n-j) 
referred assimilation and a negative correlation referred contrast. Holland and 
Lockhead (1968) model for sequential dependencies accounts for assimilation and 
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contrast effects. According to their model, the difference between the previous and 
the current stimulus would be underestimated on average and current response would 
be biased towards (assimilation) or away (contrast) from the previous stimulus. 
Alternatively, Treisman and Williams (1984) argued that the assimilation occurs 
ZKHQWKHGHFLVLRQFULWHULRQLQWULDO³Q´IROORZHGE\WKHUHVSRQVHRQWULDO³Q-M´DQG
contrast results from the stabilization of the criterion to the fixed position for longer 
sequences. 
Early work on sequential dependencies demonstrated reaction time 
measurements are affected by the preceding item types in choice tasks. For example, 
Ratcliff and Starns (2009) IRXQGUHVSRQVHVIROORZHGDQ³ROG´UHVSRQVHFompared to 
UHVSRQVHVIROORZHGD³QHZ´response created a large difference in zROC slopes. 
Their results showed that the ³QHZ´GHFLVLRQFULWHULDZHUHKLJKHUZKHQWKHSUHYLRXV
UHVSRQVHZDV³ROG´DQGWKH³ROG´GHFLVLRQFULWHULDZHUHKLJKHUZKHQWKHSUHYLRXV
UHVSRQVHZDV³QHZ´, illustrating a contrast effect. Düzel and Heinze (2002) observed 
sequence dependencies on correct rejections which were lower for change (different 
from previous trial) trials compared the no-change (same with the previous trial) 
trials but they failed to find a difference in hits. Their findings suggest new item 
recognition was influenced by the context of preceding old items. For example, 
participants are more likely to overestimate the current stimulus if its intensity is less 
than the stimulus presented on the previous trial. 
We reasoned that if match and mismatch trials of the WM task can moderate 
the SR effect then other sequential effects might also occur. Consequently, we 
investigated the sequential dependencies to further explore the distractor effect. We 
investigated whether the previous trial context (whether the previous trial was a 
new/old target or a new/old distractor) affects current trial recognition performance. 
70 
 
It might be predicted given the modality effects found by Ste-Marie and Jacoby 
(1993) that the old/new nature of the previous word target is more likely to affect the 
current trial target recognition responses as they are both from the same modality. 
The old/new nature of the previous distractor picture might not affect the current 
word target responses. However, it is possible that the previous distractor could 
interact with the current distractor as their modalities are the same. 
Results 
The analysis included target and distractor as within subjects factors, as in the 
previous analysis conducted in this chapter. Consequently, a main effect of target, 
and target and distractor interaction were also found in analysis for sequential 
dependencies (see Table 2.4 for details). Therefore, these findings were not reported 
here again. In addition, in the previous analysis there was no difference of SR effect 
between experiments and there was no prediction related to sequential dependencies 
and WM load. Therefore, to have a simpler analysis we excluded between subjects 
factors (WM load and Experiment) from this analysis.  
Mean scores and standard deviations of accuracy were calculated for oldness 
(new and old) of target and distractors for current and previous target and distractors 








Table 2. 3. Mean and Standard deviation of hit and correct rejection scores combined 
for all experiments and WM load conditions. 
  














0.78 (0.22) 0.77 (0.22) 0.89 (0.18) 0.91 (0.14) 
Previous New 
Distractor 





0.81 (0.21) 0.79 (0.20) 0.86 (0.18) 0.91 (0.15) 
Previous New 
Distractor 
0.83 (0.18) 0.82 (0.19) 0.89 (0.16) 0.90 (0.18) 
 
Subsequently, a 2 (target; old, new) x 2 (distractor; old, new) x2 (previous 
target; old, new) x2 (previous distractor; old, new) repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted to investigate the sequential dependencies of the memory Stroop task. 
Analysis revealed a significant four-way interaction of target, distractor, 
previous target and previous distractor (See Table 2.4). A subsequent 2 (target; old, 
new) x 2 (distractor; old, new) x2 (previous distractor; old, new) repeated measures 
ANOVA was done on previous old and previous new targets separately. Results 
indicated that the interaction of target, distractor and previous distractor was 
significant for previous old targets (F (1,96) = 6.30, p=0.01, Șp2= 0.06), but not for 
previous new targets (F (1,96) = 2.18, p=0.14, Șp2= 0.02). Following, a 2 (target; 
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old, new) x 2 (distractor; old, new) repeated measures ANOVA was done on 
previous old and previous new distractors separately. Results showed a significant 
target and distractor interaction for new previous distractors (F (1,96) = 23.18, 
p<0.001, Șp2= 0.19), but not for old previous distractors (F (1,96) = 1.48, p=0.23, 
Șp2= 0.02). Finally, a paired samples t-test on current targets and current distractors 
revealed that participants were more accurate to old targets paired with old 
distractors compared to new distractor (t(97)= 4.06, p<0.001). Similarly, they were 
more accurate to the new targets paired with new distractors compared to new targets 
paired with old distractors (t(97)= 2.91, p=0.005)  
Table 2. 4. ANOVA results for Memory Stroop recognition accuracy 
 
Source F (1, 95) p Șp2 
T 30.97 <0.001* 0.25 
D 0.06 0.81 0.001 
PT 1.07 0.30 0.01 
PD 5.49 0.02* 0.06 
T * D 12.69 0.001* 0.12 
T * PT 7.34 0.008* 0.07 
D * PT 2.10 0.15 0.02 
T * D * PT 5.74 0.02* 0.06 
T * PD 2.24 0.14 0.02 
D * PD 4.19 0.04* 0.04 
T * D * PD 0.91 0.34 0.009 
PT * PD 0.08 0.78 0.001 
T * PT * PD 0.51 0.48 0.005 
D * PT * PD 050 0.48 0.005 
T * D * PT * PD 7.97 0.006* 0.08 








The results on sequential dependencies provided important information on SR effect. 
Results showed that the recognition of the previous targets and distractors affected 
the recognition of current targets. The results are especially informative since the 
results further illustrates the unintentional nature of the SR. 
Importantly, a four-way interaction of target, distractor, previous target and 
previous distractor was found. Investigation on the interaction revealed that SR 
effect was present when the previous target was old and the previous distractor was 
new. This finding can be interpreted in the frame of contrast and assimilation effects. 
Assimilation of previous targets influence current targets leading an increased 
OLNHOLKRRGRIUHVSRQGLQJµROG¶ if current target is old, and contrast of previous targets 
influence current targets leading an increased likelihood of responding µQHZ¶LI
current target is new. Moreover, assimilation or contrast effects were not present for 
previous new targets. At the same time, previous distractors create contrast effect 
that occurs when the current response is biased away from stimuli presented on 
earlier trials (Holland & Lockhead, 1968; Treisman & Williams, 1984). Thus, errors 
tend to be overestimated if previous stimuli are small and underestimated if previous 
trials are large. New previous distractors assimilate with current new distractors 
when the current taUJHWLVQHZLQFUHDVLQJWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIUHVSRQGLQJµQHZ¶
Contrarily, previous new distractors contrast with the current old distractors when 
the current target was old; leading to an overestimation of the current old distractors, 
increasing the likelihoRGRIUHVSRQGLQJµROG¶ 
In a study researchers had subjects study a long list of landscape photos and 
tested memory using a confidence rating procedure (Schwartz, Howard, Jing, & 
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Kahana, 2005). 7KH\IRXQGWKDWWKHKLJKHVWFRQILGHQFH³ROG´UDWLQJZDVDERXW 
more likely to be used on trial n + 1 if it was used on trial n. Their results suggested 
that assimilation occurs because when an item is collected from memory the 
representation of the other items from the memory list are activated. When a 
previous item has already been collected, the next item is more ready to be 
reFROOHFWHGDQGPRUHOLNHO\WREHFDOOHGµROG¶ZLWKDKLJKFRQILGHQFH Similarly, 
Malmberg and Annis (2012) found that probability of a hit was greater following a 
hit than following a miss. As such, in this experiment, SR effect was observed only 
when previous pair was of an old target and a new distractor. This finding suggests a 
contrast of the previous distractors with current distractors. The new distractor is 
smaller than the old current distractor in terms of familiarity which would lead to an 
overestimation of the current old distractor. In turn this increases the likelihood of 
ROGFXUUHQWWDUJHWWREHFDOOHGµROG¶. Conversely, the new distractor leads to an 
underestimation of the new target when it was paired with an old distractor. As an 
additional factor, previous old target also might lead to an underestimation of the 
QHZWDUJHWOHDGLQJDQLQFUHDVHGOLNHOLKRRGRIFDOOLQJDQHZWDUJHWµQHZ¶However, it 
should be considered that this experiment differs from previous research 
investigating sequential dependencies by including the sequential dependencies of 
both targets and distractors.   
The results contribute to the knowledge of SR effect with providing evidence 
on sequential dependencies. These results were especially important since such an 






In our daily lives, we are often surrounded by distractor stimuli that are not in our 
focus as well as target stimuli that are processed intentionally and have importance 
for our goals. To ignore distractor stimuli and focus on our current goal is an 
essential ability for completing everyday tasks. We have reported two experiments 
on the effects of WM on spontaneous recognition of a distractor item. First, a 
replication of previous research was aimed and then results on WM extended the 
previous research. Furthermore, for the first time, sequential dependencies of the SR 
effect were explored. 
The methodology of the studies reported in this thesis specifically allowed us 
to investigate concurrent WM load on SR effect. Different from previous research, 
using n-back task as a secondary task ensured the continuous maintenance of the n-
back stimuli in the WM. The WM task had the same load in each trial with the 
exception of the difference between match and mismatch trials. However, in 
Anderson et al¶V study, participants heard a string of digits in which they were asked 
to respond when they detect three consecutive odd numbers (e.g. 5, 7, 9). This could 
lead to discrepancies in WM load in each trial. For instance, participants might need 
to hold only one digit, or two depending on the location of the number in the 
sequence, alternating the WM load in every trial. 
Moreover, the main manipulation in the Anderson et al. study was the 
presence of the secondary task, which was only included in the divided attention 
condition but not in full attention condition. Therefore, the divided attention 
condition required participants to complete a dual task paradigm as compared to the 
single task in a full attention condition in which they only completed the recognition 
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task. Contrarily, our paradigm required participants to divide their attention between 
two tasks in both WM load conditions. The paradigm used in this experiment was a 
dual task paradigm. Hence, Lavie and de Fockert (2005) showed that the interference 
of distractor is greater under dual-task conditions compared to single task conditions. 
These findings suggest that availability of WM is an important determinant of 





Spontaneous Recognition: Investigating the role of Emotional Working 
Memory 
Experiment 1 investigated the effects of WM load on distractor effect in healthy 
young adults. In the light of previous studies (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et 
al., 2016; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993), a dual task paradigm was used in this research 
to divide the attention between a WM task (the n-back task) and a recognition task 
(memory Stroop task). Two different loads (1-back and 2-back) were used for the 
secondary WM task to investigate the involvement of WM processes in SR effect. 
Analysis on accuracy showed that participants were more accurate when old targets 
paired with old distractors compared to new distractors and when new targets paired 
with new distractors compared to old distractors only in the 2-back task. To sum, 
results indicated unintentional recognition of distractor affected intentional 
recognition of target and this effect emerged when WM load was high. This finding 
implies that WM load should be high enough to divide attention and in order to 
observe SR. 
As noted earlier, SR effect occurs from the unintentional recognition of distractors. 
So far, the influence of unintentional distraction on target recognition was 
investigated using pictorial stimuli presented at the same time with target stimuli. 
However, distraction might also occur from factors such as the arousal or the valence 
of emotional stimuli. In such cases, emotional stimuli attracts attention away from 
target processing and uses attentional resources for the processing by employing 
amygdaloid complex (Adolphs, Tranel, & Buchanan, 2005). 
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In a recognition task, negative emotional words were found to be associated with 
remember responses than neutral words, but no difference in remember and know 
responses were found for neutral words suggesting that emotional stimuli elicit 
recollection rather than familiarity (Dewhurst & Parry, 2000; Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003b; Ochsner, 2000). Connectedly, source memory judgements for emotional 
words were found be more enhanced than neutral words (Doerksen & Shimamura, 
2001). However, there is also evidence showing enhanced recognition stems from 
response bias rather than recollection (Dougal & Rotello, 2007). Nevertheless, 
emotional information influence recognition for target and non-target recognition. 
Herron (2017) demonstrated that response accuracy and reaction times associated 
with targets were unaffected by valence, negative non-targets and new items were 
both associated with an increased false alarm rate and longer RTs than their neutral 
items suggesting non-target recognition is affected by emotion. Emotional processes 
are involved in sensory events, but also elicit adaptive responses and modify 
perception. For instance, Taylor et al. (1998) found that emotionally salient stimuli 
appeared to enhance processing of early sensory input during visual recognition. 
Especially in the Stroop task, interference is observed when emotion is irrelevant to 
the task. This interference suggests that people are very sensitive to emotional 
meaning, and unable to fully ignore such meaning under these conditions. Task 
irrelevant emotional stimuli modulates attention. The work on SR effect showed that 
dividing attention enhances SR effect in young adults, researchers argued that this 
stems from the executive attention and control of task irrelevant distractor 
processing. In a recognition task like memory Stroop task, the control of attention is 
especially important to avoid unintentional distractor recognition and to keep the 
task relevant goal online for correct recognition. In memory Stroop task divided 
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attention is usually achieved by asking participants to engage in a secondary task that 
is not related with the main recognition task. Secondary task takes up attentional 
resources from the recognition task efficiently to observe SR effect. A behavioural 
study has demonstrated that emotional arousal enhances attention to stimuli and 
leads to more elaborated memory representations (Bradley, Mogg, & Williams, 
1994). Therefore, using emotional stimuli in the secondary task would require more 
attention for the processing of emotional stimuli compared the non-emotional 
stimuli, leading a bigger gap between the recognition task and the secondary task.  
Not only attention but also working memory might be influenced from the emotional 
processes in two different ways. A bottom up influence of emotion would attract 
more attention towards emotional information leading to changes in working 
memory performance. This change might include an enhancement for negative 
stimuli. Alternatively, a top down approach predicts an influence on the sub-
processes of working memory and create an additional load for WM task. The 
additional load would disrupt executive attention function of working memory. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
This study aims at investigating the connection between SR and attentional biases, 
using EWM task to divide the attention of participants. Emotions potentially can 
create attentional biases. Therefore, to create an additional need for attention 
negative, positive and neutral stimuli were used in the secondary WM task. 
Although previous research lead to different results due to different 
methodologies, the consensus was always that somehow emotional stimuli influence 
long term memory, recognition memory and working memory by automatically 
attracting the attention (Perlstein, et al., 2002; Talmi, 2013; Vuilleumier, 2005). In 
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addition to the attentional requirement that is needed for working memory task, 
emotionally laden stimuli would take up more attentional resources compared to 
neutral stimuli. In contrast to intentional and goal-related working memory task with 
single digit stimuli, with the constrained resources there could be an additional 
attentional transfer from recognition task to working memory task, and this transfer 
would be unintentional and automatic with the influence of emotional stimuli. To 
rephrase, in the previous studies, competition between two tasks have been created, 
and the secondary working memory task involved neutral stimuli (single digits). 
However, by using emotional stimuli, we manipulated the attentional balance 
between two tasks. While working memory task takes away attention in a goal 
related and voluntary manner, emotions are expected to form attentional bias 
automatically and involuntarily and thus draw more attention away from the 
recognition task.   
In this study, healthy young participants were recruited. According to socio-
emotional selectivity theory, older adults show attentional bias to positive stimuli 
whereas young adults show attentional bias to negative stimuli (Carstensen & 
Mikels, 2005; Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, & Carstensen, 2005). Therefore, we 
hypothesized that any emotional effect on working memory or recognition memory 
would be more prominent in the negative condition. We hypothesized a greater SR 
effect with negative emotional working memory task compared to neutral working 
memory task. Positive EWM might also have a potential to create attentional bias. 
However, mixed results on the emotional memory literature refrain us from having 






Seventy-six healthy young adults, undergraduate students from department of 
Psychology were recruited from University of Kent.  Participants were between 18-
33 years old (15 males, Mage=19.07, SDage=0.93; 61 females, Mage=19.66, 
SDage=2.47). Health and demographic information was collected prior to the 
experiment. Two participants were eliminated due to failure in their performance on 
the secondary WM task (performing less than 50%). 
Design 
The design of the study was a 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distracter type: old, new) 
x 3 (emotion: neutral, negative and positive) ANOVA, target type, distracter type, 
and emotion was a within subjects factor. The influence of EWM on SR effect was 
measured by accuracy (hits and correct rejections) to memory Stroop task. Figure 
2.3. shows the schema of the design and representative stimuli. 
 
Figure 2.3. Illustration of the experimental procedure in the neutral block  
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Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and the procedure were the same with Experiment 1. Though, there 
were three main differences between experiment 1 and 2. (a) emotional stimuli were 
used instead of digits. Neutral (MValence= 5.25, SDValence= 0.40; MArousal=4.15 , 
SDArousal= 0.64) , negative (MValence= 2.41 , SDValence= 0.45; MArousal= 6.33 , 
SDArousal= 0.32) and positive (MValence= 7.13 , SDValence= 0.54; MArousal= 6.33 , 
SDArousal= 0.42) pictures were selected from International Affect Picture System 
IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). The difference in valence and arousal 
between emotional categories were compared with univariate ANOVA. The analysis 
showed negative, positive and neutral pictures are significantly different in terms of 
valence (F (2, 105) = 932.51, p<0.001), and arousal (F (2, 105) = 246.10, p<0.001). 
Post-Hoc analyses for arousal indicated there was no significant difference of arousal 
ratings between positive and negative pictures (t (70) = 0.02, p= 0.99), arousal 
ratings of neutral pictures were significantly different from negative (t (70) = 18.15, 
p<0.001) and positive pictures (t (70) = 17.02, p<0.001). Post-Hoc analyses for 
valence indicated there was a significant difference of valence ratings between 
positive and negative pictures (t (70) = 40.29, p< 0.001). Also, valence ratings of 
neutral pictures were significantly different from negative (t (70) = 28.29, p<0.001) 
and positive pictures (t (70) = 16.78, p<0.001). (b) I used only 2-back task as a 
secondary task in order to load WM with emotional stimuli. (c) Participants 
completed 3 consecutive rounds for each of the 3 emotion conditions, and this order 
was counterbalanced across participants. For example, a participant completed 3 
consecutive blocks of negative, then positive, and finally neutral making it up to 9 





Analysis of n-back task 
We conducted a one-way repeated measures ANOVA with emotion (neutral, 
negative and positive) as a within subject factor. The dependent variable were 
accuracy and reaction times in 2-back task. Analysis revealed that working memory 
accuracy was not significantly different amongst different emotional conditions (F 
(2, 148) = 1.30, p ȘS2=0.02). In contrast, there was a significant difference in 
reaction times between emotional conditions F (2, 148) = 4.16, p ȘS2=0.05. 
Participants responded significantly slower to negative stimuli (M=1088ms, 
SD=244) compared to positive (M=1028ms, SD=248ms; t (74) = 2.18, p=0.03), and 
neutral condition (M=1018ms, SD=222ms; t (74) = 2.86, p=0.006). There was no 
difference between neutral and positive condition, (t (74) = 0.39, p=0.70).  
Analysis on Memory Stroop 
A 3 (emotion: neutral, negative and positive) x 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 
(distractor type: old, new) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on accuracy. 
Table 2. 5. Means and Standard Deviations of Target Recognition Accuracy 
 
Old Target New Target 
 
Old Distractor New Distractor Old Distractor New Distractor 
Neutral 0.73 (0.20) 0.68 (0.21) 0.82 (0.19) 0.86 (0.16) 
Negative 0.67 (0.20) 0.63 (0.21) 0.83 (0.17) 0.86 (0.16) 




Analysis revealed the non-significant main effect of emotion and distractor 
type (F (2, 148) = 2.25, p Șp2=0.30, F (1, 74) = 0.22, p Șp2=0.003, 
respectively). The interaction between emotion and distractor type was also non-
significant (F (2, 148) = 1.06, p Șp2= 0.01).  
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction of emotion and target type, 
(F (2, 148) = 3.65, p Șp2=0.05; see Figure 2.4). Separate paired sample t-tests 
revealed that there was no difference between neutral, negative and positive 
conditions in accurate answers to new targets (p>0.57). However, there was a 
significant difference between neutral (M=0.70, SD= 0.19) and negative (M=0.65, 
SD=0.19) condition (t (74) = 3.00, p=0.004) and between negative and positive 
(M=0.69, SD=0.18) condition (t (74) = 6.60, p<0.001). But there was no difference 
between neutral and positive condition (t (74) = 1.01, p=0.32). 
Table 2. 6. ANOVA results for Memory Stroop recognition accuracy 
Source F p Șp2 
E 2.25 0.11 0.03 
T 38.19 <0.001 0.34 
D 0.22 0.64 0.003 
E * T 3.65 0.03 0.05 
E * D 1.06 0.35 0.01 
T * D 22.97 <0.001 0.24 
E * T * D 0.34 0.72 0.005 






Figure 2.4. Mean correct response accuracy of old (left) and new (right) targets for 
neutral (grey bar), negative (red bar), and positive (blue bar). Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
Importantly, there was a significant interaction of target and distractor. 
Participants were more accurate when old target was paired with old distractor 
(M=0.70, SD=0.16) compared to new distractor (M=0.66, SD=0.18; t (74) = 3.51, 
p=0.001) and when new target was paired with new distractor (M=0.86, SD=0.14) 















Figure 2.5. Mean correct response accuracy of old (left) and new (right) targets for 
old distractor (dark grey bar), and new distractor (light grey bar). Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
Finally, there was no three-way interaction of emotion, target and distractor 
(F (2, 148) = 0.34, p Șp2=0.005). This revealed that target and distractor 
relationship was not modulated by emotion.  
Discussion 
This experiment aimed to investigate whether dividing attention with emotional 
information would have an additional effect on SR effect. It has been well-
established that negative information is remembered better than neutral information 
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2003b) and is often unintentional (Talmi, 2013). The 
unintentional biasing of attention toward emotional information could result in 
enhanced processing of the distractor. Therefore, we hypothesized that a WM task 
presented with emotional stimuli would use more attentional resources than non-
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less resources for Memory Stroop task and participants would show the SR effect on 
emotional condition than non-emotional condition. 
Results on WM task revealed that participants were equally accurate in 
different emotional conditions however they were slower to respond to negative 
pictures compared to neutral and positive ones. This finding indicates that greater 
attentional resources were used to complete the WM task with negative stimuli. The 
slowing effect with negative stimuli was in accordance with socio-emotional 
selectivity theory which argues that young adults generally show attentional bias to 
negative stimuli (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). Further, slower responses might 
indicate the interference of emotional processing of negative stimuli on working 
memory. Kensinger and Corkin (2003b) argued that processing of emotional stimuli 
might interfere with task-related WM processes. Results of EWM task implies that 
negative stimuli created further attentional bias, but only for target recognition. 
Additionally, our experiment consisted of two tasks and participants were not 
instructed to prioritize one task over another. Therefore, having divided attention 
between tasks may have constrained the overall processing capacity and leading 
emotional information to consume more resources only on working memory task. 
Accordingly, structural equation modelling analysis supports that constrained 
processing enables emotional stimuli to grab larger resources compared to neutral 
stimuli (Talmi & McGarry, 2012). 
Results from the memory Stroop task yielded three important findings. 
Firstly, we replicated previous findings in demonstrating SR using the Memory 
Stroop task (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et al., 2016). Secondly, we showed 
that in a dual task paradigm a secondary task that included emotions may affect only 
target recognition judgements. This finding is in line with the mediation model 
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which acknowledges immediate effects of emotions (Talmi, 2013).  We found that 
participants were less accurate for old target recognition on negative condition than 
neutral and positive condition but emotion did not influenced recognition of the new 
targets. A previous report also found better recognition for negative old words than 
neutral old words (Windmann & Kutas, 2001). Corrected recognition scores (hits-
false alarms) also indicated better remember responses (indicator of recollection) of 
negative than neutral stimuli (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003b). Also, the negative 
emotions take up more WM resources for attentional control, and away from 
memory storage (Schweizer & Dalgleish, 2016), as a result, old targets were more 
affected by emotions than new stimuli. To sum, lack of interaction of emotional 
condition of the secondary task and SR effect suggest that the emotional stimuli 
might not be strong enough to affect the unintentional recognition of distractors on 




Unintentional recognition: Underlying neural mechanisms and the role of 
working memory. 
Previous chapters presented the evidence that unintentional recognition of distractors 
could affect recognition of target items when they were presented in the same 
context, and especially when working memory was loaded with another task 
simultaneously. This finding is consistent with previous research, which revealed 
that dividing attention with a secondary task enhances the effect of unintentional 
recognition on target recognition in young adults (Anderson, et al., 2011; Ste-Marie 
& Jacoby, 1993). The finding that the old/new status of distractors had a biasing 
effect on target recognition was later replicated by (Bergström, et al., 2016). 
Specifically, they found that old distractors increased the likelihood that old target 
words would be correctly recognized compared with new distractors. This research 
also revealed a dissociation between the ERP markers of familiarity (FN400) which 
was found for old distractors and old targets, and the ERP marker of recollection 
(parietal old/new effects, (parietal old/new effects, Rugg & Curran, 2007) which was 
found only for old target items. Instead, old distractors were associated with a late 
negative posterior slow drift, which was interpreted as related to post-retrieval 
monitoring. The results thus suggested that unintentional and intentional recognition 
were mediated by different episodic retrieval processes.  
The functional connection between WM and selective attention is argued to 
stem from the central executive component of WM, which aids selective attention to 
target information, especially when faced with distraction 5HSRYã	%DGGHOH\
2006). Furthermore, de Fockert et al. (2001) provided evidence for the causal role of 
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WM in the control of selective attention with an fMRI study. They hypothesised that 
introducing additional load on WM should interfere with the selective processing of 
task-related items. They hypothesised that introducing an additional load on WM 
should interfere with the selective processing of task-related items. To test, 
participants were asked to classify famous written names as pop stars or politicians 
while ignoring distractor faces. The distractor faces were equally likely to be 
congruent with the target name, incongruent with the target name, or anonymous. 
The selective attention task was conducted simultaneously with a secondary WM 
task (either with low or high WM load). Reaction times indicated slower 
responses/larger distractor interference during high (78ms) than low (46ms) working 
memory load, indicating more distractor processing when working memory has a 
high load. They also found enhanced activation for distractors in face processing 
related brain areas (i.e., bilateral fusiform gyri, right inferior occipital lobe, and left 
lingual gyrus) and increased activity of prefrontal cortex under conditions of high 
WM load compared to low. These behavioural and fMRI results thus confirm an 
interaction between WM and selective attention and suggest that the availability of 
WM is necessary for top-down attentional control.  
The role of WM in distractor processing is not limited to attention control. 
The dual mechanisms of control framework (DMC) propose two distinct control 
processes; proactive and reactive control (Braver, 2012). According to this 
framework, proactive control can be considered as an early selection mechanism that 
maintains the task-relevant information to modulate the cognitive processes such as 
attention, perception and preparation of responses whereas reactive control works as 
a late selection mechanism that automatically directs attention to task-relevant 
stimuli in the presence of an interference situation. Specifically, WM supports 
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processing of task-relevant information by using its ability to alter responses to task 
demands instead of automatic responses (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006). 
Although, a successful cognition requires both control mechanism, there is 
likely to be some bias for one type of control strategy over the other. In this study, 
participants may be biased to adopt a proactive control mechanism when expected 
load is low, allowing spare working memory resources to be allocated to prepare for 
the upcoming test probe. By contrast, expected high load may bias them to use probe 
as a retrieval cue which activates reactive control. Also, if participants engage in 
early selective attention processes, then their proactive control would be activated. 
By contrast, if they engage late mechanisms then their reactive control would be 
triggered.  
To further illustrate, in memory Stroop task, there were two different inputs 
coming from picture and word. As a result of reactive control, picture and word 
stimuli triggers a bottom-up recognition response individually. Although pictures 
trigger stronger response for recognition (because it is more salient than words), 
proactive control makes sure that word recognition is prioritised to satisfy the task 
needs. This is the top-down control of unintentional picture recognition by proactive 
control. Since working memory provides resources for proactive control, a loaded 
WM would be less available to maintain task demands. Thus, shortness of resources 
may cause less control over task demands and instead, may engage in bottom-up 
picture recognition. As an alternative solution in the situation of the insufficiency of 
proactive control, participants may engage in reactive control automatically. To test 
whether participants use their proactive control, reactive control or both EEG was 
also employed to provide temporal information on the possible control mechanisms.  
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The main aim of this study was to examine the role of WM in how 
unintentional distractor recognition influences intentional target recognition as 
assessed with neural markers. Primarily, a replication and extension on Bergström et 
DO¶V(2016) ERP study was aimed, which did not include a WM manipulation and 
was therefore not able to investigate this issue. Therefore,  a very similar experiment 
was conducted, with the addition that WM load was manipulated with a secondary 
task between blocks, using the load manipulation from (de Fockert, et al., 2001). 
Behaviourally, a replication of a biasing influence of distractors on target recognition 
accuracy was anticipated. Based on (Bergström, et al., 2016) it was also expected 
that neural results would indicate ERP signs of familiarity in the FN400 for both old 
targets and old distractors, but that evidence of recollection across the left parietal 
sites would be found only for old targets. Furthermore, an enhanced negative slow 
drift monitoring effects for old distractors were expected. When the secondary task 
involved high WM load, it was expected to decrease the availability of WM, and in 
turn the control of attention to intentional recognition targets. Such depletion of WM 
resources should result in increased task-irrelevant processing of distractors which 
should enhance distractor influences on target recognition. Additionally, participants 
may show a preference on employing a reactive control when there is a conflict of 
target and distractor recognition or a proactive control throughout the experiment to 
satisfy the dual task needs. The latter control mechanism would predict a larger 
difference in SR effect for high than low WM load conditions as proactive control 
require WM resources. In contrast, a reactive control would emerge in a bottom up 







Thirty-six right-handed, neurologically normal native English speakers participated. 
Participants received course credit or were given money for their participation. Five 
participants were eliminated from analyses, due to excessively noisy EEG 
recordings, and the final sample was made up of 31 participants (Mage = 20.26 years, 
range = 18-25 years, 14 males and 17 female). All participants gave written informed 
consent, and the experiment was approved by the University of Kent Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. 
Materials: 
Target words (target) and distractor pictures were taken from (Bergström, et al., 
2016) study. Their stimuli were consisted of 336 words and 336 colour photographs 
of objects, events and scenes. Words were taken from the ANEW database and their 
valence ratings ranged from 3.79 to 7.58 on a 9-point scale (ranged from 4 to 8 
letters and no more than two syllables). From the 336 picture stimuli, 277 were taken 
from the IAPS database (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and their valence ratings 
ranged from 1.51 to 6.62 on a 9-point scale, and 43 were taken from the GAPED 
database (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011) with valence ratings ranged from 1.35 to 
45.7 on a 100-point scale. Sixteen stimuli of each type (word and picture) were used 
in a practice phase and the remaining 320 were used in the experiment. Assignment 
of words and pictures to experimental conditions was fully counter-balanced across 
participants. (Bergström, et al., 2016) used negative and neutral pictures to measure 
the effects of emotional valence of distractors on target recognition but failed to find 
an effect of valence on behavioural and neural measurements. We replicated their 
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finding that the emotional valence of distractors did not affect target or distractor 
recognition. Hence, we combined all measurements across emotional factors.  
Design and procedure: 
7KHGHVLJQRIWKHVWXG\ZDVEDVHGRQWKH³PHPRU\6WURRS´SDUDGLJPGHYHORSHGE\
(Anderson, et al., 2011) and modified by (Bergström, et al., 2016). After giving 
informed consent, participants were instructed and completed a practise task, then 
moved on to the experiment which consisted of 10 study-test rounds. In study phase, 
participants were asked to rate the pleasantness of 16 words and 16 pictures 
(randomly presented) on a scale between 1 and 4 (1-very unpleasant and 4-very 
pleasant) by pressing the number keys on the keyboard. They were told that their 
memory for all items would later be tested. Stimuli were presented at the center of 
the screen for 3000ms and preceded by 500ms fixation cross. In the Memory Stroop 
test phase, 32 pairs of words superimposed on pictures were presented, and 
participants were asked to ignore the pictures and make a recognition judgement on 
each word (to indicate whether they saw the word in study phase), with response 
hand counterbalanced across participants. Each test block was made up of an equal 
number of the four target/distractor item types: old word and old picture (eight 
trials), old word and new picture (eight trials), new word and old picture (eight 
trials), and new word and new picture (eight trials), randomly displayed. Pairs were 
presented for 3000ms, preceded by a 500ms fixation cross. 
In addition to the Memory Stroop task participants were required to complete a WM 
task simultaneously. The WM task required participants to rehearse digit sequences, 
which have been shown to create interference from distractor processing in other 
tasks when the digit strings are random and repeatedly changing (e.g., de Fockert, et 
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al., 2001). In the high WM load blocks, randomly ordered five-digit sequences (0±4, 
always beginning with 0 but with 1±4 in random order) were shown for 3000ms, and 
participants were required to rehearse the sequence of numbers while completing the 
Memory Stroop task simultaneously. After four to six trials, a single digit probe was 
displayed for 3000ms, and participants were asked to indicate the number from the 
keyboard corresponding to the next digit in the number sequence that they were 
FXUUHQWO\UHKHDUVLQJ9LVXDOIHHGEDFNHLWKHU³LQFRUUHFW´³FRUUHFW´RU³QR
UHVSRQVH´ZDVSURYLGHGWRHQFRXUDJHSDUWLFLSDQWVWRSD\DWWHQWLRQWR:0WDVN
sufficiently. After the probe, participants were shown a new number sequence to 
rehearse in the following four to six recognition trials until the next probe. In the low 
WM load EORFNVWKHGLJLWVHTXHQFHZDVDOZD\V³´DQGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHWROG
that they should not rehearse the digit sequence because the correct answer to the 
probe was always predictable (i.e. the next larger integer). Half of participants 
completed five high WM blocks followed by five low WM blocks, and the other half 
completed the WM blocks in the reverse order. 
In the Memory Stroop task, target words were always tested whereas 
distractor pictures were always ignored. Therefore, it was necessary to emphasize 
study processing of the pictures as well as targets, to ensure that participants did not 
try to prevent encoding of the pictures. To solve this issue, after each test phase, 
participants were given a distractor recognition test consisting of two previously seen 
distractors intermixed with two novel pictures and were asked to press one button to 
FODVVLI\ZKHWKHUGLVWUDFWRUVDV³ROG´SUHYLRXVO\VHHQRU³QHZ´QRWVHHQDWDQ\





Figure 3. 1. Illustration of the experimental procedure. 
EEG Recording and Analysis: 
EEG was recorded at 500 Hz with a 0.05- to 70-Hz bandwidth. The recording 
reference electrode was set to FCz and 64 scalp electrodes were placed in an 
actiCAP according to the extended 10±20 system (Brain Products GmbH, München, 
Germany). Eye movements were recorded from below the left eye (vertical EOG) 
and from the right outer canthi (horizontal EOG). Continuous EEG data from all 
channels were imported into EEGLAB and were analysed using EEGLAB (UC San 
Diego; Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The EEG was re-referenced to the average of the 
mastoids and epoched using a 200ms pre-stimulus baseline period and a 3000ms 
post-stimulus period, that was time-locked to the onset of the word±picture pair in 
the test phase. AfWHUFRQFDWHQDWLQJHSRFKVODUJHDUWHIDFWVGXHWRVXEMHFW¶VPRWLRQ
facial movements, or other irregularities that may distort ERPs were manually 
eliminated. Epochs were submitted to independent component analysis using 
RunICA from the EEGLAB toolbox, with default extended-mode training 
parameters (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Independent components reflecting eye 
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movements and other sources of noise were identified by visual inspection of 
component scalp topographies, time courses, and activation spectra and were 
discarded from the data by back-projecting all but these components to the data 
space. Corrected data were subsequently high-pass filtered digitally at 30 Hz. 
Finally, any trials that still contained artefacts after filtering were removed based on 
visual inspection. Only a very small percentage of trials (5%) were deleted in total. 
Final ERPs were formed for the eight conditions: old word old picture low WM 
(mean trial numbers =36.5) old word old picture high WM (mean trial numbers 
=37.3) old word new picture low WM (mean trial numbers =36.1), old word new 
picture high WM (mean trial numbers =37.2),  new word old picture low WM (mean 
trial numbers =36.3), new word old picture high WM (mean trial numbers =37.1), 
new word new picture low WM (mean trial numbers =36.5), and new word new 
picture high WM (mean trial numbers =37.3).  
For statistical analysis, time windows and electrode locations were chosen based on 
Bergstrom et al. (2016) to measure the early frontal and later parietal old/new effects 
corresponding to familiarity and recollection-based retrieval processing, as well as 
the late posterior negative (LPN) ERP slow drifts that are thought to index retrieval 
monitoring processes.  The early FN400 old/new effects was measured as the mean 
amplitude between 300 to 500ms at the mid-frontal (Fz) electrode, and the later 
parietal old/new effect was measured as the mean amplitude between 500 to 800ms 
at the left parietal (P3) electrode. The LPN was measured as the mean amplitude at 
left (PO7) and right (PO8) parieto-occipital electrodes between 500 to 1000ms, 
which is where and when the LPN effect in Bergström et al. (2016) was maximal. 
The mean amplitudes for time windows were extracted and statistically analysed in 





Analysis of WM task 
Accuracy in high WM load condition varied from 100% to 71% whereas it ranged 
from 100% to 91% in low WM load condition. For the WM task performance, 
accuracy and reaction time measurements of low load and high load were compared 
with paired samples t-test. Analysis revealed that there was a significant difference 
between low load and high load in accuracy and reaction times, (t (30) = -5.48, p < 
0.001; t (30) = 12.04, p < 0.001), respectively. Participants were more accurate in 
WM task in low load (M=0.96, SD=0.03) compared to high load (M=0.84, SD=0.12) 
condition. Moreover, participants were slower to respond in high load (M=1629, 
SD=216) compared to low load (M=1238, SD=198) condition. These differences 
between low and high WM load conditions thus confirmed that the manipulation of 
WM load had been successfully implemented and ruled out a speed-accuracy trade-
off (see Figure 3.2). 
 
Figure 3. 2. Means and standard deviations of accuracy (right graph) and RT (left 































Analysis of Memory Stroop task 
For the Memory Stroop task, accuracy was analysed with a 2 (target type: old, new) 
x 2 (distracter type: old, new) x 2 (working memory load: high, low) repeated 
measures ANOVA (see Table 3.1.). Mean accuracy and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3. 1. Mean hit and correct rejection scores and standard deviations for target 
type, and distractor type for high and low WM load conditions. 
Source F Sig. Partial Eta Squared 
T 0.05 0.83 0.002 
D 3.84 0.06 0.12 
WM 0.10 0.75 0.003 
T * D 4.75 0.04* 0.14 
T * WM 2.77 0.11 0.09 
D * WM 2.19 0.15 0.07 
T * D * WM 0.12 0.73 0.004 
D=Distractor, WM= Working Memory Load, *p<0.05, **p<0.001 
 
 The analysis revealed non-significant main effects of the target type and distractor 
type factors. Furthermore, no significant main effect was found between the WM 
load conditions for accuracy, indicating that participants were not differentially 
engaged in the memory Stroop task in the different WM conditions. However, a 
significant interaction effect between target and distractor type (F (1, 29) = 4.75, 
p Șp2=0.14) was found. Participants were more accurate when old targets were 
paired with old distractors and new targets were paired with new distractors. 
Accuracy was higher for new target and new distractor pairs compared to new target 
and old distractor pairs (t (29) = 2.77, p=0.01). The difference between old target old 
distractor pairs and old target new distractor pairs did not differ significantly (t (29) 
= 0.71, p= 0.48). However numerically, participants were more accurate in old target 
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old distractor pairs than in old target new distractor pairings (see Table 3.1). The 
interaction of target and WM load, distractor and WM load, and finally three-way 
interaction of target, distractor and WM load were non-significant (F (1, 29) = 2.77, 
p Șp2=0.09; F (1, 29) = 2.19, p Șp2=0.07; F (1, 29) = 0.12, p=0.73, 
Șp2=0.004, respectively).   
Table 3. 2. Mean hit and correct rejection scores and standard deviations for target 
type, and distractor type for high and low WM load conditions. 
 
Analysis of Discrimination and Response Bias 
Response bias and discriminability are two measures produced from recognition 
memory tasks that are beneficial in understanding the cognitive processes. 
According to signal detection theory, old±new recognition decisions can be affected 
by response bias, a JHQHUDOWHQGHQF\WRUHVSRQGHLWKHU³ROG´RU³QHZ´5HVSRQVHELDV
reflects the processes underlying the making a decision between two options, 
 
Mean (SD) 
High WM Load Low WM Load 
Old Target  
Old Distractor 
0.88 (0.15) 0.88 (0.11) 
Old Target  
New Distractor 
0.88 (0.15) 0.85 (0.16) 
New Target  
Old Distractor 
0.86 (0.14) 0.87 (0.13) 
New Target  
New Distractor 
0.90 (0.10) 0.90 (0.10) 
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whereas discrimination refers to the accuracy that reflects the memory strength. 
Therefore, as an additional analysis, I calculated estimates of discrimination (Pr) and 
response bias (Br) (see Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). This was done to investigate 
whether unintentional recognition of distractors primarily affected response biases or 
also the ability to discriminate between old vs. new targets (see Table 3.2). Response 
ELDVUHIOHFWVWKHWHQGHQF\WRHLWKHUUHVSRQGLQDOLEHUDOLH³\HV´RUFRQVHUYDWLYH
LH³QR´GLUHFWLRQ Values of Br that are above 0.5 indicate a tendency to guess 
³ROG´UDWKHUWKDQ³QHZ´ZKHQuncertain, (a positive response bias), whereas values 
below 0.5 indicate the opposite tendency (a negative response bias). The Br is 
FDOFXODWHGE\GLYLGLQJHDFKSDUWLFLSDQW¶VIDOVHDODUPUDWHE\± Pr. The Pr reflects 
the discrimination between old and new items that is corrected for response biases 
and to calculate, new word false alarms were subtracted from old word hits 
separately based on distractor type (old and new). 
Table 3. 3.  Means and Standard Deviations of Discrimination Performance (Pr) and 
Response Bias (Br) for Target Recognition Decisions 
 
High WM Load Low WM Load 
Mean (SD) Br  Mean (SD) Pr Mean (SD) Br  Mean (SD) Pr 
Old Distractor 0.57 (0.28) 0.76 (0.20) 0.53 (0.26) 0.77 (0.17) 
New Distractor 0.49 (0.24) 0.79 (0.17) 0.44 (0.30) 0.78 (0.17) 
 
Two-way ANOVAs conducted with the factors distractor (old vs. new) and 
WM load (high vs. low) on Pr and Br. The analysis revealed a marginally significant 
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main effect of distractor, and non-significant main effect of WM load as well as the 
interaction between distractor type and WM load on Pr and Br (see Table 3.3 for 
details). Participants discriminated words paired with new distractors (M=0.79, 
SD=0.16) better than old distractors (M=0.77, SD=0.18). Moreover, they showed 
positive response bias to words paired with old distractors (M=0.55, SD=0.24) and a 
negative response bias to words paired with new distractors (M=0.47, SD=0.25).  
Table 3. 4. ANOVA results for Response Bias (Br) and Discrimination (Pr) 
Pr F (1, 29) p Șp2 
D 3.84  0.06 0.12 
WM 0.10 0.75 0.003 
D x WM 2.19 0.15 0.07 
Br    
D 3.90 0.06 0.13 
WM 1.31 0.26 0.05 
D x WM 0.02 0.88 0.001 
D=Distractor, WM= Working Memory Load, *p<0.05, **p<0.001 
Analysis of Correlation between SR effect and WM Performance 
I did Spearman¶V correlations to observe whether WM task accuracy (performance) 
correlated with the size of the congruency accuracy effect (congruent minus 
incongruent conditions) on the Memory Stroop task. Results indicated positive (but 
non-significant) correlations in both high (rs=0.33, p=0.08) and low WM load 
conditions (rs=0.31, p=0.10). The results indicated that there was a weak positive 
relationship between WM performance and the congruency accuracy effect. 
ERPs: 
FN400 Old/New Effects 
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Grand-averaged ERPs from the mid-frontal (Fz) site for high and low working 
memory loads are displayed in Figure 3.3. Both old targets (F (1, 29) = 10.53, 
p=0.003) and old distractors (F (1, 29) = 34.61, p<0.001) elicited significantly more 
positive FN400 amplitudes than new targets and new distractors, respectively, 
replicating previous findings (Bergström, et al., 2016). In addition, there was a 
significant main effect of WM load, FN400 was more positive in low WM load trials 
compared to high WM load trials (F (1, 29) = 8.42, p=0.007), irrespective of old/new 
status of the words or pictures, as none of the interactions were significant (see Table 
3.4). 
Table 3. 5. ANOVA results for FN400 ERP effects 
Source F (1,29) p Șp2 
T 10.53 0.003* 0.27 
D 34.61 <0.001** 0.54 
WM 8.42 0.007* 0.23 
T x D 1.56 0.22 0.05 
T x WM 0.09 0.77 0.003 
D x WM 0.07 0.79 0.002 
T x D x WM 0.11 0.75 0.004 












Figure 3. 3 (A) Grand-average ERPs showing FN400 old/new effects for targets and 
distractors. The box illustrates the 300-500ms time-window used for statistical 
analysis. ERPs from mid-frontal (Fz) site in high (upper panel) and low (lower 
panel) WM load conditions. (B) Mean FN400 amplitudes between 300-500ms for 















Old Target Old Distractor
Old Target New Distractor
New Target Old Distractor
New Target New Distractor
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Parietal Old/ New Effects 
Grand-averaged ERPs from the left parietal (P3) electrode sites for high and low 
working memory loads are displayed in Figure 3.4. In contrast to the FN400, a 
typical increased parietal positivity for old compared with new items was only found 
for word targets, F (1, 29) = 31.87, p Șp2=0.52, but not for picture 
distractors (F (1, 29) = 0.72, p  Șp2=0.02) again replicating previous findings 
(Bergström, et al., 2016). There was no significant effect of WM load on the parietal 
old/new effect, and no interactions (see Table 3.5). 
Table 3. 6. ANOVA results for LPC ERP effects 
Source F (1, 29) p Șp2 
T 31.87 <0.001** 0.52 
D 0.72 0.40 0.02 
WM 0.002 0.97 <0.001 
T x D 3.15 0.09 0.10 
T x WM 0.32 0.57 0.01 
D x WM 0.002 0.97 <0.001 
T x D x 
WM 1.60 0.22 
0.05 













Figure 3. 4. (A) Grand-average ERPs showing left parietal old/new effects for targets 
and distractors. The box illustrates the 500-800ms time-window used for statistical 
analysis. ERPs from the left parietal (P3) site in high (upper panel) and low (lower 
panel) WM load conditions. (B) Mean left parietal amplitudes between 500-800ms 
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The Late Parietal Negativity  
Grand-averaged ERPs from the left (PO7) and right (PO8) parieto-occipital electrode 
sites for high and low working memory loads are displayed in Figure 3.5. The LPN 
was analysed with a 4-way repeated measures ANOVA, with the factors hemisphere 
(left PO7/right PO8) x target type (old/new) x distractor type (old/new) x WM load 
(high/low). This analysis revealed (Table 3.5) that there was a significant main effect 
of target type (F (1, 29) = 13.64, p Șp2=0.32) and a main effect of distractor 
type (F (1, 29) = 24.59, pȘp2=0.46). Participants showed more negativity to 
new targets (M=1.01, SD=2.17) compared to old targets (M=1.77, SD=2.15), and 
they showed more negativity to old distractors (M=0.96, SD=2.07) compared to new 
distractors (M=1.81, SD=2.21). Also, there was an interaction between target and 
distractor type (F (1, 29) = 6.35, p Șp2=0.18). Paired samples t-tests were 
conducted to explore the interaction. The LPN was marginally more negative for old 
target old distractor pairings than old target new distractor pairings (t (29) = 1.92, 
p=0.07). On the other hand, the LPN was significantly more negative in new target 
old distractor pairings than the new target new distractor pairings (t (29) = 4.22, 
p<0.001). Interestingly, target interacted with hemisphere, (F (1, 29) = 6.05, p=0.02, 
Șp2=0.17). The LPN was more negative in the left than right hemisphere for the new 
targets, (t (29) = 2.42, p=0.02) whereas there was no difference observed between 
left and right hemisphere for the old targets, (t (29) = 1.24, p=0.23). Moreover, there 
was a significant interaction between hemisphere and WM load, (F (1, 29) = 4.58, 
p Șp2=0.14). More negativity was observed in left than right hemisphere for 
low WM load condition, (t (29) = 2.35, p=0.03), whereas there was no difference 
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observed between left and right hemisphere in high WM load condition, (t (29) = 












Figure 3. 5 (A) Grand-average ERPs of old/new effects for targets and distractors. 
ERPs from left posterior (PO7, lower panel) and right posterior (PO8, upper panel) 
sites in high (right column) and low (left column) WM load conditions. (B) Mean 
P07 (left) and PO8 (right) amplitudes for hit and correct recognition responses 







































Table 3. 7. ANOVA results for LPN ERP effect 
Source F (1, 29) p Șp2 
HEM 3.50 0.07  0.11 
T 13.64 0.001**  0.32 
D 24.59 <0.001**  0.46 
WM 1.21 0.28  0.04 
HEM X T 6.05 0.02*  0.17 
HEM X D 1.17  0.29 0.04 
T X D 6.35  0.02*  0.18 
HEM X T X D 0.56  0.46  0.02 
HEM X WM 4.58  0.04*  0.14 
T X WM 0.98  0.33  0.03 
HEM X T X WM 1.81  0.19  0.06 
D X WM 2.15  0.15  0.07 
HEM X D X WM 0.60  0.45  0.02 
T X D X WM 1.87  0.18  0.06 
HEM X T X D X WM 3.49  0.07  0.11 
T= Target, D=Distractor, WM= Working Memory Load, HEM= Hemisphere, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.001 
Results summary 
In sum the key behavioural and ERP findings were: (a) a significant interaction 
between target and distractor type for intentional recognition accuracy showed that 
participants performed better on the recognition task when the target and distractor 
pairings were congruent vs. when they were incongruent. (b) The ERP results 
showed that both targets and distractors elicited the FN400 correlate of familiarity, 
whereas the left parietal correlate of recollection was only present for targets. (c) 
Although we failed to find an effect of WM load on behavioural measurements, 
ERPs indicated that frontal ERPs in the FN400 time-window was more positive in 
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the high WM condition compared to low WM condition, confirming that the WM 
load manipulation influenced neural processing on the memory Stroop task. (d)  
previous findings were replicated that old distractors triggered retrieval monitoring 
as indexed by enhanced LPN effects. (e) Extending previous research, the LPN was 
found to be more pronounced specifically when old distractors were paired with new 
targets, and (f) the LPN was larger across the left hemisphere for low WM load 
whereas it was more bilateral in the high WM load condition, suggesting differences 
in retieval monitoring as a function of WM load.  
Discussion 
This study aimed to determine how WM availability influences unintentional 
recognition of distractors and intentional recognition of targets by manipulating WM 
load and measuring the neurocognitive markers of distractor and target recognition. 
As predicted, the behavioural results replicated previous research investigating 
effects of distractors on target recognition (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et al., 
2016; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993). The results suggest that 
intentional recognition judgements can be biased by unintentional recognition of 
distracting information in the same environment.  
The ERP results replicated the previous finding (Bergström, et al., 2016) of a 
clear dissociation between two well-established ERP markers of recollection and 
familiarity (Rugg & Curran, 2007), consistent with dual process of recognition 
memory (Curran, DeBuse, & Leynes, 2007). Converging with behavioural results, 
the ERPs indicated that participants showed evidence of familiarity to both old 
targets and distractors. Although participants were instructed to focus only on the 
words in the Memory Stroop task, they still showed more positive FN400 to old than 
112 
 
new distractors, suggesting that distractors were processed automatically. 
Furthermore, the parietal old/new effect indicated that further processing for 
recollection was present only for old targets but not for old distractors, indicating 
that intentional recognition was specific to old target items. Overall, the results 
replicated the neural evidence from an earlier study (Bergström, et al., 2016) that 
suggests unintentional recognition of distractors and its effects on target recognition 
is driven by familiarity rather than recollection.  
Behavioural results were weak so it was expected  not to see a WM influence 
on SR effect with ERPs. The only difference between WM load conditions was 
found on FN400 and it did not interact with target and/or distractor. The difference 
in FN400 seems like a component overlap in the frontal scalp and it could not 
suggest modulation of FN400. However, this finding might suggest that WM was 
activated in the early stage of recognition, around the same time with the FN400 
familiarity ERP effect. Proactive control was be associated with sustained and/or 
anticipatory activation of lateral PFC, which indexes the active maintenance of task 
goals that requires high cognitive demand (Braver, 2012). Accordingly, this evidence 
supports the proactive control account which suggests an early mechanism that 
controls and orients attention toward goal-related tasks. Furthermore, the observed 
difference might support the proactive control account, since research suggests only 
proactive control employs WM resources (Braver, 2012; Burgess & Braver, 2010). 
Moreover, the hemispheric activity for high and low WM load conditions were 
differed; in high WM load condition both hemispheres elicited greater LPN for high 
WM in contrast, only left hemisphere was activated for low WM load condition. 
This finding may suggest that the recruitment of processes indexed by LPN was 
greater for high WM load condition as it was emerged in both hemispheres. 
113 
 
The ERP results demonstrated that to-be ignored distractors are still 
processed automatically, which may then presumably lead to a response conflict 
between targets and distractors if the correct responses for the two stimuli were 
different. Hence, reduced accuracy for incongruent trials (old target/new distractor 
and new target/old distractor) may be due to a conflict. Consistent with this view, 
new target old distractor pairings triggered a larger LPN than old target new 
distractor pairings, suggesting that response conflict caused by unintentional 
GLVWUDFWRUUHFRJQLWLRQZKHQWKHWDUJHWUHTXLUHGD³QHZ´UHVSRQVHFUHDWHGDmore 
negative LPN. (Johansson & Mecklinger, 2003) reviewed the evidence that early 
frontal and later parietal old/new effects are sometimes followed by an LPN that is 
greater for old items compared to new items. They divided studies into two groups 
according to their separate contributions to the LPN: (a) memory tasks that required 
additional post-retrieval monitoring due to response conflict (b) memory tasks that 
require retrieval of source or contextual information. The results were consistent 
with the view that the LPN is related to post-retrieval monitoring in situations of 
high response conflict (Hu, Bergström, Bodenhausen, & Rosenfeld, 2015). That is, 
participants should have the highest need to monitor and evaluate familiarity signals 
from distractors when the target is new compared to when the target is old. Because 
new distractors did not elicit familiarity signals, they also did not recruit post-
retrieval monitoring processes even when presented incongruently with old targets. 
Considered together, ERPs and behavioural findings suggest that the effect of 
WM on SR was weak. Related to the failure to find behavioural and ERP evidence 
for interactions between distractor processing and WM load, there are also other 
studies that showed that high WM load does not always produce an increase in 
distractor processing. For instance, a recent fMRI study similarly found that, 
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although there was an interaction between WM and distractor processing in brain 
activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, the interaction was not supported by the 
behavioural measurements (de Fockert & Theeuwes, 2012). Moreover, Carmel, 
Fairnie and Lavie (2012) suggested that WM might affect distractor processing only 
when distractor stimuli are sufficiently salient. As such, their results revealed that the 
distractor interference was greater for more salient faces compared to non-salient 
buildings. Similarly, in this experiment emotional pictures might have been attention 
grabbing that which might have stopped participants to process them (De Fockert, 
2013). With really salient distractors, distractor bias is still there even with the WM 
load.  Furthermore, few studies found that distraction was reduced under high 
working memory load (Berti & Schröger, 2003; SanMiguel, Corral, & Escera, 2008) 
however the WM task in those experiments (0-back and 1-back tasks which were 
considered too easy for young adults) may have insufficiently loaded WM. 
Conclusion 
I investigated the underlying neural processes of the biasing effect of distractors on 
target recognition and how this may be modulated by working memory load using 
EEG. The results replicated the previous findings on intentional (target) and 
unintentional (distractor) processing that the neural and memory processes are 
dissociable for unintentional and intentional recognition. ERP results also indicated, 
early processing in high WM load compared to low WM load conditions suggesting 
an activation of proactive control in the face of an interference. A novel finding of 
the research is that the retrieval monitoring was found to be greater when new targets 




Does confidence in intentional recognition decisions covary with distractor-
induced recognition biases? 
The main aim of this study was to explore the relationship between the SR effect 
(lower accuracy for incongruent than congruent memory Stroop trials) and 
confidence judgments associated with recognition decisions to target stimuli. As 
previous research demonstrated (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et al., 2016) the 
SR effect arises from unintentional recognition of distractors, which biases target 
recognition judgements.  
According to the signal detection theory, confidence is directly related to the 
memory strength, as a result, accuracy and confidence tend to covary. High 
confidence decisions for targets found to be correlated with higher accuracy, and this 
relationship is linked with the contribution of recollection (Yonelinas, 2001). 
However, distraction also influences confidence decisions along with target 
accuracy. For instance, Beaman and Jones (1997) investigated the influence of 
auditory distraction by asking participants to ignore non-sense words during a two-
alternative forced-choice recognition task. They found impaired recognition on 
distraction condition compared to non-distraction condition suggesting that auditory 
distraction impairs memory access directly. It is possible that participants could shift 
their criterion to compensate for distraction. In case of a distraction, participants may 
become less confident of their candidate responses, so that fewer of them passes the 
criterion. Alternatively, participants may have become more cautious and adopt a 
more stringent criterion. A study found that distraction did not reduce correct 
responses but increased the number of incorrect responses (Perfect, Andrade, & 
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Eagan, 2011). Researchers argued that participants reacted to the distraction by 
adopting a more liberal criterion, thus volunteering candidate responses held with 
lower confidence. Beaman, Hanczakowski and Jones (2014) investigated the 
influence of distraction on resolution, a metacognitive process that shows the ability 
to distinguish between their correct and incorrect responses indexed by confidence 
judgements. Their results showed that distraction impairs resolution that is lower 
metacognitive monitoring of retrieval under distraction. Also, they found that 
participants have not tried to strategically compensate for the loss in the quantity of 
output under distraction by lowering their report criterion. Instead, participants used 
the same report criterion in all conditions. 
Unintentional distractor recognition is considered to be automatic and triggers early 
memory processes (Bergström, et al., 2016) which may suggest that it occurs outside 
of awareness (see e.g. Paller, et al., 2007). Alternatively, participants may 
consciously experience familiarity to the distractors, but may be unable to resist the 
biasing effects of distractor recognition because they misattribute the conscious 
experience to the incorrect stimulus, or because they fail to override the incorrect 
motor response that is elicited by distractor recognition. However, previous research 
has not investigated how consciously distractors were processed when participants 
showed a distractor-induced recognition bias.  
One factor that may help us understand this issue, and also the mechanisms 
XQGHUO\LQJWKH65HIIHFWPRUHJHQHUDOO\FRXOGEHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQILGHQFHLQWKHLU
recognition judgements to target stimuli. Participants might experience lower 
confidence for some judgements because they unintentionally but consciously 
recognise the distractors and experience response conflict at a relatively late, 
conscious stage of decision making. That is, they may subjectively detect that 
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recognition decisions are being biased on the incongruent trials. This account would 
predict larger SR effects and more neural evidence of distractor recognition for low 
compared to high confidence target recognition judgements. In contrast, if 
unintentional recognition of distractors elicits only implicit memory signals that 
participants are unaware of, then the SR effect may not show any relationship with 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHRIFRQILGHQFHIRUWKHLUWDUJHWUHFRJQLWLRQ
judgements. 
Alternatively, the SR effect could be stronger for target recognition 
judgements made with low compared to high confidence because memory of the 
target is weaker (e.g. due to less effective encoding), which may make participants 
more susceptible to bias arising from memory signals from the distractor. Relevant 
to this point, Ste Marie and Jacoby (1993) investigated the effect of increased 
familiarity to distractors and targets on the SR effect by manipulating the number of 
repetitions of the distractors and targets during study presentation. However, their 
results were complicated, in that there was no evidence that the number of distractor 
or target repetitions per se influenced the SR effect, but rather, the largest effect 
seemed to arise when the number of repetitions of targets and distractors were 
congruent (i.e. when a target had been repeated the same number of times as its 
paired distractor during the study phase). Based on these findings, the authors 
suggested that the absolute familiarity of targets and distractors might not be an 
important modulator of the SR effect. However, their study did not take into account 
the subjective experience of memory, which may be a more direct measure of 




Pilot Study for Experiment 4 
The first experiment in this chapter investigated whether the behavioural SR effect 
would covary with intentional recognition confidence, partly to pilot the changes to 
the behavioural task before a subsequent EEG study (presented in Experiment 4). 
The design included a typical memory Stroop manipulation where targets and 
distractors were presented together and could both be either old or new, and also 
working memory load was manipulated using an n-back task similar to the previous 
studies. In addition, participants were asked to report their confidence on target 
recognition decisions during the memory Stroop test, using a continuous scale. Next 
for each participant, the trials were split into separate bins for high and low 
confidence responses (based on a median split) and were calculated recognition 
accuracy and reaction times separately for these bins. 
I hypothesized that overall, recognition of old (studied) targets paired with 
old distractor items would be more accurate compared to old targets paired with new 
distractors. Similarly, recognition of new targets paired with old distractor items 
would create less correct rejections compared to new targets paired with new 
distractors. These effects would be important indicators of occurrence of SR. 
0RUHRYHUDVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQILGHQFHLQWKHLUMXGJHPHQWVLVW\SLFDOO\SRVLWLYHO\
related to retrieval accuracy (Busey, et al., 2000), participants should be more correct 
for high than low confidence judgements. In line with my previous studies, I also 
predicted that, in the light of the findings from Experiment 1, the SR effect was 
expected to be observed with 2-back rather than with 1-back WM task. However, the 
changes in the methodology, that is requiring participants to indicate their subjective 
confidence levels, might undermine the influence of WM on SR. The relationship 
between confidence and working memory has never been directly investigated. 
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However, making confidence judgements requires several cognitive processes which 
are also needed for working memory. For example, to make a confidence judgement, 
one would compare the memory with a criterion which would require an online 
activation and manipulation of memory and the criterion. Furthermore, confidence 
judgements are usually followed by monitoring the decision before or after the 
response was given (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Participants monitor the contents of 
their memory and assess the different strengths of the stored items. This assessment 
becomes the basis for their confidence judgment. A study found a greater activation 
in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for correct low than correct high confidence 
judgements (Henson, et al., 2000). Therefore, asking participants to evaluate their 
confidence levels might also create an additional working memory load. This might 
reflect in the occurrence of the SR effect even in the situations with low WM load. 
Finally, and most importantly, I wanted to test whether the SR congruency effect 
covaried with target recognition confidence. If participants experienced conscious 
response conflict or were more susceptible to distractor-induced bias when their 
target memory was weaker, then the SR effect should be larger for low than high 
confidence responses. However, if participants were unaware of distractor 
recognition causing a bias or the bias is not modulated by target memory strength, 
then the SR effect should be found regardless of target recognition confidence.  
Methods 
Participants 
The data were collected from 39 participants. Two participants were 
eliminated due to poor performance in the n-back task (below 50% accuracy). 
Thirty-seven healthy young adults (22 assigned to 1-back condition and 15 assigned 
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to 2-back condition), undergraduate students from department of Psychology 
recruited from University of Kent made up the final sample.  Participants were 
between 18-21 years old (6 males, Mage=19, SD age=0.82; 31 females, Mage=18.7, SD 
age=0.84). They received course credit or were given money for their participation. 
Design 
The design of the study was a 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distracter type: 
old, new) x 2 (working memory load: low; 1-back, high; 2-back) x 2 (confidence: 
high, low) mixed factorial design with target type, distractor type and confidence as 
within subjects factors, and working memory load as a between subjects factor. 
Figure 5.1 shows the schema of the design and representative stimuli. 
 
Figure 4. 1. Illustration of the experimental procedure: In the test phase, participants 
make confidence judgements on their target recognition, upper left panel (A) 
demonstrates a very high confident (indicated by colour red) old response (indicated 
by NH\µ6¶whereas lower left panel (B) demonstrates a low confident (indicated by 




132 words and 132 pictures were used for stimuli in the Memory Stroop task. 
Pictures were single line, simple drawings in black and white and they were taken 
from (Bonin, et al., 2003; Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980)(retrieved from: 
http://leadserv.u-bourgogne.fr/bases/pictures/) and words were selected from 
ELEXICON project database (http://elexicon.wustl.edu/). The words selected by 
length (3-6 letters), only nouns and concrete words were used. They were presented 
in blue 60-point Arial font. Pictures and words were randomly paired for the memory 
test with the restriction that the picture and word should not be semantically related.  
Procedure 
After giving information and having signed the informed consent from 
participants, they were taken to a quiet room with a computer set up. The experiment 
started with a practice round which followed by 10 rounds of study and test phases 
interleaved with the working memory task. In study phase, participants were shown 
12 pictures and 12 words for 2500ms with an ISI of 500ms which were presented 
randomly intermixed for each participant. Participants were asked to memorize the 
words and pictures. They were asked to switch between two tasks during the test 
phase (see Figure 4.1). The first task was an n-back task which is widely used in the 
literature for the manipulation of working memory. In this task, participants were 
DVNHGLIWKHQXPEHURQWKHFXUUHQWWULDOZDVWKHVDPHZLWKWKHQXPEHU³Q´WULDOV
before. Two different levels (1-back/2-back) of the n-back task was used. 
Participants were instructed to presVWKHµ6¶IRUVDPHRUµ/¶IRUGLIIHUHQWNH\V
Behavioural outputs for the n-back task were reaction times and response accuracy 
(hits and correct rejections). The second task was the memory Stroop task (MST) 
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task developed by Anderson, et al., (2011). In this task, participants were required to 
make recognition (old/new) judgements to the words when displayed simultaneously 
with the pictures. Each test phase included 24 words superimposed on 24 pictures. 
Pictures and words were randomly paired and pairings were different across all 
participants. There were four conditions: new words and new pictures (6 trials), new 
words and old pictures (6 trials), old words and new pictures (6 trials) and old words 
and old pictures (6 trials). Each test block included an equal number of the four item 
types. In the test phase, participants were instructed to ignore the pictures and make 
their recognition judgements only based on the oldness of the words (did you see the 
word before in the study phase or not). Participants were also asked to make a 
decision about how confident they were about their recognition judgement by 
SUHVVLQJWKHµROG¶RUµQHZ¶NH\VIRUORQger or shorter. As they held in the keys, labels 
displayed on the screen that indicated the response options (old, new) would 
gradually change colour, specifically for their chosen option. That is, if participants 
pressed a key to indicate that the item waVQHZWKH³QHZ´ODEHOZRXOGFKDQJHLWV
colour, and the amount of change would depend on the duration of the key release. 
Participants were informed that they should show their confidence on a colour 
continuum (from green to red). Pressing the keys briefly resulted in a green colour 
that indicated low confidence, whereas holding the keys for longer (max 2500ms) 
would change the colour more towards red, which indicated high confidence. The 
inter stimulus interval (ISI) between a memory Stroop trial and an n-back trial was 
500ms and the duration of each Memory Stroop stimulus was 2500ms. The screen 
VKRZLQJWKHWHVWLWHPVZDVSUHVHQWHGXQWLOSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHRUWHUPLQDWHGDWWKH




Analysis of N-back task 
Accuracy in high WM load condition varied from 96% to 50% whereas it ranged 
from 98% to 51% in low WM load condition. The n-back performance accuracy and 
reaction times were compared between 1-back and 2 back with independent samples 
t-test. For accuracy, there was a significant difference between 2-back and 1-back, t 
(35) = 2.96, p=0.006. Participants were more accurate in the 1-back task compared to 
2-back task (2-back, M = 0.77, SD = 0.13, 1-back, M = 0.89, SD = 0.10). These 
differences between low and high WM load conditions thus confirmed that the 
manipulation of WM load had been successfully implemented and ruled out a speed-
accuracy trade-off (see Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4. 2. Means and standard deviations of accuracy (right graph) and RT (left 
graph) for High and Low WM Conditions 
For reaction times, there was a significant difference between 2-back and 1-
back, t (35) = 3.73, p=0.001, Participants were significantly slower in the 2-back task 




























221ms). These results indicate that the manipulation of WM load was successfully 
implemented. 
Analysis of Memory Stroop 
Confidence judgments were collected as continuous data (the latency of key press), 
therefore it was necessary to process the data to transform them from a continuous to 
categorical variable. First, the median confidence level per participant, per condition 
was calculated. Then, each trial was categorised as high confidence if the confidence 
was higher than the median score for the specific participant and condition and 
categorised as low confidence if the confidence was lower than the median score for 
the specific participant and condition. This was done to take into account possible 
differences in the confidence criterion across participants and resulted in equal 
number of trials contributing to high versus low confidence conditions. Next, mean 
accuracy was calculated separately for each target (old/new) and distractor (old/new) 
condition according to confidence levels (high and low) for each participant in order 
to analyse the data in a mixed measures ANOVA design, with the added between-
subjects factor of n-back group (1 and 2). Mean scores and standard deviations of 







Table 4.  1. Mean accuracy (hit and correct rejection rates) and their standard 
deviations for target type, distractor type and confidence levels for high and low WM 
load conditions. 
 Old Target New Target 










1- back 0.73(0.19) 0.73 (0.21) 0.77 (0.21) 0.86 (0.11) 
2 - back 0.71 (0.13) 0.64 (0.22) 0.84 (0.18) 0.87 (0.15) 
High 
Confidence 
1- back 0.92 (0.14) 0.91 (0.14) 0.84 (0.27) 0.93 (0.13) 
2 - back 0.93 (0.09) 0.86 (0.15) 0.92 (0.13) 0.91 (0.17) 
Note: Old target scores show hits, new target scores show correct rejections. 
Firstly, a 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distracter type: old, new) x 2 (working 
memory load: low; 1-back, high; 2-back) x 2 (confidence: high, low) mixed ANOVA 
was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant interaction between target and 
distractor. A paired samples t-test used to compare the accuracy of old distractors 
and new distractors separately for old and new target decisions. Analysis revealed 
that participants were more accurate to old targets when they were paired with old 
than new distractors (t (32) = 2.27, p=0.03), similarly participants were more 
accurate to new targets paired with new than old distractors (t (32) = 2.07, p=0.05). 
The main effect of WM load was non-significant.  
There was a significant interaction of distractor and WM. Paired samples t-
test on collapsed means for target and confidence revealed that participants were 
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more accurate to targets paired with new compared to old distractors on 1-back (t 
(21) = 1.96, p=0.06), but there was an opposite pattern in 2-back, participants were 
more accurate to targets paired with old compared to new distractors, (t (14) = 1.82, 
p=0.09). However, it should be noted that results from paired samples t-test were 
only marginally significant. Target, distractor and WM load was non-significant. 
Finally, interaction of target and confidence was significant. Paired samples 
t-test on collapsed means for distractor type and working memory load condition 
revealed that the difference between old target (M=0.71, SD=0.17) and new target 
(M=0.83, SD=0.14) was significant for low confidence judgements (t (36) = 3.23, 
p=0.003), but not for high confidence judgements (t (36) = 0.43, p=0.67; see Figure 
4.3). 
 
Figure 4. 3. Mean correct recognition responses separate for low (left) and high 
























Table 4.  2. ANOVA results for Memory Stroop recognition accuracy 
Source    
T F (1, 35) = 4.45, p = 0.042, Șp2 = 0.11* 
T X WM F (1, 35) = 1.53, p =  0.23, Șp2 = 0.42 
D F (1, 35) = 0.37, p =  0.55, Șp2 = 0.01 
D X WM F (1, 35) = 5.54, p = 0.02, Șp2 = 0.14* 
C F (1, 35) = 46.97, p < 0.001, Șp2 = 0.57** 
C X WM F (1, 35) = 0.05, p =  0.83, Șp2 = 0.001 
T X D F (1, 35) = 5.55, p = 0.02, Șp2 = 0.14* 
T X D X WM F (1, 35) =0.005, p =  0.82, Șp2 = 0.001 
T X C F (1, 35) = 18.41, p < 0.001, Șp2 = 0.35** 
T X C X WM F (1, 35) = 0.57, p =  0.46, Șp2 = 0.02 
D X C F (1, 35) = 0.12, p =  0.73, Șp2 = 0.004 
D X C X WM F (1, 35) = 0.13, p =  0.72, Șp2 = 0.004 
T X D X C F (1, 35) = 0.08, p =  0.79, Șp2 = 0.002 
T X D X C X WM F (1, 35) = 0.35, p =  0.59, Șp2 = 0.01 
T= Target, D=Distractor, C=Confidence, *p<0.05, **p<0.001 
Discussion 
The first aim of this study was to replicate the previous findings of the SR effect, and 
to make sure the SR effect could be observed even with the additional task 
requirements for participants to make confidence judgements (for the purpose of 
piloting the task for an EEG study). It was also important to determine whether the 
SR effect would be modulated by working memory load, more specifically, whether 
high WM load would create more SR, and also whether WM would influence 
confidence judgements. 
Previous findings on SR were replicated with this study (Anderson, et al., 
2011; Bergström, et al., 2016). Firstly, there was a clear congruency effect; 
participants were more accurate to old targets when they were paired with old than 
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new distractors and were more accurate to new targets when they were paired with 
new than old distractors. This finding indicates that the to-be ignored old distractors 
were unintentionally processed and biased target recognition decisions. The 
unintentional recognition signal coming from distractors combined with the 
recognition of targets and resulted in more accurate recognition when both targets 
and distractors were congruent (old-old; new-new) compared to incongruent (old-
new; new-old). Moreover, the results suggested that this SR effect was present 
UHJDUGOHVVRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQILGHQFHOHYHOVWKHVDPHSDWWHUQZDVREVHUYHG for both 
high and low confidence judgements. Instead, confidence did significantly covary 
with recognition accuracy for old targets (i.e. hit rate), which was significantly lower 
for low compared to high confidence responses. These findings indicate that 
participants may not be consciously experiencing response conflict when biased by 
distractor recognition, but rather, their target responses appear to be biased outside of 
awareness, and regardless of target memory strength.  
In this experiment, the influence of WM load on the SR effect was not 
replicated, however it is important to note that the power of the study was very low 
and may have been insufficient to determine such differences due to relatively 
smaller sample size. Furthermore, our results showed that WM load did not influence 
confidence judgements. However, we found that the WM load manipulation did have 
VRPHLQIOXHQFHRQGLVWUDFWRUSURFHVVLQJ'LVWUDFWRUVGLGQRWDIIHFWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
accuracy in the low WM load condition, whereas dividing attention with a high WM 
load task made the distractors influence recognition judgements; as reflected in more 
accurate answers to targets when they were paired with old compare to new 
distractors. This pattern is in line with (Lavie & De Fockert, 2005), who showed that 
the processing of distractor is greater under dual-task compared to single-task 
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conditions and in high WM load compared to low WM load conditions. Hence in the 
next EEG study, WM load was not manipulated but we used the more powerful high 
load (2-back task) in order to ensure that the basic SR effect would be detected.   
Experiment 4  
In Experiment 4, I used a similar design to the pilot study with the exception that all 
participants conducted the high WM load 2-back task as a secondary task, and the 
addition of EEG recordings during the Memory Stroop task to investigate further the 
neural mechanisms underlying the SR effect. The benefits of using EEG with this 
task is that it allowed me to separate the memory processes that occurred for 
distractors and targets, and also separate different stages of retrieval processing, such 
as initial memory activation from post-retrieval monitoring processes that 
participants engage to evaluate whether retrieved information is likely to be accurate 
(Higham, Luna, & Bloomfield, 2011). The latter may in fact be a particularly 
relevant process to investigate in relation to recognition confidence in the current 
paradigm, as outlined below. 
There are several studies that attempted to provide a link between retrieval 
monitoring and confidence. For example, research showed that retrieval, monitoring, 
and setting a report threshold is affected by distraction, and both the response and 
monitoring processes affect confidence levels (Goldsmith, Pansky, & Koriat, 2014). 
In one attempt to disentangle the neural correlates of retrieval success from retrieval 
monitoring, participants were asked to indicate the confidence of each of their old-
new decisions during a word recognition task (Henson, et al., 2000). Researchers 
found that the right DLPFC (a region that was hypothesised to mediate retrieval 
monitoring) showed a greater response for low than high confidence judgements. 
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Moreover, an LPN-like negativity, which is an ERP marker of retrieval monitoring 
(Johansson & Mecklinger, 2003), has been found for correct recognition judgements 
made with low confidence with widespread topography (Addante, Ranganath, & 
Yonelinas, 2012). These findings thus suggest that participants engage more retrieval 
monitoring when they make low confidence judgements compared to high 
confidence judgements.  
In addition to retrieval monitoring, confidence is also related to the accuracy 
of recognition memory decisions (Brewer & Sampaio, 2006; Busey, et al., 2000) and 
for recognition of old items, confidence seems to be related to the strength of 
memory and/or amount of information retrieved. Previous studies have found that for 
intentional recognition, high confidence is associated with enhanced positive ERPs 
for recognised old items for both FN400 and left-parietal ERP old/new effects (e.g. 
Curran, 2004). That is, the typical old>new ERP effects that have been related to 
familiarity and recollection respectively are enhanced for high compared to low 
confidence responses. This finding suggests that old items that are intentionally 
recognised with high confidence may do so because they elicit stronger familiarity 
signals and recollection of more contextual information than old items that are 
recognised with low confidence. However, no previous studies have investigated 
how unintentional recognition of distractors covaries with confidence on an 
intentional recognition task.  
Therefore, the main research question of this study was to investigate the 
neural correlates of the SR effect and how it would relate to confidence in 
recognition decisions.  The pilot study revealed no difference in the SR effect for 
recognition judgements made with high and low confidence. However, the accuracy 
of target recognition covaried with the level of confidence; old targets were 
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identified less accurately when the recognition judgement made with low 
confidence, whereas recognition of new and old targets were similar when the 
recognition judgement made with high confidence. This behavioural pattern suggests 
that confidence judgements are more related to intentional target recognition than 
unintentional distractor recognition, hence that ERP markers of unintentional 
distractor recognition (as evident in the FN400 effect for distractors) might be 
relatively similar across high and low confidence responses, but that the  ERP 
markers of target recognition (FN400 and left parietal old/new effects for targets) 
might  be reduced for low compared to high confidence responses (in line with 
previous findings, e.g. Curran, 2004). Additionally, our previous study presented in 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that participants engage retrieval monitoring processes 
whilst they make recognition judgements, as indexed by the LPN effect. Thus, we 
hypothesized that similar retrieval monitoring processes would be observed in this 
experiment and they would be more prominent for low confidence judgements 
compared to high confidence judgements. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-one right-handed, native English speakers participated (Mage =20.08 
years, SD=0.89, range 18- 40= years, 24 female and Mage =18.78 years, SD=0.67 
range 18- 20= years, 9 male). Participants received course credit or were given 
money for their participation. All participants gave written informed consent, and the 






The materials and design were similar to the pilot study with several changes 
to make the design compatible for EEG recording. (a) A fixation cross was presented 
for 500ms before each trial in both study and test phases. (b) In the test phase, 
stimuli were presented for 2000ms before requiring a response, and only after the 
end of 2000ms would a response selection become available. Participants are asked 
to delay their responses until the response selection options appeared on the screen in 
order to avoid visual and motor confounds in the EEG time-window of interest. 
After the response options appeared, a time window of 2500ms was given to make 
recognition/confidence judgements. It should be noted that such delayed responses 
were implemented only for the memory Stroop task. (c) In the previous experiment, 
the slowest responses for the n-back task never exceeded 2500ms, therefore to make 
the experiment shorter we reduced the trial duration in the n-back task from 6000ms 
to 2500ms. (d) This experiment was conducted only using the 2-back task as the 
aims of the study focused on the role of confidence rather than WM load in the SR 
effect. 
EEG Recording and Analysis 
EEG was recorded at 500 Hz with a 0.05- to 70-Hz bandwidth. The reference 
electrode was set to FCz and 64 scalp electrodes placed in an actiCAP according to 
the extended 10±20 system (Brain Products GmbH, München, Germany). Eye 
movements were measured and recorded from below the left eye (vertical EOG) and 
from the right outer canthi (horizontal EOG). Continuous EEG data from all 
channels were imported into EEGLAB and were analysed using EEGLAB (UC San 
Diego; Delorme & Makeig, 2004). The EEG was re-referenced to the average of the 
mastoids and epoched using a 200ms pre-stimulus baseline period and a 1500ms 
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post-stimulus that was time-locked to the onset of the word±picture pair in the test 
SKDVH$IWHUFRQFDWHQDWLQJHSRFKVODUJHDUWHIDFWVGXHWRVXEMHFW¶VPRWLRQIDFLDO
movements, or other sources of noise were manually deleted. Epochs were submitted 
to independent component analysis using Runica from the EEGLAB toolbox, with 
default extended-mode training parameters (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Independent 
components reflecting eye movements and other sources of noise were identified by 
visual inspection of component scalp topographies, time courses, and activation 
spectra and were discarded from the data. Corrected data were high-pass filtered 
digitally at 30 Hz. Finally, any trials that still contained artefacts after filtering 
visually inspected and were removed. Only a small percentage of trials (11%) were 
deleted in total. Final ERPs were formed for the eight conditions: old word old 
picture low confidence (mean trial numbers =28.48), old word old picture high 
confidence (mean trial numbers =28.70)  old word new picture low confidence 
(mean trial numbers =28.58), old word new picture high confidence (mean trial 
numbers =28.47), new word old picture low confidence (mean trial numbers = 
28.67), new word old picture high confidence (mean trial numbers = 27.85) and new 
word new picture low confidence (mean trial numbers =29.21), and new word new 
picture low confidence (mean trial numbers =28).  
For statistical analysis, time-windows were chosen to measure average 
amplitudes for the early and late old/new effects corresponding to familiarity and 
recollection-based processing, respectively, plus later time windows for measuring 
the LPN effect associated with retrieval monitoring. Average amplitudes were 
extracted from 300 to 500ms for the mid-frontal electrode (Fz) for the early old/new 
effect, and from 500 to 800ms for the left parietal electrode (P3) for the late old/new 
effect, in line with Bergström et al. (2016). The LPN was measured between 500 to 
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1500ms from left parieto-occipital (PO7) and right parieto-occipital (PO8) electrode 
sites using two separate time windows; 500 to 1000ms and 1000 to 1500ms. We 
included a late time window (1000 to 1500ms) different from previous research on 
the SR effect (Chapter 3 and Bergström, et al., 2016) because of two reasons. First, 
Bergström, et al. (2016) conducted a PLS analysis for 0 to 1000ms and they 
observed a sustained negativity from 500 to 1000. However, they did not test or 
specify whether the effect was prolonged. Furthermore, Herron (2007) defined two 
LPN subcomponents and they argued the 600-1900ms time window reflect 
mnemonic aspects of the task, such as search for episodic features and maintenance 
of the retrieved information. Secondly, participants were asked to withhold their 
answers until the response labels displayed (for 2000ms) therefore, this enabled us to 
investigate a longer time-window without motor response artefacts. The mean 
amplitudes for time windows were extracted and statistically analysed in IBM SPSS 
Statistics for Windows (Version 22.0, IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). 
Results 
Behaviour 
Analysis of Memory Stroop task 
For the Memory Stroop task, we analysed accuracy (hit rates and correct rejection 







Table 4.  3. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) of Accuracy for Target 
Recognition Decisions 
 









Confidence M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low 0.63 (0.15) 0.59 (0.16) 0.71 (0.16) 0.73 (0.17) 
High 0.90 (0.11) 0.87 (0.13) 0.79 (17) 0.82 (0.16) 
 
Statistical analysis of accuracy data (proportions hits and correct rejections) was 
conducted with a 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distracter type: old, new) x 2 
(confidence: high, low) within subjects ANOVA. Analysis revealed non-significant 
main effects of target and distractor types (F (1, 32) = 0.28, p=0.60; F<0.001, 
p=0.99, respectively). However, we found a significant interaction effect of target 
and distractor, (F (1, 32) = 6.69, p=0.01, Șp2=0.17). Paired samples t-tests conducted 
on collapsed means for high and low confidence measurements. Analysis revealed 
that accuracy was higher for old target and old distractor pairings compared to old 
target and new distractor pairings, (t (32) = 2.27, p=0.03), and new target and new 
distractor pairings compared to new target and old distractor pairings (t(32) = 2.07, 
p=0.05),  (see Table 4.4). In addition, a significant difference was found between the 
high and low confidence judgements, (F (1, 32) = 128.64, pȘp2=0.80). 
Participants were more accurate in their high confidence judgements compared to 
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low. The interaction of confidence and target type was found significant (F (1, 32) = 
23.33, pȘp2=0.42; see Figure 4.3). Paired samples t-tests were conducted to 
identify the nature of the interaction. Results indicated that participants were more 
accurate to old targets compared to new targets in their high confidence judgements 
(t (32) = 2.95, p=0.006), whereas, they were less accurate to old targets compared to 
new targets in their low confidence judgements (t (32) = -2.55, p=0.02). 
Table 4.  4. ANOVA results for Memory Stroop recognition accuracy 
Source    
T F (1, 32) = 0.28, p Șp2 = 0.01 
D F <0.001, p Șp2<0.001 
C F (1, 32) = 128.64, pȘp2 = 0.80 
T x D F (1, 32) = 6.69, p Șp2 = 0.17* 
T x C F (1, 32) = 23.33, pȘp2 = 0.42** 
D x C F (1, 32) =0.43, p Șp2 = 0.01 
T x D x C F (1, 32) =0.29, p Șp2 = 0.01 
T= Target, D=Distractor, C=Confidence, *p<0.05, **p<0.001 
ERPs 
Grand-averaged ERPs from the mid-frontal (Fz) and left parietal (P3) 





Figure 4. 4. Grand-average ERPs of old/new effects for targets and distractors. ERPs 
from mid-frontal (Fz, left column) and left parietal (P3, right column) sites for high 
(upper panel) and low (lower panel) confidence decisions.  
FN400- Old/New Effects 
The first analysis investigated mean amplitudes at 300-500ms at the mid-frontal site 
(Fz) that is thought to index familiarity, with a 2 (target type: old, new) x2 (distractor 
type: old, new) x2 (confidence: high, low) within subjects of ANOVA. Both old 
targets (F (1, 32) =4.74, p=0.04) and old distractors, (F (1, 32) = 4.95, p=0.03) 
elicited significantly more positive FN400 amplitudes than new targets and new 
distractors, respectively (see Figure 4.5), replicating previous findings (Chapter 3, 




Figure 4. 5. Mean Fz amplitudes between 300-500ms for the different target and 
distractor types separate for low (left) and high (right) confidence levels. 
Table 4.  5. Tests of Within-Subjects Effects on ERPs of FN400 
Source F (1, 32) p Șp2 
T 4.74 0.04* 0.13 
D 4.95 0.03* 0.13 
C 0.003 0.96 <0.001 
T * D 0.05 0.83 0.001 
T * C 0.07 0.79 0.002 
D * C 0.02 0.89 0.001 
T * D * C <0.001 0.99 <0.001 
T=Target, D= Distractor, C=Confidence, *p<0.05, **p<0.001. 
 
Parietal old/ New Effects- Late Positive Component (LPC) 
Next, I investigated mean amplitudes at 500-800ms at the left-parietal site (P3) that 
is thought to index recollection, with a 2 (target type: old, new) x2 (distractor type: 
old, new) x2 (confidence: high, low) within subjects of ANOVA. In contrast to the 
FN400, a typical increased parietal positivity for old compared with new items was 
only found for word targets, F (1, 32) = 11.18, p  Șp2=0.26, also replicating 




















significant main effect of confidence, F (1, 32) = 7.93, p Șp2=0.20, whereby 
parietal ERPs in this time-window were more positive for high compared to low 
confidence responses (see Figure 4.6.). Both the single-process and dual-process 
recognition memory models predict that the parietal old/new effect should be 
affected by confidence in recognizing old items, but they differ with respect to 
predicted effects of confidence on new items. Previous research and behavioural 
findings indicate that the recognition of old targets compared to new targets will be 
larger for high confidence than low confidence responses (Curran, 2004). Therefore, 
the target and confidence interaction had a directional hypothesis (F (1, 32) =2.59, 
p Șp2=0.08, one-tailed). Indeed, paired samples t-tests indicated that there was 
a significant difference between old and new targets when recognition decisions 
were made with high confidence (t (32) = 3.73, p= 0.001) but not with low 
confidence (t (32) = 1.79, p= 0.08). Further, analyses revealed a significant 
difference between low and high confidence judgements for old target, but not for 
new targets. LPC was more positive for high (Mhigh=2.14, SDhigh= 2.68) than low 
confidence (Mlow=1.01, SDlow= 2.30) judgements for old targets, but they were 
similar for new target (Mhigh=0.61, SDhigh= 2.74; Mlow=0.25, SDlow= 2.56). Main 
effect of distractor F (1, 32) =0.45, p Șp2=0.01, the target and distractor 
interaction, F (1, 32) =0.44, p Șp2=0.01; and the distractor and confidence 




Figure 4. 6. Mean P3 amplitudes between 500-800ms for the different target and 
distractor types separate for low (left) and high (right) confidence levels. 
Table 4.  6. Tests of Within-Subjects Effects on ERPs of LPC 
Source F (1, 32) p Șp2 
T 11.18 0.002* 0.26 
D 0.45 0.51 0.01 
C 7.93 0.008* 0.20 
T * D 0.44 0.51 0.01 
T * C 2.59 0.12 0.08 
D * C 1.88 0.18 0.06 
T * D * C 0.13 0.72 0.004 
T=Target, D= Distractor, C=Confidence, *p<0.05, **p<0.001. 
Late Parietal Negativity (PO7 and PO8) 
Grand-averaged ERPs from the left parietal (PO7) and right parietal (PO8) 





























Figure 4. 7. (A) Grand-average ERPs of old/new effects for targets and distractors. 
ERPs from left parieto-occipital (PO7, left column) and right parieto-occipital (PO8, 
right column) sites for high (upper panel) and low (lower panel) confidence 
decisions. (B) Mean P07 (left) and PO8 (right) amplitudes between 500-1000ms 
(early) and 1000-1500ms (late) for the different target and distractor types separate 
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For statistical analysis of the LPN, a 2 (hemisphere: left, right) x 2 (time 
window: 500-1000ms, 1000ms- 1500ms) x 2 (target type: old, new) x 2 (distracter 
type: old, new) x 2 (confidence level: high, low) within subjects ANOVA (see Table 
4.5. for details) was conducted. 
There was a significant hemisphere x target x confidence interaction F (1, 32) 
= 5.43, p = 0.03 and a time x hemisphere x target x confidence interaction F (1, 32) 
= 4.33, p = 0.05. Therefore, separate 2 (hemisphere: left, right) x 2 (confidence: low, 
high) x 2 (time: early, late) ANOVAs for old and new targets were conducted. A 
significant interaction of hemisphere, time and confidence was found for new targets 
(F (1, 32) = 8.04, p=0.008), but not for old targets (F (1, 32) = 0.52, p=0.48). Then, 
separate analyses were conducted for left and right hemisphere which revealed a 
significant interaction of time x confidence, F (1, 32) = 7.06 p=0.01 in left 
hemisphere, whereas the same interaction was not significant in the right 
hemisphere, F (1, 32) = 0.28, p=0.60). Finally, separate paired samples t-tests for 
high and low confidence decisions (on new targets and left hemisphere) revealed a 
significant difference between early and late time windows in high confidence 
(t(32)= 2.18, p=0.04) but not for low confidence (t(32)= 0.36, p=0.72). LPN was 
more negative in late time window compared to early time window for decisions 
made with high confidence for new targets in left hemisphere. 
In addition, distractor type interacted with confidence and time window F (1, 
32) = 4.96, p=0.03 in the omnibus ANOVA. I conducted 2 (time windows: 500-
1000ms, 1000ms- 1500ms) x 2 (confidence; high and low) repeated measures 
ANOVAs separately for old and new distractors (see Figure 4.7B). The interaction of 
time window and confidence was significant for old distractors (F (1, 32) = 14.33, 
p=0.001Șp2 =0.31), but not for new distractors (F (1, 32) = 1.10, p=0.30Șp2 
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=0.03). Further, separate paired samples t-tests were for late and early time windows 
revealed a significant difference between early and late time windows for high 
confidence judgements (t (32) = 2.95, p=0.006), but not for low confidence 
judgements (t (32) = 0.42, p=0.68). LPN was more negative in late time window 
compared to early time window for decisions made with high confidence when the 

























Table 4.  7. Tests of Within-Subjects Effects on ERPs of LPN 
 
Source F (1, 32) p Șp2 
H 0.32 0.58 0.01 
TIME 3.31 0.08 0.09 
T 1.35 0.25 0.04 
D 3.68 0.06 0.10 
C <0.001 0.99 <0.001 
H * TIME 0.08 0.78 0.003 
H * T 0.04 0.85 0.001 
TIME * T 0.43 0.52 0.01 
H * TIME * T 0.001 0.98 . <0.001 
H * D 1.03 0.32 0.03 
TIME * D 0.15 0.70 0.005 
H * TIME * D 0.88 0.36 0.03 
T * D 0.59 0.45 0.02 
H * T * D 0.05 0.83 0.001 
TIME * T * D 0.68 0.42 0.02 
H * TIME * T * D 1.23 0.28 0.04 
H * C 0.02 0.89 0.001 
TIME * C 14.79 0.001 0.32 
H * TIME * C 2.13 0.15 0.06 
T * C 0.12 0.73 0.004 
H * T * C 5.43 0.03 0.15 
TIME * T * C 0.32 0.57 0.01 
H * TIME * T * C 4.33 0.05 0.12 
D * C 1.36 0.25 0.04 
H * D * C 1.46 0.24 0.04 
TIME * D * C 4.96 0.03 0.13 
H * TIME * D * C 0.26 0.61 0.008 
T * D * C 1.51 0.23 0.05 
H * T * D * C 0.10 0.76 0.003 
TIME * T * D * C 0.006 0.94 <0.001 
H * TIME * T * D * C 0.01 0.91 <0.001 









As we conducted a pilot study, we expected to find the same results for the 
behavioural measurements. Initially, we expected to replicate the results on the SR 
effect and confidence, which we did. Firstly, target and distractor interaction 
revealed that participants were more accurate when they were responding to old 
targets paired with old distractors compared to old targets paired with new 
distractors, and new targets paired with new distractors compared to new targets 
paired with old distractors. This finding is in line with previous experiments in this 
thesis and previous research on the SR effect (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et 
al., 2016).  
Secondly, high confidence judgements were more accurate than low 
confidence judgements. This finding fits well with the single process models 
especially with the global matching model which argues that the confidence in an 
old/new memory decision is related directly from the perceived familiarity of the test 
item, and confidence is used as an index of memory strength (see Van Zandt, 2000 
for a review)$FFRUGLQJO\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQILGHQFHUDWLQJVUHODWHWRWKHGLVWDQFH
EHWZHHQWKHLWHP¶VSHUFHLYHGPHPRU\VWUHQJWKDQGWKHGHFLVLRQWKUHVKROGIRU
UHVSRQGLQJ³ROG´YHUVXV³QHZ´7KHUHIRUHLWHPVWKDWDUHUHFRJnised as old with high 
confidence have very high memory strength, and are therefore very likely to be truly 
³ROG´(Stretch & Wixted, 1998). In line with this account, research generally finds a 
positive correlation between memory accuracy and confidence (with some 
exceptions), suggesting that correct recognition judgements are related to higher 
confidence judgements (DeSoto & Roediger III, 2014; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). 
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Moreover, the main effect of confidence was qualified by a target and confidence 
interaction, since recognition decisions made with high confidence were more 
accurate for old compared to new targets, whereas decisions made with low 
confidence were similar for new compared to old targets. These results are similar to 
previous findings by Henson, et al. (2000), who also showed that the proportion of 
correct new judgements were similar for high and low confidence judgements, 
whereas a greater proportion of correct old judgements were made with high 
confidence than low confidence. This pattern suggests that recognition confidence is 
particularly related to memory strength for old items, consistent with ERP findings 
that old items that are recognised with high confidence elicit more positive ERPs 
(indicative of memory retrieval) than old items that are recognised with low 
confidence, whereas ERPs for new items are more similar regardless of confidence 
(Curran, 2004). 
Interestingly, in this experiment we also replicated the finding that the 
behavioural SR effect was not modulated by target recognition confidence, as it was 
equally present for both high and low confidence responses. Thus, consistent with 
the pilot study, behavioural findings indicate that participants may not be 
consciously experiencing response conflict when biased by distractor recognition, 
but rather, their target responses appear to be biased outside of awareness, and 
regardless of target memory strength. 
EEG Results 
First, we expected to replicate the dissociation between unintentional recognition of 
distractors and intentional recognition of targets by comparing ERP markers of 
recollection and familiarity (Bergström et al., 2016). Indeed, the ERP marker of 
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familiarity was present for both targets and distractors, as the FN400 was more 
positive for old than new targets and for old than new distractors. However, the 
parietal positivity which indexes recollection was only present for targets, since old 
targets elicited more positive ERPs across the parietal area than new targets. These 
results are in line with prior research showing a dissociation between these two ERP 
markers of recognition processes (Rugg & Curran, 2007; Wilding & Ranganath, 
2011) and supports dual process models that consider familiarity and recollection as 
functionally independent processes (see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review). More 
specifically, the results replicated previous findings on the dissociable ERP 
correlates of unintentional recognition of distractors versus intentional recognition of 
targets (Bergström, et al., 2016).  
There was also no evidence from ERPs that recognition of distractors was 
UHODWHGWRSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQILGHQFHLQWKHLUWDUJHWUHFRJQLWLRQMXGJHPHQWVDVWKH
FN400 was not different for high and low confidence judgements. In contrast, later 
left parietal ERPs were more positive for high confidence judgements compared to 
low confidence judgements, converging with the behavioural results to suggest that 
confidence is more related to recognition processes engaged during intentional 
recognition rather than those elicited by unintentional recognition. Hence, the ERP 
results also suggest that the biasing influence of distractors does not relate to 
participants subjective experience of response conflict and may therefore be 
occurring outside of awareness. 
Further, retrieval monitoring processing indexed by LPN was also explored 
as a function of confidence judgements, which revealed three important results 
concerning the LPN. Firstly, LPN was more negative in the late than early time-
window for high confidence decisions. This indicates that retrieval monitoring was 
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engaged more between 1000ms and 1500ms than 500 to 1000ms for in high 
confidence decisions, whereas there was no difference in early and late time 
windows for low confidence judgements, suggesting that low confidence judgements 
elicited retrieval monitoring in a more sustained manner. Second, the LPN was more 
negative across the left parieto-occipital location and in the late time-window for 
high confidence decisions to new targets. Herron (2007) argued that some aspects of 
the LPN are not related to response monitoring but rather are related to a search for 
episodic features and maintenance of the retrieved information. Thus, in the current 
study, the LPN for high confidence old targets may be due to maintenance of 
retrieved information rather than retrieval/response monitoring (see also Curran, et 
al., 2007; de Chastelaine, Friedman, & Cycowicz, 2007; Herron, 2007; Johansson & 
Mecklinger, 2003; Mecklinger, 2000). Third, in line with previous findings (Chapter 
3 and Bergström et al., 2016), old distractors elicited a larger LPN than new 
distractors, but a novel finding was that this distractor-related LPN was more 
pronounced in the late compared to early time window for high confidence 
judgements. This finding is especially important as it suggests that unintentional 
recognition of distractors elicited enhanced retrieval monitoring when the 
judgements were made with high confidence, which is the opposite of what we 
predicted. One possible explanation for this pattern could be formed by considering 
the ERP results all together. Recollected old targets (only old targets elicited a 
parietal old/new effect) lead to higher confidence judgements (the parietal positivity 
was larger for high than low confidence), however, in this situation familiarity to old 
distractors (indexed by FN400), lead participants to engage in more retrieval 
monitoring as it required them to evaluate and monitor signals arising from two 
different stimuli. In contrast, for low confident responses old stimuli were associated 
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with less recollection, and thus the total amount of information to monitor was lower 
for these trials than the high confidence trials.  
Conclusions 
Two experiments presented above aimed to determine the behavioural and neural 
correlates of spontaneous recognition in relation to high and low confidence 
intentional recognition judgements. The main finding of this research is that 
judgement confidence does not seem to be related to the influence of unintentional 
recognition of distractors on target recognition. Both behavioural results from two 
experiments and the ERP results support that assessment. Therefore, this research 
showed that participants¶ subjective experience of recognition confidence was solely 
related to target decisions, not to distractor processing, suggesting that distractors 
biased participants¶ responses outside of awareness and regardless of target memory 
strength. Another novel finding of this research was to show that retrieval 
monitoring was engaged for the high confidence recognition decisions when those 




Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
This thesis investigated the distractor bias on intentional target recognition created 
by unintentional recognition of to-be ignored information that aimed to explore the 
SR effect under conditions of working memory load, and subjective confidence 
levels. The first chapter provided a general review of the related concepts such as 
recognition memory, working memory and confidence judgements all of which were 
of interest in this thesis. Previous research on SR has consistently shown that 
unintentional recognition of distractor biases target recognition especially when 
attentional resources are depleted with a secondary task (Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993) 
and that the SR effect originated from the dissociable intentional and unintentional 
neural processes (Bergström et al., 2016). In addition, recognition accuracy 
deteriorates with the influence of distractor bias in older adults, whereas young 
adults show this bias only when the secondary task demands substantial amount of 
attention (Anderson et al., 2011). 
The first research used the memory Stroop task to investigate the role of 
dividing attention on the SR effect (Anderson et al., 2011). Specifically, experiment 
2 compared the SR effect of young adults in divided and full attention conditions. 
Half of the participants engaged in a secondary task whereas the other half did not 
attend to a secondary task at all. Yet, the secondary task they used required WM 
resources as participants had to maintain the several digits and their respective order. 
Similarly, (Bergström, et al., 2016), used a secondary task that demanded subvocal 
rehearsal of a string of digits and required responding to a related probe digit that 
uses WM to maintain and recall a particular piece of information from the rehearsed 
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string of digits. Still, the researchers failed to test how WM load would modulate the 
SR effect. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence validating that working 
memory is involved in distractor processing and that it employs several functions 
such as attentional control (Berti & Schröger, 2003) and proactive control (Braver, 
2012) to avoid unwanted distractor biases. Therefore, the role of WM on SR effect 
remains unanswered in the literature. Initially, this thesis aimed to explore the role of 
WM on SR effect and fill the gap in the literature. In doing so, in contrast to the 
Anderson et al. (2011) study participants across the herein presented studies, were 
constantly engaged in a WM task with different WM load conditions (either low or 
high). 
The purpose of Chapter 2 was to address the involvement of working 
memory via manipulating the load on the secondary task. The design aimed to 
provide a wider understanding of the process underlining SR and whether or not 
other memory processes are involved in the distractor effect. Experiment 1 aimed to 
replicate the previous results on the SR effect with a similar methodological 
approach to (Anderson, et al., 2011). The memory Stroop task was used to measure 
distractor effect which was indicated by the difference of target recognition accuracy 
in the presence of previously studied and not studied distractor items. The results of 
the experiments reported in Chapter 2 indicated reduced target accuracy when the 
target and the distractor were congruent (old-old or new-new) compared to 
incongruent (old-new or new-old). These findings converge with the previous 
research (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et al., 2016). Additionally, experiments 
presented in Chapter 2 measured and compared recognition accuracy under the 
divided attention conditions with high and low working memory load. The distractor 
effect was observed when the attention was divided with a secondary task that 
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heavily demanded working memory resources. By contrast, the SR effect was absent 
when the secondary task was less demanding. Importantly, the difference in the 
presence of the SR effect when the secondary task was low WM load compared to 
high WM load highlights that attentional processes cannot fully explain the causes of 
the SR effect. The influence of the secondary WM task was not limited to the WM 
load. Interestingly, the findings also indicated that the congruency in the n-back task 
(match-mismatch trials) can influence the SR effect; unintentional recognition of 
distractors biased target recognition in match trials but not in mismatch trials. This 
difference in SR effect suggests that there might be overlapping recognition 
processes in n-back task and memory Stroop task. The results indicated that the SR 
effect was more likely to be observed when the previous secondary task trial 
required a match response, this was especially observed in high episodic memory 
load. This finding can be explained by the involvement of the n-back task with 
recognition memory as well as working memory as suggested in previous research 
(Jaeggi, et al., 2010). In the n-back task, decisions would be made by comparing 
current and n-back trial, in the case of a match situation, familiarity would help the 
decision. Familiarity encourages a match response whereas a mismatch trial does not 
have the advantage of the familiarity. As such, automatic familiarity to match trials 
and the distractor bias in the memory Stroop task possibly compete for the resources 
of unintentional recognition. Moreover, the congruency of n-back trials did not 
interact with WM load, suggesting that the different working memory processes such 
as maintenance and shifting did not influence congruency of n-back task. This 
suggests that the SR effect is mainly influenced by the recognition processes 
underlying the n-back task.  
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Furthermore, sequential dependencies of SR effect were explored with the 
data of experiment 1. The findings were especially informative since this has not yet 
been reported before. Main findings on sequential dependencies revealed that 
previous targets and distractor pairs altered how the SR effect would occur. If the 
previous pair was an incongruent pair (old target- new distractor), then SR effect was 
more likely to occur. This suggests that there is a lingering influence of unintentional 
recognition as well as an immediate distractor bias.  
Finally, experiment 2 investigated the influence of emotional working 
memory on SR effect. Specifically, the stimuli in the secondary WM task were 
replaced with emotional (positive and negative) and non-emotional realistic, 
colourful pictures from IAPS. The aim of doing this was (a) to explore the influence 
of emotions on the SR effect, and (b) to use emotional stimuli to manipulate the 
attention allocated for the secondary task. The results showed that when the 
secondary task contained negative emotional stimuli, only target recognition was 
affected. SR effect remained unaffected in all emotional conditions suggesting that 
emotions do not influence attention and/or resources allocated to avoid the 
unintentional recognition of the distractors. This finding compliments the results of 
(Bergström, et al., 2016) where emotional pictures were used as distractors. The 
authors failed to find any differences between emotional conditions therefore they 
combined all the emotional conditions. This was also replicated in experiment 3 of 
chapter 3 as we used the same stimuli and could not find an influence of emotion on 
SR effect.  
Considered together, the findings from Chapter 2 reflect a high replicability 
of SR effect in young adults. The results also have shown that in order to avoid the 
unwanted SR effect WM resources are needed. The SR effect does not only rely on 
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attentional resources but also WM. These two main findings contribute to the 
literature by establishing the influence of unintentional recognition on intentional 
recognition. As a novel contribution, Chapter 2 demonstrated that the influence of 
unintentional recognition is not limited to the current conflict, but also depends on 
previous task conflict (sequential dependencies) and the concurrent recognition (n-
back congruency). 
Chapter 3 sought to address the neural processes underlying the distractor 
effect when the secondary task included high and low working memory load 
conditions. The main aim was to replicate the results of (Bergström, et al., 2016), 
and extend their results by investigating the neural correlates of the influence of WM 
load on the SR effect. In addition, chapter 3 investigated the distractor effect using 
the same methodology used by (Bergström, et al., 2016). Behavioural results showed 
that participants were more likely to claim to recognise old targets paired with 
previously seen distractors compared to not-seen distractors. However, this response 
bias was equivalent irrespective of the working memory load. Moreover, the findings 
on the neural processes underlying the SR effect were replicated (Bergström, et al., 
2016). Both targets and distractors elicited familiarity-related ERPs, whereas only 
target recognition elicited the ERP marker of conscious recollection. The results on 
ERPs are in line with the previous research supporting the view that familiarity and 
recollection are dissociable recognition processes (Rugg & Curran, 2007). The novel 
finding of experiment 3 was related to the early effect of the working memory load 
on the FN400 familiarity effect. As research has shown that prefrontal areas are 
recruited during WM processes, it is arguable that the difference found in the FN400 
for high and low WM conditions are due to an overlap between recognition and 
WM. Extending the findings on LPN related to SR effect, the results also 
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demonstrated that old distractors elicited more retrieval monitoring, suggesting a 
detection of the conflict.  
The four experiments presented in Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that the 
influence of WM on SR effect can be observed both behaviourally and neurally. 
Findings from experiment 3 indicate that the SR effect stems from the familiarity to 
distractors. Although participants are instructed not to pay any attention to the 
distractors, they continued to process them along with the target information. Next, 
the unintentional familiarity (presence of previously seen distractor) made 
SDUWLFLSDQWVPRUHOLNHO\WRUHVSRQGµROG¶forming the SR effect. In an attempt to 
resist distractor bias, proactive control might have been engaged during the early 
stages of recognition to avoid distractor bias. However, given that depleted WM 
resources do not allow proactive control to be fully functional, the SR effect was 
only seen when participants were engaged in a secondary task with a high WM load. 
Additionally, retrieval monitoring indexed by LPN found for old distractors, also 
suggests a reactive control driven by the conflict. 
In Chapter 2, results from experiment 1 showed the modulatory effect of WM 
RQ65HIIHFW+RZHYHU:0GLGQ¶WDIIHFWGLVWUDFWRUprocessing in experiment 3. 
Superficially, it seems that the influence of the WM could not be replicated in 
experiment 3. A direct comparison of the experiments was not possible because of 
the differences in the designs, yet several reasons could be suggested which may 
explain such differences. First, the secondary task used for experiment 1 was 
different than experiment 3. Although both secondary tasks were established as tasks 
that tap into WM processes, they might rely on slightly different processes. Second, 
the n-back task used in experiment 1 was interleaved with the memory Stroop task 
and therefore functioned in a more sustained manner, on the other hand, the WM 
156 
 
task from experiment 3 required participants to rehearse a string of numbers and may 
be more prone to decay in the course of time (participants rehearsed strings from 4 to 
6 trials that are randomly determined). Third, the low load condition of the WM task 
used in experiment 3 required no rehearsal, engaging almost no WM. Therefore, it is 
fair to say that the low load conditions from different WM tasks were hardly 
comparable. Across all experiments pictures were used as distractors and the words 
were used as targets. On the other hand, simple black and white drawings were used 
as distractors in Experiment 1, but colourful emotional photographs were used as 
distractors in experiment 3. Although, the emotional stimuli did not influence the SR 
effect, it may have created an attentional advantage because of their salience. The 
photographs used in experiment 4 may have been too salient so that the participants 
FRXOGQ¶WZLWKGUDZWKHLUDWWHQWLRQIURPWKHPGHVSLWHWRWKHFRQFXUUHQW:0WDVN$
similar effect was reported in earlier studies on the SR effect. The SR effect was only 
observed when the targets were words and distractors were pictures, but not vice 
versa (Anderson, et al., 2011; Bergström, et al., 2016). The authors suggested that 
this might stem from the differences in the saliency of targets and distractors. A 
salient distractor would more likely to be perceptually processed and therefore attract 
more attention compared to a non-salient distractor.  
Following this, the focus of the thesis moved from investigating the role of 
WM on SR effect to exploring the consciousness in the distractor bias. The aim of 
Chapter 4 was to address the influence of subjective confidence across two 
experiments. Those two experiments sought to answer the question: are people aware 
of the interference created by distractors. To investigate this, experiment 4 compared 
high and low confidence decisions across different target and distractor pairs and 
using ERP measures. Overall,  experiment 4 revealed three important results. A late 
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posterior negativity, which may be related to post-retrieval response monitoring 
(Johansson & Mecklinger, 2003), was modulated by high confidence judgements, 
although LPN for low confidence judgements was sustained from 500 to 1500ms. 
The novel finding of experiment 4 was that LPN was more pronounced for new 
targets in the late compared to early time window for high confidence judgements. 
Moreover, old distractors elicited more negative LPN which suggests that 
unintentional recognition of distractors produced enhanced retrieval monitoring 
when the judgements were made with high confidence. However, the SR effect did 
QRWVKRZDQ\UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VXEMHFWLYHH[SHULHQFHRIFRQILGHQFHIRU
their target recognition judgements. However, experiment 4 failed to replicate the 
findings from experiment 3 on the LPN differences for target, distractor type and the 
interaction of target and distractor. The possible explanation might be the type of 
response requirements between experiments. In experiment 4 participants were asked 
to respond on their confidence judgements 2000ms after the presentation of the 
word-picture pair. This type of response was absent in experiment 3 as it did not 
include confidence judgements with the recognition response.  
Considered together, the findings in this thesis reflect that the processing of 
the distractors results in unintentional recognition which then influences the 
intentional recognition of targets. This effect was particularly observed when the 
working memory was loaded, and previously encountered with a conflict. 
Furthermore, emotions do not seem to enhance or deteriorate the SR effect, as well 





Interpretation of the findings across studies 
One consistent finding throughout the reported experiments was that the SR 
effect can be replicated with various stimuli and different secondary tasks that taps 
onto WM resources. Overall, three main methodological differences were presented 
in this thesis. First, except from experiment 3, all experiments contained black and 
white drawings as distractors in memory Stroop task. Experiment 3 was a close 
replication of Bergström et al. (2016), so the distractor stimuli were the emotional 
and non-emotional coloured photographs. Second, experiment 4 required participants 
to evaluate their confidence judgements. Third, experiment 2 used emotional and 
non-emotional coloured photographs in WM task as opposed to digits that were used 
in all other experiments. Nevertheless, SR effect was observed and replicated 
consistently in all experiments.  
This thesis explored the modulators of SR effect with various constructs including 
WM, emotions and confidence levels and sequential dependencies of previous trials 
as well as the match and mismatch responses given to the n-back task. Chapter 2 
found that concurrent high working memory load manipulated by n-back task 
enabled the SR effect to break through. In contrast, with a different working memory 
manipulation (chapter 3) SR effect was similar for both high and low WM loads. 
Differences in the saliency of distractor stimuli was suggested to account for such 
differences however future research should attempt to experimentally manipulate the 
distractor salience in order for its effects to be clarified. 
Working memory effect was clearly illustrated in Experiment 1. However, 
experiment 3 and pilot study of the experiment 4 did not reveal any working memory 
influence on behavioural measurements. Several reasons might influence the results. 
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First, there were several differences in stimuli between experiment 1 and pilot of 
experiment 4 as highlighted above. Second, asking participants to evaluate their 
confidence levels might create an additional WM load. Confidence judgements are 
FRPPRQO\XVHGIRUGHWHUPLQLQJDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQUHWULHYHG
from memory is accurate and it is assumed that confidence reflects memory strength, 
especially in studies that use signal detection theory and receiver-operating 
characteristics (ROC) (Yonelinas, 1994). However, making a confidence judgement 
also involves other cognitive processes. One should make a decision and compare 
the decision with the criterion and monitor the retrieval of the final response. 
Retrieval attempt must be evaluated in order to select an appropriate response, as in 
tests of source memory (Henson, Shallice, & Dolan, 1999; Rugg et al., 2003; 
Wilding, 1999; Wilding and Rugg, 1996, Wilding and Rugg, 1997a) or when the 
information derived from a retrieval attempt is impoverished, leading to uncertainty 
whether retrieval has been successful (Henson et al., 2000; Henson, Rugg, Shallice, 
Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Rugg et al., 2000, Rugg et al., 2002, Ullsperger et al., 
2000). As such, Chua et al. (2006) found greater activation of medial and lateral 
parietal during confidence assessment compared to recognition, suggesting that these 
regions may play a specific role in the process of post-retrieval memory monitoring. 
Further, Henson et al (2000) found greater activation of right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex for low than high confidence judgements related to episodic retrieval reflects 
the degree of retrieval monitoring. 
Another important finding regarding WM sub-systems could be discussed by 
comparing experiments 1 and 2 LQWKHIUDPHRI%DGGHOH\¶VPXOWLFRPSRQHQW:0
model. Experiment 1 used a WM task including digits that employed phonological 
loop whereas experiment 2 used a WM task including pictures that employs visuo-
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spatial sketchpad sub-system. Stimuli from WM task was shared with target stimuli 
in experiment 1 in contrast, it was shared with distractor stimuli in experiment 2. 
Nevertheless, secondary task (specifically 2-back task) divided attention to reveal SR 
effect in both experiments.  
The aim of this thesis was not to test recognition models however the results have 
been interpreted in the context of dual process of recognition memory models. 
Especially, ERP findings indicated two distinct recognition processes involved in 
target and distractor recognition. $FFRUGLQJO\7XOYLQJ¶VPRGHOSRVWXODWHV
recognition responses involve auto-noetic awareness (remember/recollection) or 
noetic awareness (know/familiarity) or a combination of both; ERPs (experiment 3) 
indicated that target recognition triggered recollection and familiarity whereas 
distractor recognition triggered only familiarity. This further illustrates the automatic 
nature of unintentional distractor processing (Jacoby, 1993). This can also be linked 
with the results on experiment 4 where target recognition was found to be related 
with confidence judgements; accuracy in old target recognition was higher than new 
target recognition for high confidence judgements qualified by more positive LPC-
recollection index on ERPs.  
In memory Stroop task, the idea of the distraction effect stems from stimulus driven 
bottom-up processes. Salient distractor items attract the attention and enabled 
automatic memory search for the distractors as well as target items regardless from 
WM load (experiment 3). Therefore, memory signals coming from distractor items 
(as indexed by ERPs) biased the memory signals for target items. Further, Soto et al. 
(2005) argued that active maintenance of an irrelevant item in WM can elicit a bias 
to deploy attention, top-down effect can also occur in early onset. The results of 
experiment 3 in this thesis (the difference of FN400 in high and low WM load 
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conditions) highlighted possible top-down influence of distraction which supports 
proactive account of dual mechanisms of cognitive control theory (Braver, 2012).  
Limitations 
Broad research on WM, attention and distraction has shown that the SR effect should 
be modulated by the latter factors. However, the work presented in this thesis did not 
address the influence of the WM sub-processes, focus of attention and the saliency of 
the distractors may have on the SR effect. Nevertheless, future research should 
include investigations on these constructs. For example, research showed that the SR 
effect only emerges when targets were words and distractors were pictures but not 
vice versa. Researchers argued that salient picture distractors may have been more 
likely to elicit unintentional recognition than words because they are more likely to 
attract attention. Alternatively, in Bergström (2016) et al. suggested that the 
secondary verbal WM task they used may have interfered more with their word 
processing than their picture processing. Similarly, in experiment 3 (see chapter 3). I 
found the SR effect even in low load condition suggesting that highly salient pictures 
alone (detailed, colourful and emotional) can be a strong trigger of unintentional 
recognition. 
Experiment 1 (chapter 2) was a close replication of Anderson et al.¶VVWXG\
However, in our examination new factors were introduced including episodic load 
and congruity lead to more complicated analysis (a 5-way ANOVA) which reduced 
the statistical power. For example, the added congruity factor was tested as a within 
subjects factor which greatly reduced the amount of trials per condition. Increasing 
the amount of trials could potentially account for a higher statistical power. 
However, this would require longer testing times, leading participants to feel 
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fatigued towards the end of the experimental session. An alternative solution would 
have been to increase the sample size that would generate higher statistical power.   
Targeted analysis was used to investigate recollection and familiarity using EEG. 
Although a substantial amount of research has shown that specific electrodes reflect 
recollection and familiarity, other cognitive processes that are related to the SR 
effect might have been overlooked. To account for this, Bergström et al. (2016) used 
partial least squares (PLS) analysis which correlates electrical activity in all 
electrodes and provides information on distributed patterns of spatial and temporal 
dependencies in the ERP data with minimal assumptions regarding the timing and 
distribution of potential effects. Targeted analysis conducted on ERPs limited the 
exploration of the SR effect in this thesis. Future research, should attempt to use PLS 
analysis to explore the neural activity underlining the SR effect. 
Implications and future directions 
The experiments reported in this thesis investigated the role of working memory on 
the occurrence of the SR effect. The first experiment demonstrated that concurrent 
task with a high working memory load increased the likelihood of the SR effect. This 
finding is in line with the load theory of selective attention and cognitive control that 
put forward by (Lavie, et al., 2004). According to Lavie and colleagues (2004) with 
high perceptual load, the distractor interference is expected to be reduced and with 
increasing cognitive load the distractor interference is expected to be increased. 
Experiments reported in this thesis consistently used a cognitive load and low 
perceptual load, as the memory Stroop task included only one target and one 
distractor stimulus. In the situations of low perceptual load, distractors may still be 
perceived. The cognitive control would ensure that focus is on goal-related stimuli. 
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Hence, findings on the role of WM load on the SR effect can be explained on the 
basis of the load theory of selective attention and cognitive control. Future 
investigations on the SR effect might be extended by testing the predictions of this 
theory on perceptual load. In turn, a distinction between the two mechanisms of 
selective attention could be made for SR effect. It could be predicted that the high 
perceptual load on the memory Stroop task might reduce the distractor processing 
and may produce SR effect despite the concurrent working memory load. At the 
same time, the early and late selection mechanisms may compete as the cognitive 
load and the perceptual load increased. 
This thesis examined the role of WM on the SR effect with the lack of 
thorough investigation on the role of specific working memory sub-systems. It has 
been found (experiment 1) that the contribution of the WM on SR effect is related to 
the shifting, maintenance and updating sub-processes of working memory as 2-back 
task required these specific processes. More specifically, different type of tasks that 
measures or manipulates specific WM sub-processes might be employed as a 
secondary task. Furthermore, the findings showed that the SR effect occurred only 
after the match trials of the concurrent n-back task. In chapter 2, it has been argued 
that this might stem from the recognition used by the n-back task, still more research 
is needed for confirmation. Moreover, response congruency might be another factor 
that influences the SR effect. However, the insufficient amount of trials refrained the 
research to further explore the data on this issue. This might be addressed in the 
future research. 
The differences in findings of WM load across studies suggest that the SR effect can 
be influenced by task used to divide attention and manipulate the WM load. This 
suggests that the occurrence of the SR effect is very sensitive to the nature of the 
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secondary task. Further, working memory is a cognitive construct which relies on 
several cognitive sub-processes at the same time. WM measures and manipulation 
varies widely in the literature and each task taps onto different sub-processes. 
Therefore, the WM manipulation might have different results with different tasks. 
This thesis did not focus on the influence of sub-processes of the WM on the SR 
effect thoroughly. Thus, future research investigating different sub-processes would 
contribute in the understanding the influence of WM on the SR effect.  
Furthermore, individual differences in attention regulation and working memory 
capacity (WMC) could potentially influence the SR effect. Especially, WMC has 
been linked to successful avoidance from distraction (Conway, et al., 2001). As an 
alternative to WM load manipulation, it is also possible to investigate the individual 
differences in WMC. This would be more informative on the general picture of the 
SR effect, since the WMC measurements (complex span tasks) are argued to 
measure WM more extensively especially compared to single span tasks (e.g. n-back 
task). WMC is defined by Kane and Engle (2002) as the capability of the executive-
attention (maintenance of memory representations actively in the state of 
interference, which are reflected with action plans, goals and task-relevant stimuli) 
component of the WM system. Individual differences in the executive attention may 
also reflect in the capacity to prevent the diversion of focus from the distractors. For 
example, low WM span individuals are found to be more susceptible to interference 
than high WM span individuals (Conway & Engle, 1994; Conway, et al., 2005; Kane 
& Engle, 2002). Limited executive attentional ability in low spans lead them to rely 
more on automatic responses whereas high spans rely more on attentional 
processing. If that is the case SR effect would be larger for low span individuals 
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compared to high span individuals since SR effect stems from familiarity to 
distractors which is thought to be an automatic process. 
Finally, the role of retrieval processes indexed by the LPN need to be investigated in 
terms of time windows and the hemispheric location to further understand the SR 
effect. The experiments conducted in this thesis employed ERPs and revealed that 
participants probably monitored their retrieval after a detection of an old distractor. 
This was enhanced more when the new targets were paired with the old distractors.  
Experiment 3 and 4 showed intentional recognition of targets and unintentional 
recognition of distractors can be dissociated with ERP measures. Although, the 
effect of WM on neural processes was not clear the results indicated that targets 
trigger recollection and familiarity related ERPs whilst distractors trigger only 
familiarity ERPs. This replicated Bergström et al. (2016) findings on ERPs, 
suggesting the recognition of targets and distractors in the memory Stroop paradigm 
is a reliable neural measure of SR effect. In forensic settings, discrimination of 
unintentional recognition of peripheral stimuli (distractors in memory Stroop 
context) from target recognition even without an accurate response, could have been 
useful in the search of the criminal evidence.  
Distraction has been related to negative experiences, however, the distraction in SR 
effect is somewhat different than those on flanker tasks and negative priming 
research. General influence of SR is that the oldness (old or new) of distractor 
HQFRXUDJHSDUWLFLSDQWVWRHQGRUVHWKHWDUJHWLWHPDVµROG¶ RUµQHZ¶,QWKHFDVHRIold 
target, recognition receives a boost from old distractors and leads to a correct 
recognition judgement. For new targets, new distractors create the same effect. 
Furthermore, in educational settings, identifying the influence of unintentional 
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recognition on intentional recognition could have been used to develop more 
successful measurements of acquired knowledge. However, further research is 
required to make such claims. 
Conclusion 
This thesis explored the influence of the unintentional recognition of distractors on 
intentional recognition of targets. More specifically, the comparison of the influence 
of the seen or not-seen distractors on the recognition of old and new targets has been 
made and the difference is termed the SR effect. Previous research showed that 
dividing attention increased the likelihood of observing SR effect (Anderson, et al., 
2011; Ste-Marie & Jacoby, 1993) and this stems from the familiarity to distractors 
(Bergström, et al., 2016). This thesis focused on the replication and the extension of 
the previous research to establish the SR effect. In addition to the replication, the 
results of the experiments (experiments 1 and 2) demonstrated the involvement of 
WM possibly by employing proactive control at the early stages of the recognition 
(experiment 3). Furthermore, conscious awareness of the unintentional recognition 
has been questioned by employing subjective confidence levels and revealed that the 
confidence judgements only affect intentional target decisions (experiment 4). Thus, 
the unintentional recognition does not go unnoticed by the cognitive system as it 
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